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ABSTRACT

The Impact of Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment on the Provision of
Hospital Uncompensated Care and Quality of Care
by Hui-Min Hsieh, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctoral of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond Virginia, May 2010
Director: Gloria J. Bazzoli, Ph.D.
Bon Secours Professor, Department of Health Administration

Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment is one of the major
funds supporting health care providers as they treat low-income patients. However,
Medicaid DSH payments have been targeted for major budget cuts in many health policy
reforms. This study examines the association between the changes in Medicaid DSH
payments resulting from the BBA policy changes and hospital outcomes, in terms of
hospital provision of uncompensated care and quality of care.
Economic theory of non-profit hospital behavior is used as a conceptual
framework, and longitudinal data for California short-term, non-federal general acute
care hospitals for 1996-2003 are examined. California was especially affected by DSH
changes because it is one of the states with highly concentrated DSH payments and high
uninsured rate. Economic theory suggests that hospitals would change their
uncompensated care provision as well as quality of care when confronted with a

reduction in public payments. Hospital uncompensated care costs and percent of
operating costs devoted to uncompensated care are used to measure the provision of
hospital uncompensated care. Six AHRQ’s Patient safety indicators (PSIs) and one
composite measure are selected to measure hospital quality of care provided for Medicaid
and uninsured patients as well as privately insured patients. The key independent variable
is Medicaid DSH payments received by individual hospitals. This study also includes
control variables such as other governmental financial subsidies, market characteristics,
and hospital characteristics.
The primary data sources include the detailed hospital annual financial data and
Medicaid annual report data at the county level from California Office of Statewide
Health Planning and Development, Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) state
inpatient data (SID), American Hospital Association Annual Survey, Area Resource File,
Interstudy HMO Data and Medicare cost report data.
After controlling for different factors, the study findings suggest that not-forprofit hospitals may reduce their provision of uncompensated care in response to
reductions of Medicaid DSH payments. The results, however, do not support the
hypotheses that for-profit hospitals may reduce uncompensated care by a smaller degree
than not-for-profit hospitals for a comparable DSH decline. With respect to quality of
care model, the overall study findings do not strongly support there is an association
between net Medicaid DSH payments and patient adverse events for both
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Specific Aims
A growing number of individuals in the U.S. do not have health insurance. Census
Bureau data indicate the number of uninsured increased dramatically from 31 million in
1987 to 45.7 million in 2007. In the U.S. health system, the uninsured often rely on
hospitals to provide charity care, or more broadly defined uncompensated care (Bazzoli,
Lindrooth, Kang, & Hasnain-Wynia, 2006; Davidoff, LoSasso, Bazzoli, & Zuckerman,
2000; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007; Mann, Melnick, Bamezai, & Zwanziger, 1997). One
study estimated the overall amount of hospital uncompensated care costs was about 23.6
billion in 2001 (Hadley & Holahan, 2003). In order to offset the burden from this type of
care, hospitals need to get various types of public and private financial support from
federal, state, local governments or private philanthropy (Fishman & Bentley, 1997;
Hadley, Cravens, Coughlin, & Holahan, 2005; Hadley & Holahan, 2003).
The Federal and State Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment
is one of the major funding sources for uncompensated care, accounting for
approximately 7.8% of total Medicaid expenditures in 1997.1 It supported about 36%

1

The percentage of inpatient hospital Medicaid DSH to total Medicaid expenditures decreased
after 1997 Balanced Budget Act. In 1997, the percentage was about 7.8%. In 2000, it became 5.9%. In
2005, it was about 4.5%. In the Obama health reform plan, from 2010 to 2019, cutting Medicare and
Medicaid DSH budget is one of the major ways planned from financing health reform.
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/healthreform_tri_full.pdf
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of total uncompensated care costs for hospitals in 2001 (Fagnani, Tolbert, & Fund, 1999;
Fishman & Bentley, 1997; Hadley et al., 2005; Hadley & Holahan, 2003; Lo Sasso &
Seamster, 2007). In the early 1990s, Medicaid DSH payments expanded rapidly.
Medicaid DSH spending grew from less than $1 billion in 1990 to more than $ 17 billion
in 1992. In order to limit this dramatic growth, Congress implemented two major reforms
to cap the amount of DSH spending by limiting the source of state matching funds and
also by limiting DSH payments for individual hospitals, requiring hospitals that received
Medicaid DSH have at least one percent of their patients covered by Medicaid (Wynn,
Coughlin, Bondarenko, & Bruen, 2002). One reform bill was the Medicaid Voluntary
Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991, which became effective in
federal Fiscal Year 1993 and the other was Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(OBRA`93), which became effective in 1995.
In 1997, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) further limited Medicaid DSH payments
by reducing state specific federal allotments2 by $10.4 billion over the 1998 and 2002
period (CBO, 1997). These substantial DSH reductions constituted the major sources of
federal Medicaid savings, specifically accounting for 61 percent of total Medicaid gross
savings over five years. After the BBA, Congress passed the Balanced Budget
Refinement Act (BBRA) in 1999. This law eliminated the BBA DSH cuts for Federal
Fiscal Year (FFY) 2001 and FFY 2002 and also provided relief by setting 2001 statespecific allotments at 2000 levels adjusted for inflation and setting 2002 allotments at

2

State specific DSH allotment, also called DSH payment limit or DSH funding cap, is a specified
amount of DSH payment adjustment for each state for each Federal fiscal year (FFY) (Federal Register,
62(178), pp.2).
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2001 levels adjusted for inflation. However, the Benefit and Improvement Protection Act
(BIPA) of 2000 let the full BBA DSH reductions become effective in FFY 2003
(Mechanic, 2004).
In the U.S. health care reform debates of 2009 and 2010, one of the approaches
that Congress and the Obama administration proposed for financing expanded health care
coverage was to redirect of funds currently used to support safety net hospitals so that
subsidies could be provided for individual’s purchasing health insurance. Medicaid DSH
payment is one of the major sources of funds that would be redirected for these purposes.
Most existing empirical studies have examined the effects of Medicaid DSH
payments, which increased dramatically during the 1990s, on hospital uncompensted care
provisions as well as patient quality of care. Very few studies examined the impact the
reduction of Medicaid DSH payment resulting from the BBA policy at the hospital level.
This study examines the association between the changes in Medicaid DSH payments
resulting from the BBA policy changes and hospital outcomes, in terms of hospital
provision of uncompensated care and quality of care. Through this study, we will gain a
better understanding of past health policies as well as a better ability to anticipate the
impact of future policies.
Conceptual Framework
A primary concern of this study is whether the reduction of Medicaid
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment affected the provision of hospital
uncompensated care and quality of care for Medicaid and uninsured patients. The
underlying conceptual framework in this study derives from the Newhouse (1970)
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economic theory of not-for-profit hospital behavior and theoretical extensions from
Hoerger (1991), Frank and Salkever (1991) and other researchers. Specifically, this study
focuses on theoretical discussions of how hospitals, in particular not-for-profit hospitals,
respond when confronted with changes in governmental policy or other exogenous
factors (i.e., the reduction of public payments). This study primarily examines the
associations between Medicaid DSH payments and hospital provision of uncompensated
care. For the quality of care analysis, this study investigates whether the reductions in
Medicaid DSH payments affected the quality of care for Medicaid/uninsured. This study
also examines changes in the quality of care for privately insured patients, given the
public good /private good theoretical perspectives of quality of care.
In order to control for other potential factors that may also affect the provision of
hospital uncompensated care and quality of care, this study includes other governmental
financial subsidies, market characteristics and hospital-specific characteristics as control
variables. The graphical depiction in Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework of the
effect of Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital payment on the provision of hospital
uncompensated care and quality of care.

Key Independent Variable
 Medicaid DSH payment

Hospital Outcomes
 Uncompensated Care
 Quality of Care

Control Variables
 Other Governmental Financial Subsidies
 Market Characteristics
 Hospital-Specific Characteristics

Figure 1. Brief Schematic of the Conceptual Framework of the Effects of Medicaid
Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment on the Provision of Hospital
Uncompensated Care and Quality of Care.
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Research Questions
Medicaid DSH payment is a major funding source from Federal and State
governments that offsets costs for those hospitals providing large amounts of care to
Medicaid and uninsured patients. Budget cuts in Medicaid DSH payment after the BBA
reduced hospital net revenue. Hospitals that depend most on Medicaid DSH payments
were most affected in this regard. Economic theory generally predicts that reductions in
the subsidies for the uninsured may lead to reductions in the provision of uncompensated
care and quality of care provided to the uninsured (Davidoff, LoSasso, Bazzoli, &
Zuckerman, 2000; Frank & Salkever, 1991; Hoerger, 1991; Newhouse, 1970). This study
addresses these concerns and will answer the following research questions:


Research Question I: What impact did the reductions of Medicaid DSH payments
have on hospital provision of uncompensated care, in particular for not-for-profit
hospitals?



Research Question II: How do the reduced Medicaid DSH payments affect hospitals’
patient quality of care for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients?



Research Question III: Is quality of care a private good or a public good?
A set of testable hypotheses discussed in the Chapter 3 are developed based on the

economic theory to answer these research questions.
Scope and Approach
A longitudinal panel study is developed using unbalanced annual panel data for
short-term, non-federal general acute care hospitals in California from 1996 to 2003,
which is a study period that includes observations from both before and after the passage
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of the BBA. There are several reasons for examing this state: first, California has a higher
uninsured rate than the nation as a whole. Second, California receives a high proportion
of Medicaid DSH payments each year (Hearne, 2004). Third, the audited financial report
data contain relatively complete information regarding the Medicaid DSH payments
hospitals received and the uncompensated care hospitals provided.
Study data are drawn from several databases, including (1) annual hospital
financial data from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD)
in California; (2) Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) state inpatient data
(SID); (3) the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey; (4) the Area
Resource File (ARF); (5) the Health Leader-Interstudy HMO enrollment data; (6) MediCal annual statistical reports; (7) Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports; (8)
Medicare Cost Reports; and (9) Hospital case-mix index data from OSHPD.
Several analytical approaches are applied in this study. For the uncompensated
care models, this study primarily uses fixed effects modeling, adjusting for
heteroskedasticity-robust and intra-cluster standard errors. For the quality of care models,
this study stratifies patients into two groups by insurance status when examining patient
safety outcome measures: one group consists of the privately insured and the other those
insured by Medicaid or uninsured. Risk-adjusted patient safety indicator (PSI) measures
for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients are constructed separately at
the hospital provider level. Random effects modeling with heteroskedasticity-robust
standard error adjustment is used to take account of unobserved hospital specific factors.
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Significance of the Study
The study contributes to the body of knowledge in several ways. For the
uncompensated care model, this study uses audited hospital financial data from OSHPD
to assess the extent to which hospital uncompensated care provision was affected by
declining Medicaid DSH payments during the period 1996 to 2003. The advantage of
using audited hospital financial data is that Medicaid DSH payment and other state and
local governmental financial subsidies are measured explicitly by the dollar amounts that
hospitals recive. As such, this study provides information on how additional Medicaid
DSH payments are associated with the provision of hospital uncompensated care, holding
other governmental subsidies, market and hospital characteristics constant. This study
also explores the effects of other federal and state policies, in addition to Medicaid DSH
payments, on hospital uncompensated care provision, such as Medicare DSH payments.
With respect to the quality of care model, this study uses hospital inpatient
discharge data from Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Inpatient Data
(SID) and audited hospital financial data to assess the extent to which hospital quality of
care was affected by reductions in Medicaid DSH payments during the period 1996 to
2003. This study examines hospital quality of care for both Medicaid/uninsured and
privately insured patients between the ages 18 and 64. This study also investigates the
public or private good nature of quality of care from the theoretical perspectives.
Summary of Remaining Chapters
This chapter briefly summarizes the purpose of this study as well as the
conceptual framework, scope and analytical approach that are used in this study. More
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detailed information is discussed and elaborated on in subsequent chapters. Chapter 2
reviews the background of the changes of Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital
payment policy and prior empirical studies, particularly the effect of public payment on
hospital uncompensated care provision and the effect of public payment on quality of
care. This review highlights gaps in the existing empirical literature.
Chapter 3 establishes a conceptual framework based on the organizational
economic theory, and discusses a set of testable hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses research
methodologies used in this study, including research design, data sources, variable
measurements, econometric issues encountered, and analytical approaches. Chapter 5
presents study findings, including descriptive analysis, regression models and sensitivity
analysis. Chapter 6 summarizes the results based on the hypotheses and discusses the
implications and limitation of this study.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter includes three major sections. In the first section, the study provides
an overview regarding the background of the changes of Medicaid Disproportionate
Share Hospital (DSH) payment policy, which is the key independent variable in this
study. In the second section, the study reviews how previous studies measured several
key dependent variables, including uncompensated care provision, and quality of care.
The third section discusses two general issues that have been examined empirically: the
effect of public payment on hospital uncompensated care provision and the effect of
public payment on quality of care. This study will also include summary tables for
uncompensated care and quality of care measurements and empirical evidence from
existing literature. In general, this chapter provides information on the current body of
knowledge from prior studies that is related to this research. Through literature review,
this study identifies the gaps among current studies and will identify a proceeding plan
for this study.
Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment Policy
The Federal and State Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment
is one of the major funding sources for uncompensated care, accounting for 36% of total
funds for hospitals care of the uninsured (Fagnani et al., 1999; Fishman & Bentley, 1997;
Hadley et al., 2005; Hadley & Holahan, 2003; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007). Medicaid
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DSH payment was enacted after Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981.
At that time, Congress required states to “take into account the situation of hospitals
which serve a disproportionate number of low income patients with special needs”
(Fishman & Bentley, 1997). Then, in the Budget Reconciliation Legislation of 1987,
Congress established minimum criteria for designing and paying DSH hospitals so that
individual states could have more generous criteria in calculating DSH payment for
hospitals in that states, either using Medicare existing formula or making an adjustment
to hospitals with a high proportion of Medicaid utilization rate (Fagnani et al., 1999;
Fishman & Bentley, 1997; Hearne, 2004; Schwartz, Genshan, Weil, & Lam, 2006; Wynn
et al., 2002).
In the early 1990s, Medicaid DSH payment expanded quickly. The Medicaid
DSH spending grew from less than $1 billion in 1990 to more than $ 17 billion in 1992.
As a result of this dramatic expansion, Congress implemented two major reforms to cap
the amount of DSH spending in order to limit the growth of the Medicaid DSH
expenditure. One was the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax
Amendments of 1991and another was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(OBRA`93). These reforms limited the source of state matching funds, limited DSH
payments for individual hospitals, and required hospitals to have a Medicaid utilization
rate of at least one percent in order to qualify for Medicaid DSH payments need (Wynn et
al., 2002).
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 further limited Medicaid DSH payment
by reducing state specific federal allotments by $10.4 billion over the 1998 to 2002
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period (CBO, 1997). These substantial DSH reductions constituted the major sources of
federal Medicaid projected savings, specifically accounting for 61 percent of total
Medicaid gross savings over five years. 3 After the BBA, Congress passed the Balanced
Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) in 1999. The laws eliminated the BBA’s DSH cuts for
Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 2001 and FFY 2002 and also provided relief by setting 2001
state-specific allotments at 2000 levels adjusted for inflation and setting 2002 allotments
at 2001 levels adjusted for inflation. However, the Benefit and Improvement Protection
Act (BIPA) of 2000 let the full BBA DSH reductions become effective in FFY 2003
(Mechanic, 2004).
Figure 2 reflects the historical national and California trends of Federal and State
inpatient hospital Medicaid DSH expenditures for the years 1996 through 2003. The
trend lines of the combined federal and state share of Medicaid DSH expenditure reflect
the association of DSH expenditures and policy changes.
Measurement of Key Study Variables
Uncompensated Care Provision
Uncompensated care provision is often used to measure hospital charitable care
provided to uninsured or underinsured individuals. It is normally defined as “…the sum
of charity care (for patients who are qualified for charity care and are deemed unable to
pay after meeting certain criteria) and bad debts (for patients who presumably can afford
to pay, but do not)” (Weissman, 1996). Although one may argue that charity care is a
precise measure, many researchers found that variations do exist across hospitals in
3

See Schneider, A. (1997), Overview of Medicaid Provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
P.L.105-33, from http://www.cbpp.org/908mcaid.htm (Access Date: Feb 20, 2008).

Medicaid DSH expenditures (in millions)
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The data primarily reflects inpatient hospital Medicaid DSH payments. These data have been
adjusted by the consumer price index to 1996 dollars.
Data Source: Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) Form 64 annual reports; Fagnani
and Tolbert. (1999).

Figure 2. 1996-2003 Trends of Federal and State Inpatient Hospital Medicaid DSH
expenditures for California and National total (in millions, adjusted by CPI to
1996 dollar)
hospital accounting for charity care and bad debt (Bazzoli, Kang, Hasnain-Wynia, &
Lindrooth, 2005; Bazzoli, Lindrooth, Kang, & Hasnain-Wynia, 2006; Davidoff et al.,
2000; Gaskin, 1997; Kane & Wubbenhorst, 2000; Rundall, Sofaer, & Lambert, 1988;
Sanders, 1993; Sutton & Stensland, 2004; S. Zuckerman, Bazzoli, Davidoff, & LoSasso,
2001). Rundall et al. (1988) commented that hospitals may report their indigent care
service as charity care or bad debt, depending on their ownership status. Because of tax
consideration, for-profit hospitals tend to report their indigent care as bad debt whereas
not-for-profit hospitals prefer to report as charity care. Kane and Wubbenhorst (2000), on
the other hand, indicated that if hospitals are able to identify the relevant information
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about the patient’s financial information, some of what is classified as bad debt might be
re-classified as charity care. Given the reporting inconsistencies, many empirical studies
have combined charity care and bad debt into the measure of uncompensated care
generally.
There are three common ways to calculate uncompensated care provision
operationally in the literature. One is to measure in total dollar amounts. The second is to
measure it as a ratio. The third is to measure in volume. These are described below with
detail shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Measurements of the Provision of Hospital Uncompensated Care
Author

Data source
Unit of
Definitions and Measurements
/year(s)
Analysis
Measure in Total Amounts (Expenses/Costs)
Sheingold AHA survey
Hospital
The sum of bad debt and
and
data/ 1980level/ all
charity charges
Buchberge 1981
national
r (1986)
hospitals
Thorpe
Audited cost
State data/
Natural logarithm of the sum
and Phelps reports from
hospital
of (inpatient and outpatient )
(1991)
the New
level
uncompensated care costs per
York State
bed
Department
of Health
Sanders
AHA survey
National
The sum of the costs of pure
(1993)
data/1987
data/
charity care and bad debts.
hospital
level
Campbell
California
State data/
Charity care expenditures plus
and Ahern Health
hospital
bad debt expenditures less
(1993)
Facilities
designated subsidies
Commission/
1983 and
1987
Mann et
al. (1995)

California
OSHPD/
1980-1989

State data/
hospital
level

Natural logarithm of the sum
of charity care plus bad debt
costs minus any gifts and
subsidies for indigent care.

Notes

Adjusted by the ratio of
gross charges to expenses

Adjusted total UC charges
by using hospital mark up

Adjusted charity care
charges by using cost to
charge ratio
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Table 1 (continued)
Author

Data source
/year(s)
AHA survey
data/ 19901995

Unit of
Analysis
National
data/
hospital
level

Zuckerma
n et al.
(2001)

AHA survey
data/ 1990

Blewett et
al. (2003)

Minnesota
cost report/
1992-1996

Garmon
(2006)

Florida and
Texas
inpatient
discharge and
hospital
financial
data/ 1999
and 2002
AHA survey
data/ 19962000

Davidoff
et al.
(2000)

Bazzoli et
al. (2006)

Definitions and Measurements

Notes

Natural logarithm of the sum
of charity care plus bad debt
cost

 Charity care and bad
debt are reported as
hospital revenue in
AHA survey
 Adjusted revenue by
using cost to charge
ratio (total cost-bad debt
cost)/(gross patient
revenue+ other
operating revenues)

National
data/
hospital
level

The sum of charity care and
bad-debt expenses

 Charity care and bad
debt are reported as
hospital revenue in
AHA survey
 Adjusted revenue by
using cost to charge
ratio (total cost-bad debt
cost)/(gross patient
revenue+ other
operating revenues)

State data/
Aggregate
to county
level
State data/
hospital
level

The sum of bad debt and
charity care expenses on a per
capita

National
data/
hospital
level
Lo Sasso
AHA survey
National
and
data/ 1990data/
Seamster
2000
Aggregate
(2007)
to State
level
Measure in Total Amounts (Charges)
Dunn and
New Jersey
State data/
Chen
data/ 1979hospital
(1994)
1987
level

 Inpatient charity care and
bad debt costs
 Outpatient charity care and
bad debt costs

Adjusted charity care and
bad debt charges by using
cost to charge ratio

Natural logarithm of the sum
of charity care plus bad debt
costs

Adjusted charity care and
bad debt charges by using
institutional cost to charge
ratio
Adjusted charity care and
bad debt charges by using
cost to charge ratio

The sum of bad debt and
charity care costs per capita

Total inpatient and outpatient
hospital charity and bad debt
charges
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Table 1 (continued)
Author

Data source
/year(s)
AHA survey
data/ 19801981

Unit of
Analysis
Sheingold
Hospital
and
level/ all
Buchberge
national
r (1986)
hospitals
Measure in Portion of Expenses/Costs
Campbell
California
State data/
and Ahern Health
hospital
(1993)
Facilities
Commission/
1983 and
1987

Definitions and Measurements
The sum of bad debt and
charity charges

The percentage of charity care
expenditures plus bad debt
expenditures less designated
subsidies, divided by total
expenses

Adjusted total UC charges
by using hospital mark up

 [(adjusted
uncompensated care
expenses)/(total
operating expenseadjusted uncompensated
care expense)*100]
 Adjusted
uncompensated care
equal to bad debt plus
charity care charges
adjusted by cost to
charge ratio, then minus
DSH payments
Adjusted by cost to charge
ratio

Rosko
(2001)

Pennsylvania
cost report
data/ one
year 1995

State data/
hospital
level

The percentage charity care
and bad debt expense subtract
Medicare and Medicaid DSH
payments, divided by total
operating expenses other than
uncompensated expenses

Thorpe et
al. (2001)

AHA survey
data/19911997
California
OSHPD/ one
year 19951996

National
data/hospital
level
State data/
hospital
level

The sum of charity care and
bad debt charges divided by
total expenses
Natural logarithm of the
percentage of charity care and
bad debt costs to operating
expenses

Bazzoli et
al. (2006)

AHA survey
data/ 19962000

The percentage of hospital
expenses that are
uncompensated

McKay
and Meng
(2007)

Florida
financial
reports/
1998-2002

National
data/
hospital
level
State
data/hospital
level

Clement et
al. (2002)

Measure in Portion of Charges
Buczko
Washington
State data/
(1994)
financial
hospital
report/ 1987
level

Notes

The percentage of charity care
and bad debt costs to
operating expenses

The sum of charity care and
bad debt charges, divided by
total revenue

Adjusted total UC charges
by using cost to charge
ratio

Adjusted total UC charges
by using the ratio of
operating expense to gross
patient-care revenue
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Table 1 (continued)
Author

Data source
/year(s)
Seven state
financial
data/ 19941996

Unit of
Analysis
State data/
hospital
level

The sum of bad debt and
charity care charges, divided
by total charges

Needlema
n et al
(1999)

Florida
financial
reports/ 19811996

State data/
hospital
level

The sum of bad debt and
charity charges, divided by
total charges

Magnus et
al. (2004)

Merritt
Research
LLC
data/1997

National
data/
hospital
level

The sum of charity care
charges and bad-debt, divided
by total operating revenue

Atkinson
et al.
(1997)

Measure in Volume
Frank and Maryland
Salkever
financial
(1991)
hospital
data/19801984

State data/
hospital
level

Definitions and Measurements

 Natural logarithm of
equivalent uncompensated
care admissions
 Natural logarithm of
equivalent uncompensated
care admissions adjusted
hospital case mix index

Gaskin
(1997)

New Jersey
audited
hospital
financial
data/ 19861990

State data/
hospital
level

Natural logarithm of adjusted
uncompensated care
admissions

Banks et
al. (1997)

California
OSHPD/
1981-1989

State data/
hospital
level

The sum of charity care and
bad debt charges, divided by
inpatient days, then divided by
hospital bed size

Rosko
(2004)

Pennsylvania
cost data/
1995-1998

State data/
hospital
level

Adjusted uncompensated care
admissions

Notes

Uncompensated care
admissions is divided the
dollar amount of
uncompensated care (bad
debts and charity care
expenses) by the hospital’s
gross inpatient revenue per
admission.

Adjusted uncompensated
care admissions equal total
uncompensated care charges
divided by the hospital’s
average charge per
admission

Adjusted uncompensated
care admissions equal total
uncompensated care charges
(bad debt plus charity care)
divided by the hospital’s
average charge per adjusted
admissions.
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Total Uncompensated Care Dollar Amounts
Several studies have examined the total amount of charity care and bad debts. One
study calculated uncompensated care measured in charges (Dunn and Chen, 1994).
However, many researchers have argued that uncompensated care should be measured in
other ways because hospitals have different markups (Sanders, 1993; Campell and Ahern,
1993). Many researchers have used cost-based measures as a solution for this problem.
Most studies converted uncompensated care charges to costs using a hospital cost-tocharge ratio (RCC) (Bazzoli et al., 2006; Campbell & Ahern, 1993; Davidoff et al., 2000;
Garmon, 2006; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007; Mann, Melnick, Bamezai, & Zwanziger,
1995; Sanders, 1993; S. Zuckerman et al., 2001).
There are some advantages and disadvantages of measuring total amounts of
charity care and bad debts. One advantage is that this type of measure allows for more
flexibility in functional form. Since the distribution of the amount of hospital
uncompensated care provision across hospitals is often skewed, it is helpful to use a
natural log transformation of total uncompensated care dollar amounts. Many researchers,
such as Mann et al. (1995), Davidoff et al. (2000) and Bazzoli et al. (2006), employed
Natural logarithm of the sum of charity care and bad debt costs as the measure of
uncompensated care provision at a hospital level. In addition, it also allows for
aggregating to a higher level of unit of analysis. For example, Blewett et al. (2003) used
aggregated uncompensated care data at a county level and Lo Sasso and Seamster (2007)
aggregated uncompensated care data to a state level.
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However, this measure does not capture or adjust for hospital size or scale if
doing simple descriptive comparisons across hospitals. Many studies have shown that
uncompensated care is unevenly distributed across hospitals and much of the burden is
concentrated within public, teaching or some not-profit hospitals (Bazzoli et al., 2006;
Cunningham & Tu, 1997; Mann et al., 1995; Mann, Melnick, Bamezai, & Zwanziger,
1997; Weissman, 1996; S. Zuckerman et al., 2001). The use of hospital-specific data may
result in heteroskedasticity (Thorpe & Phelps, 1991). For example, assume that there is a
hospital A and hospital B. Hospital A has 1,000 dollars of total revenue and provides free
care of 100 dollars from its total revenue. Hospital B has 200 dollars of total revenue and
provides free care of 50 dollars from its total revenue. So, hospital A contributes 0.1
dollars (=100/1000) to charity care from its total revenue; for hospital B, on the other
hand, it contributes 0.25 (=50/200) dollars to charity care from its total revenue. In this
case, hospital B is more burdened by charity care than hospital A. Empirically, Thorpe
and Phelps (1991) used the approach by using uncompensated care costs divided by the
number of hospital beds. Because they were still concerned that the distribution of the
variable remained skewed, they further used natural log transformation in advance
analyzing regression model.
Uncompensated Care Measured as a Ratio
Given the disadvantage of the measures based on the total dollar amount of
uncompensated care, many researchers defined an alternative uncompensated care
measure as a proportion of total expenses or total revenue. This type of measure allows
for controlling the differences in the scale if doing single descriptive comparisons across
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hospitals. Moreover, the use of this measure controls for year-to-year changes and does
not require adjustment for price inflation when doing research longitudinally (Atkinson,
Helms, & Needleman, 1997). As Table 1 presents, Rosko (2001), Thorpe et al. (2001),
Clement et al. (2002), Bazzoli et al. (2006) and McKay and Meng (2007) examined
measures of uncompensated care as a proportion of total expenses. They first adjusted the
sum of charity care and bad debt charges to costs by using hospital cost-to-charge ratios,
and then divided this sum by either total expenses or total operating expenses.
Magnus et al. (2004) argued that it is preferable to use charge-based ratio
measures than cost-based ratio measures because charity care and bad debt are often
measured as forgone charges and also biases may result if one uses an overall
institutional cost-to-charge ratio to measure individual charges from different service
lines and departments. Researchers such as Buczko (1994), Atkinson et al. (1997),
Needleman et al. (1999) and Magnus et al. (2004) used the sum of charity care and bad
debt charges, divided by total revenue or total operating revenue when they measured
uncompensated care provision.
Uncompensated Care Measured in Volume
The third approach that researchers often used to measure hospital uncompensated
care provision is volume of care delivered (Banks, Paterson, & Wendel, 1997; Frank &
Salkever, 1991; Gaskin, 1997; Rosko, 2004). Usually, it equals the sum of charity care
and bad debts charges, divided by the hospital’s average charge per admission. Some
researchers considered patient severity across hospitals and thus adjust hospital admission
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by the hospital’s case-mix index (Frank & Salkever, 1991; Rosko, 2004). Banks et al.
(1997), on the other hand, measured as uncompensated care days per bed.
There are several advantages and disadvantages using this approach. Similar to
uncompensated care ratio measures, this approach allows year-to-year comparisons
without having to adjust for inflation when doing longitudinal research. The disadvantage
of this type of measure is that it is also an approximation. Specifically, this measure has
been calculated from charges to admission by using a hospital’s average charges per
admissions.
Overall, three approaches are commonly used in the literature to measure hospital
uncompensated care provision and each approach has its advantages and disadvantages.
Another point regarding the measurement of uncompensated care is the data sources for
constructing these measures. Looking at the Table 1, some studies used national data
sources and some used state data. Most studies in the literature employ the information
from individual state audited financing data (Atkinson et al., 1997; Banks et al., 1997;
Blewett et al., 2003; Buczko, 1994; Campbell & Ahern, 1993; Clement et al., 2002; Dunn
& Chen, 1994; Frank & Salkever, 1991; Garmon, 2006; Gaskin, 1997; Mann et al., 1995;
McKay & Meng, 2007; Needleman et al., 1999; Rosko, 2001, 2004). As Kane and
Magnus (2001) noted, there are at least fifteen states with audited financial data that
allow researchers to measure charity care and bad debt. National sources are mostly from
AHA survey data (Bazzoli et al., 2006; Davidoff et al., 2000; Lo Sasso & Seamster,
2007; Sanders, 1993; Thorpe et al., 2001; S. Zuckerman et al., 2001). However, the AHA
survey information for hospital charity care and bad debt are considered confidential and
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not widely available to researchers outside of the AHA. Another source of national data
is the Medicare Cost Reports, but these data are only available after fiscal year 2004. 4
Quality of Care
Quality of care has been widely discussed in the health care literature since 1970s
(Stiles and Mick, 1994). The most common and authoritative definition of quality of care
comes from IOM (Institute of Medicine, 1990) : “The degree to which health services for
individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are
consistent with current professional knowledge”. There are various ways to capture this
conceptual definition in the existing literature. In general, health service researchers
frequently use patient outcomes to quantify quality of care (Donabedian, 2005; Hearld,
Alexander, Fraser, & Jiang, 2008; Mitchell & Shortell, 1997; Sari, 2002; Stiles & Mick,
1994).
Patient outcome measures represent the result of medical interventions in terms of
patient survival and recovery of functional status (Donabedian, 2005; Stiles & Mick,
1994). The outcome indicators used in the existing literature include: mortality
(Alexander, Weiner, Shortell, & Baker, 2007; Cutler, 1995; Encinosa & Bernard, 2005;
Kahn, Keeler et al., 1990; Mark, Harless, & McCue, 2005; Mark, Harless, McCue, & Xu,
2004; McCue, Mark, & Harless, 2003; Mukamel, Zwanziger, & Tomaszewski, 2001;
Mutter, Wong, & Goldfarb, 2008; Rogers et al., 1990; Ross et al., 2007; Sari, 2002;
Seshamani, Schwartz, & Volpp, 2006; Seshamani, Zhu, & Volpp, 2006; Shen, 2003;

4

The Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 established the requirement that short-term, acute
care hospitals report uncompensated care costs as part of their Medicare cost reports beginning with periods
ending on or after April 30, 2003. The uncompensated care related information is in CMS-S10 form.
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Volpp, Ketcham, Epstein, & Williams, 2005; Volpp, Konetzka, Zhu, Parsons, &
Peterson, 2005; Volpp et al., 2003); patient adverse events (Bazzoli, Chen, Zhao, &
Lindrooth, 2008; Burstin, Lipsitz, Udvarhelyi, & Brennan, 1993; Clement, Lindrooth,
Chukmaitov, & Chen, 2007; Encinosa & Bernard, 2005; Mark et al., 2004; Mutter et al.,
2008; Sari, 2002); length of stay (Kahn, Rogers et al., 1990; Mark et al., 2005); or
hospital readmission (Cutler, 1995; Kahn, Rogers et al., 1990). Table 2 includes several
empirical studies that generally examine the impact hospital external and internal
characteristics on quality outcomes. Overall, mortality and patient adverse events are
most prevalently used to measure quality of care. In the following section, relevant
literature for these two outcome measures will be reviewed.
Table 2. Measurements of Quality of Care
Quality
Measures
Authors
Data Source /year(s)
Examples
Outcome Measures of Quality
Mortality
Kahn et al.
Medical records/ Health Care
(1990)
Financing Administration claim
file/ 1981-1982 and 1985-1986
Langa and
CA hospital discharge abstracts
Sussman
from OSHPD/ 1983, 1995, 1988
(1993)
Cutler (1995)
Medicare and Social Security
death records in six New
England states /1981-1988
Duggan(2000) CA hospital discharge abstracts
from OSHPD/ 1990 and 1995
Baicker and
Area Resource File with
Staiger(2005)
National Center for Health
Workforce Analysis and
Medicare Claim data/ 1988-1990
and 1998-2000
Mukamel et al. Medicare Hospital Information
(2001)
Reports/ 1990

Sari (2002)

HCUP-NIS/1992-1997

Measures and Definitions





In-hospital mortality
30-day postadmission mortality
180-day postadmission mortality
Inpatient mortality

 In-hospital mortality rate
 Post hospitalization mortality rate
(30, 180, 365 days)
 Infant mortality rates at zipcode
level
 28-day Infant mortality at county
level
 90-day Post hospitalization heart
attack mortality at county level
 Risk-adjusted 30 days postadmission mortality (considering 6
conditions: observed and expected
mortality rates)
 HCUP QIs: In-hospital mortality
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Table 2 (continued)
Quality
Measures
Examples

Authors

Data Source /year(s)

Measures and Definitions

McCue et al.
(2003)

HCUP and Medstat / 1990-1995

Shen (2003)

Medicare Claim data and Social
Security death records/ 19851994

 Risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality
(considering all cases observed and
expected mortality rates )
 Post-admission AMI mortality rates
(7 days, 30 days, 90 days, 1yr,
15months, 2 yrs)

Volpp et al.
(2003)

New Jersey and New York
hospital discharge data/ 19901996
HCUP and Medstat/1990-1995

Mark et al.
(2004)
Mark et al.
(2005)

HCUP and Medstat / 1990-1995

Encinosa and
Bernard (2005)
Volpp et al.
(2005a)

HCUP-SID for Florida/ 19962000
National Registry of Myocardial
Infarction(NAMI)/1996-2001

Volpp et al.
(2005b)

New Jersey and New York
hospital discharge data/ 19901996

Seshamani et
al. (2006a)

Pennsylvania State discharge
data and death certificate records
from Pennsylvania department
of Health/ 1997-2001

Seshamani et
al. (2006b)

Alexander et
al. (2007)

Pennsylvania State discharge
data and death certificate records
from Pennsylvania department
of Health/ 1997-2001
Medicare Inpatient Database/
1997 and 1998

Ross et al.
(2007)

MEDPAR/ CMS-Quality
Alliance/ 2002-2003

Mutter et al.
(2008)

HCUP-SID for 22 states/1997

 Risk-adjusted AMI patient inhospital mortality rate
 Risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality
(considering all cases observed and
expected mortality rates )
 Risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality
(considering all cases observed and
expected mortality rates )
 Risk-adjusted In-hospital mortality
during surgery (IQIs)
 Risk-adjusted AMI patient inhospital mortality rate

 Risk-adjusted In-hospital mortality
(IQIs) for several conditions: AMI,
hip fracture, stroke, gastrointestinal
bleeding, congestive heart failure
and pneumonia

 Risk-adjusted Patients Mortality rate
within 30 days of hospital
admissions, including Hip fracture,
stroke, AMI, gastrointestinal
bleeding
 Surgical patients Mortality rate
within 30 days of hospital
admissions
 Risk-adjusted Inpatient hospital
mortality for CABG, AMI, CHF,
stroke and pneumonia
 AMI patients
hospitalization:hospital-specific riskstandardized 30-day all-cause
mortality rates (RSMRs)
 18 Risk-adjusted in-hospital
mortality rates (IQIs)
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Table 2 (continued)
Quality
Measures
Examples
Adverse
Events

Length of
Stay

Authors

Others:
Service
intensity

Measures and Definitions

Burstin et al.
(1993)

Medical record review-New
York/ 1984

 Negligence adverse events

Sari (2002)

HCUP-NIS/1992-1997






Mark et al.
(2004)

HCUP and Medstat /1990-1995

 Complication ratio for decubitus
ulcers, pneumonia and urinary tract
infections

Encinosa and
Bernard (2005)

HCUP-SID for Florida/ 19962000

 Nursing-related PSIs
 Surgery-related PSIs
 All likely patient safety events

Bazzoli et al.
(2008)

HCUP-SID for 11 states/19952000

Clement et al.
(2007)

HCUP-SID for 11 states/19952000






Mutter et al.
(2008)
Kahn et al.
(1990)

HCUP-SID for 22 states/1997

 20 PSIs

Medical records/ Health Care
Financing Administration mater
file/ 1981-1982 and 1985-1986
HCUP and Medstat / 1990-1995

 Length of stay

Kahn et al.
(1990)

Medical records/ Health Care
Financing Administration mater
file/ 1981-1982 and 1985-1986

 180-day postadmission mortality or
readmission
 365-day postadmission readmission

Cutler (1995)

Medicare and Social Security
records in six New England
states /1981-1988

 Post hospitalization readmission rate
(30, 180, 365 days)

Dranove and
White (1998)

CA OSHPD/ 1983 and 1992

 Service intensity

Mark et al.
(2005)
Readmission

Data Source /year(s)

Obstetrical complications
Adverse/iatrogenic complications
Wound Infections
Major Surgery Complications

Death in low mortality DRGs
Nursing-related PSIs
Surgical-related PSIs
Risked-adjusted PSIs (PSI3decubitus ulcer, PSI7-infection
resulting from medical care, PSI9postoperative hemorrhage or
hematoma, PSI12-postoperative
pulmonary embolism or deep vein
thrombosis)

 Risked adjusted ratio of observed
and expected length of stay
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Table 2 (continued)
Note:
n/a: not available
HCUP-SID: Hospital Cost and Utilization Project-State Inpatient Data
HCUP-NIS: Hospital Cost and Utilization Project-Nationwide Inpatient Sample
OSHPD: the office of Statewide Health Planning and Development in California
MEDPAR: Medicare Provider Analysis and Review File
CMS: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
JACHO: the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization
AHA: American Hospital Association
IQIs: Inpatient Quality Indicators, which is a product of Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality
PSIs: Patient Quality Indicators, which is a product of Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality
DRGs: Diagnostic-Related-Groups
AMI: Acute Myocardiac Infarction
CABG: Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery
CHF: Congestive Heart Failure

Mortality Measures
Mortality is often defined as deaths that occurred during patient hospitalization,
which is denoted as short-term mortality, or deaths after patient hospitalization, which is
denoted as medium-term or long-term mortality (Kahn, Keeler et al., 1990). The majority
of literature use in-hospital mortality (Alexander et al., 2007; Encinosa & Bernard, 2005;
Mark et al., 2005; Mark et al., 2004; McCue et al., 2003; Mutter et al., 2008; Sari, 2002;
Volpp, Ketcham et al., 2005; Volpp, Konetzka et al., 2005; Volpp et al., 2003).
Alternatively, some researchers use mortality within 30 days after admission. The latter
one may eliminate any potential bias due to length of stay differences across hospitals
and over time (Mechanic, 2004; Ross et al., 2007; Seshamani, Schwartz et al., 2006;
Seshamani, Zhu et al., 2006). As to medium-term or long-term mortality measures, some
studies use post hospitalization mortality for a certain range of days (i.e., 30 days, 180
days) (Cutler, 1995; Kahn, Keeler et al., 1990; Shen, 2003).
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Data resources for constructing mortality measures typically derive from
administrative data sets (i.e., inpatient discharge data), medical chart review, or other data
(i.e., death certificates). Administrative data, such as inpatient discharge data from
individual states, are most frequently used. 5 One of disadvantages of using
administrative data to measure patient outcomes, as researchers argued, is that it does not
capture all patients’ risk characteristics, which are available in a medical chart and could
be obtained through review (Romano, Chan, Schembri, & Rainwater, 2002). However,
use of existing administrative data is less expensive than data extraction from medical
charts. Also, due to high costs, researchers are usually limited to only a few hospitals
when using medical chart data rather than more representative hospital samples in
administrative data.
Nevertheless, researchers use multiple data sources (i.e., administrative data sets
or medical chart records) based on the availability of data for their research purpose. For
example, Kane et al. (1990) linked medical records to Medicare Part B files of physician
bills and constructed post-admission mortality for almost 2,800 people with congestive
heart failure (CHF), acute myocardiac infarction (AMI), pneumonia, cerebrovascular
accident, and hip fracture diseases. Culter (1995) and Shen (2003) matched Medicare
claim data with death records to construct patient post-admission mortality in their
research. Seshamani et al. (2006) and Seshamani et al. (2006) used Pennsylvania State
inpatient discharge data and also death certificate records from Pennsylvania Department
of Health to identify patients who died within 30 days of hospital admissions.
5

In U.S., the not-for-profit institution, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ),
have generated Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) state inpatient date from many states.
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There are several issues that researchers confront when they study mortality
across hospitals (Mukamel et al., 2001; Romano & Mutter, 2004; Sari, 2002). First,
patient severity of illness varies widely across providers. To overcome this issue, risk
adjustment methods are often used in the literature when constructing mortality indicators
(Alexander et al., 2007; Encinosa & Bernard, 2005; Mark et al., 2005; Mark et al., 2004;
McCue et al., 2003; Mukamel et al., 2001; Mutter et al., 2008; Volpp, Ketcham et al.,
2005; Volpp, Konetzka et al., 2005; Volpp et al., 2003)6. The most common approach to
account for patient risk factors is to calculate excess mortality, which is the deviation
between expected and observed mortality (Mark et al., 2005; Mark et al., 2004; McCue et
al., 2003; Mukamel et al., 2001). Expected mortality is essentially based on individual
patient-level risk-adjusted models that predict the probability of death conditional on
individual risk factors.
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has developed
approaches to measure excess mortality and has developed a set of inpatient quality
indicators (IQIs), which uses patient age, gender, severity score calculated by 3M’s all
patient refined diagnosis related group (APR-DRG) as patient risk factors. Not only
adjusting patient risk factors, AHRQ IQIs also adjusted for the trend over time and
adjusted for within-provider correlation (AHRQ, 2007). AHRQ’s IQIs softward have
been frequently used in many recent studies (Alexander et al., 2007; Encinosa & Bernard,
2005; Mutter et al., 2008; Seshamani, Schwartz et al., 2006; Seshamani, Zhu et al., 2006;
6

AHRQ (2007) also calculated risk-adjusted rate at the provider-level is further adjusted by the
observed National Average rate to compare mortality across hospitals. See AHRQ Quality Indicators
Guideline http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/downloads/iqi/iqi_guide_v31.pdf and
http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/listserv_archive_2006.htm#Oct13 (Access Date: May 24, 2009).
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Volpp, Ketcham et al., 2005; Volpp et al., 2003). Others agencies, such as the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA)’s risk-adjusted mortality measures (Mukamel et
al., 2001) and Medstat’s Disease Staging Methodology (Mark et al., 2005; Mark et al.,
2004; McCue et al., 2003), are also used and reported in the literature.
A second issue that researchers confront is that mortality is only a relevant
outcome for certain severe patient conditions (Sari, 2002). Therefore, instead of
monitoring overall hospital mortality, many researchers have focused on certain types of
diseases or procedures to examine the effect of various factors on patient outcomes (Sari,
2002). For example, some articles study AMI patient mortality rates (Alexander et al.,
2007; Mutter et al., 2008; Seshamani, Schwartz et al., 2006; Shen, 2003; Volpp, Ketcham
et al., 2005; Volpp, Konetzka et al., 2005; Volpp et al., 2003). Two articles focus on
mortality among surgical patients (Encinosa & Bernard, 2005; Seshamani, Zhu et al.,
2006). Some study other conditions, such as hip fracture, stroke, gastrointestinal
bleeding, congestive heart failure, pneumonia (Alexander et al., 2007; Mutter et al., 2008;
Seshamani, Zhu et al., 2006; Volpp, Konetzka et al., 2005). The AHRQ IQIs allow
researchers to study several in-hospital mortality measures for certain types of diseases,
such as AMI, CHF, stroke, GI hemorrhage, hip fracture, and pneumonia.
In addition, mortality is not a sensitive quality indicator, in particular to outpatient
treatments and hospitalization involving younger patients because of low number of
deaths (Sari, 2002; Silber & Rosenbaum, 1997). Alternatively, researchers suggest using
adverse event measures (i.e., complication rates, failure-to-rescue or patient safety
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indicators) as a solution to solve this concern (Silber & Rosenbaum, 1997; Silber,
Rosenbaum, Schwartz, Ross, & Williams, 1995).
Adverse Event Measures
Adverse events refer to serious complications and other iatrogenic events
resulting from medical management (Burstin et al., 1993; Clement et al., 2007; Silber et
al., 1995). The examples of adverse event measures used in the literature that examine the
relationship between organizational factors and outcomes include negligent adverse
events (Burstin et al., 1993), complications for certain conditions (Mark et al., 2004; Sari,
2002), and AHRQ’s patient safety indicators (PSIs) (Bazzoli et al., 2008; Clement et al.,
2007; Encinosa & Bernard, 2005; Mutter et al., 2008). Among the diversity of adverse
event measures, AHRQ’s PSIs are commonly applied in the literature. The PSIs of
AHRQ are a set of indicators derived from administrative data.7 The PSI algorithms
were developed by the University of California, San Francisco-Stanford Evidence-Base
Practice Center (EPC), with collaboration from the University of California at Davis,
under funding from AHRQ. The algorithm flags patients safety events based on the
International Classification of Disease, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes found in
the diagnosis and procedure variables from each discharge (Encinosa & Bernard, 2005).
The method for calculating risk-adjusted PSIs measures is conceptually similar to those
used in other studies that examined excess mortality (Bazzoli et al., 2008; Mark et al.,
2005; Mark et al., 2004; McCue et al., 2003; Mukamel et al., 2001). However, patient

7

Patient Safety Indicators Overview. AHRQ Quality Indicators. February 2006. Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/psi_overview.htm
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risk adjusted factors in PSIs are slightly different from those used in AHRQ-IQIs,
including patient age, gender, modified DRG categories, co-morbidities, and interactions
of age and gender.8
AHRQ’s PSIs module contains 20 types of adverse event measures, including
death in low-mortality DRG, the occurrence of decubitus ulcer, selected infections due to
medical care, post-operative hip fracture, anesthesia complications, foreign body left in
patient during procedure, post-operative hemorrhage or hematomy, hip fracture,
physiologic and metabolic derangement, pulmonary embolism or deep vein thrombosis,
respiratory failure, sepsis, or wound dehiscence, accidental puncture or laceration during
procedure, birth trauma, and obstetric trauma.9
With respect to the applications of PSIs, some studies select several individual
PSIs to capture potential signals of the occurrence of patient adverse events in their
studies, while some researchers examine the composite measures. For example, Clement
et al.(2007) selected 4 individual PSIs (PSI3, PSI7, PSI9 and PSI12) in their study
because these individual PSIs provided information on the higher incidence of population
at risk in a hospital. With respect to the composite measures, Encinosa and Bernard
(2005) and Bazzoli et al.(2008) sought to capture the underlying construct of quality from
multiple PSIs and thus classified into two broader composite measures (nursing-related

8

Specific information on the covariates used in risk adjustment for each PSI can be found as
follows: http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/downloads/psi/psi_covariates_v31.pdf (Access date: May
26, 2009).
9

More detailed about the definition of individual PSI can be found as follows: Version 4.1
technical documentation AHRQ Quality Indicators. December, 2009. Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, Rockville, MD. http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/TechnicalSpecs41.htm (Access Date: Feb
13, 2010).
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PSIs and surgical-related PSIs). Alternatively, AHRQ released a new version of
composite measures in March 2008, which reflects the most common patient safety
adverse events occurring in a hospital. To the best of the knowledge, there is no existing
empirical study using the new version of AHRQ-PSIs composite measure as a quality
outcome.
To summarize, mortality and adverse events are frequently used to measure
patient outcomes in the literature. This section reviewed these two quality measures from
different perspectives. There are various quality measures that can be used in health
services research studies. Researchers may need to consider multiple quality indicators
when conducting their analyses (Hearld et al., 2008; Mitchell & Shortell, 1997; Sari,
2002; Silber & Rosenbaum, 1997).
Empirical Research
This study is interested in the research question: whether the reductions of
Medicaid DSH payment affected hospitals’ behaviors, in terms of the provision of
hospital uncompensated care and quality of care? This section summarizes the existing
literature examining the ways and extent to which hospitals respond to changes in public
payment. This review will help to identify the insights provided by existing research that
could inform the research questions of this study and the gaps this study could address.
Two subsections of empirical studies will be presented: the effect of public payment
policy changes on hospital uncompensated care and the effect of public payment policy
changes on quality of care. Tables that summarize existing empirical studies will follow
each subsection.
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The Effect of Public Payment Changes on Uncompensated Care Provision
Several studies have examined the effect of changes in public payment policy on
hospital uncompensated care provision. As Table 3 shows, some studies have focused on
Medicare payment changes. For example, Sheingold and Buchberger (1986) examined
the changes of hospital uncompensated care provision in response to the direct effect of
the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) in terms of hospital financial margins.
They estimated ordinary least square (OLS) models using cross-sectional data from
national hospital sample in 1981 and controlled for the baseline level of individual
hospital uncompensated care (i.e., UC1980) and hospital supply and demand factors. This
study found that the Medicare’s prospective payment system (PPS) may affect hospitals’
financial resources for providing uncompensated care. Campell and Ahern (1993) studied
the cost containment efforts that resulted from the Medicare prospective payment system
(PPS) in California. Campell and Ahern primarily used ordinary least square (OLS)
models and examined separate regressions for hospital uncompensated care costs and the
percent of uncompensated costs to total expense between 1983 and 1987. They found
cost containment pressure may adversely affect the provision of hospital uncompensated
care. Mann et al. (1995) examined California hospitals data using ten-years of panel data
(from 1980 to 1989) with random effect specification and found that hospitals with
greater fiscal pressure from Medicare PPS provided a greater level of uncompensated
care than less pressured hospitals.
Focusing on state policy reforms, Thorpe and Phelps (1991) examined the
changes of hospital uncompensated care between pre-reform period (1981-1982) and

Table 3: Empirical Studies of the Effect of Public Payment Changes on Hospital Uncompensated Care Provision
Authors

Data
Unit of analysis/ Study
Public Payment policy/
Sources/year Sample/Statistical
policy effects
(s)
technique
Medicaid DSH payment on Uncompensated Care Related Studies
Lo Sasso
AHA survey
State level/ all national
Medicaid DSH payment
and
data and
short-term general
Spending/ no specific
Seamster
HCFA-Form hospitals/ Fixed effect
(2007)
64/ 1990model
2000
Davidoff et AHA survey
Hospital level/all national Medicaid payment
al. (2000)
data/ 1990short-term general
generosity (including
1995
hospitals/ Fixed effect
Medicaid DSH)/
linear regression with one increasing incentives to
error component
hospitals
Bazzoli et
AHA survey
Hospital level/ national
1997 The Balance Budge
al. (2006)
data/ 1996hospitals/ fixed effect
Act/ reducing Medicaid
2000
model
DSH reimbursement
effect

Changes of Public Payment or Subsidies on Uncompensated Care Studies
Sheingold
AHA survey Hospital level/ all national Medicare PPS/ cost
and
data/ 1980hospitals/ Cross-sectional
containment effort
Buchberger 1981
Ordinary Least Square
(1986)
regression
Thorpe and Audited cost Hospital level/ New York
1983 New York
Phelps
reports from
state hospitals/ FirstProspective Hospital
(1991)
the New
differenced models
Reimbursement policy/
York State
assist hospitals providing
Department
charity care
of Health

Theoretical
Perspective

Payment
change
measures

Economic
theory of
organizational
behavior

Real Medicaid The sum of bad
DSH payment
debt and charity
per capita
care expenses per
(monetary
capita
units)
HospitalNatural logarithm
specific ratio
of the sum of
of Medicaid
charity care plus
payment to
bad debt costs
costs
Medicaid
 The percentage of
Fiscal pressure
hospital expenses
index
that are
uncompensated
 Natural logarithm
of the sum of
charity care plus
bad debt costs

NS

Changes in
Hospital
financial
margin
Pre-post design
with time trend
in regression
model

Change in
uncompensated
care

S(-)

Natural logarithm
of the sum of
(inpatient and
outpatient )
uncompensated
care costs per bed

S(+)

Economic
theory of
organizational
behavior
Economic
theory of
organizational
behavior

n/a

Economic
theory of
organizational
behavior

Uncompensated
Care Measures

Results

S(+)

S(-)

33

Table 3 (continued)
Authors

Campbell
and Ahern
(1993)

Dunn and
Chen
(1994)

Mann et al.
(1995)

Gaskin
(1997)

Data
Sources/year
(s)
California
Health
Facilities
Commission/
1983 and
1987

Unit of analysis/ Study
Sample/Statistical
technique
Hospital level/ CA state
hospitals/ Cross-sectional
Ordinal Least Square
regression

Public Payment policy/
policy effects

Theoretical
Perspective

Payment
change
measures
1983 CA Medicare PPS and Economic
 The
Medi-Cal reform in 1982/ theory of
proportion of
cost containment effort
organizational
revenue to
behavior
contractual
adjustments
 Medicare
share

Uncompensated
Care Measures

Results

Natural logarithm
of the sum of bad
debt and charity
care expenses
minus designated
subsidies

S(-)

Audited
financial
report from
State of New
Jersey
Department
of Health/
1979-1987
California
OSHPD/
1980-1989,
10 years data

Hospital level/ New
Jersey hospitals/
Multivariate Ordinal Least
Square Regression/ Fixed
effect/ Random effect

1980 New Jersey DRGBased Reimbursement
reform/ increase hospital
incentives to provide
indigent care

n/a

Pre-post design
with a binary
variable to
indicate policy
effective

Total inpatient and
outpatient hospital
charity and bad
debt charges

Ns

State data/ hospital level/
Random effect model with
one random error
component estimation

1983 CA Medicare PPS
and Medi-Cal reform/ cost
containment effort

Economic
 Pre-post
theory of
research
organizational design
behavior
 Medicare
pressure index
 Medi-Cal
pressure

Natural logarithm
of the sum of
charity care plus
bad debt costs
minus any gifts and
subsidies for
indigent care

S(+)

New Jersey
audited
hospital
financial
data/ 19861990

Hospital level/ New
Jersey hospitals/ Random
effects models

1987 New Jersey
Uncompensated care trust
fund/increase hospital
incentives to provide
indigent care

Economic
theory of
organizational
behavior

Natural logarithm
of equivalent
uncompensated
care admissions

S(+)

Pre-post design
with a binary
variable and
time trends to
indicate policy
effective
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Table 3 (continued)
Note:
 S(-): Significant negative relationship between public payment changes on
uncompensated care provision
 S(+): Significant negative relationship between public payment changes on
uncompensated care provision
 Ns: No significant relationship between public payment changes on
uncompensated care provision
 Mixed: Mixed relationship between payment changes on uncompensated
care provision
 n/a: not available

 CHSPR: the Center for Health Services and Policy Research of
Northwestern University
 DRGs: Diagnostic-Related-Groups
 DSH: Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment
 PPS: Prospective Payment System
 HCFA: Health Care Financing Administration
 BBA: The Balance Budget Act
 DSH: Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment
 AHA: American Hospital Association
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post-reform period (1983-1984) when New York state implemented a reimbursement
program to assist hospitals providing charity care. They found the uncompensated care
payment rates (i.e., price effect) was positively associated with the provisions of hospital
uncompensated care, but did not find evidence showing a relationship between funding
supports from state uncompensated care pool (i.e., income effect) and the provisions of
uncompensated care. Dunn and Chen (1994) studied whether New Jersey DRG-based
reimbursement reform in 1980 provided hospitals with an incentive to provide more
indigent care. They used a pre and post design and fixed effect model to assess the impact
of the introduction of uncompensated care payment between 1979 and 1987. They did not
find evidence of a relationship between policy intervention and the provision of
uncompensated care. Gaskin (1997) used a random effect panel model with study year
from 1986 to 1990 to examine how the initiation of the New Jersey Uncompensated Care
Trust Fund in 1987 affected hospital provision of indigent care and found that hospital
provision of uncompensated care increased.
In relation to Medicaid DSH programs, an article by Lo Sasso and Seamster
(2007) used a fixed effect model to examine the effect of changes in state Medicaid DSH
spending on uncompensated care provision between 1990 and 2000 while controlling for
other policy effects. They used real Medicaid DSH payment per capita as a direct
measure of Medicaid DSH payment change; and used uncompensated care expenses per
capita to measure uncompensated care provision. This article did not find an association
between Medicaid DSH payments and hospital uncompensated care. Two additional
articles related to Medicaid DSH payments are by Davidoff et al. (2000) and Bazzoli et
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al. (2006). Davidoff et al. (2000) used a fixed effect model to examine the effect of
changing state policy (i.e., payment generosity) on provision of hospital uncompensated
care for the period 1990 to 1995 at the hospital level. They found a positive association
between Medicaid payment generosity and uncompensated care provision among NFP
hospitals during a period when Medicaid DSH increased incentives for hospitals to
provide indigent care during the early 1990s. Bazzoli et al. (2006) studied how the level
of hospital uncompensated care provision was affected by the Medicaid pressure
resulting from the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) budget cuts. They found core safety net
hospitals reduced their uncompensated care in response to Medicaid financial pressure.
There are several gaps in existing research relevant to the study questions. First,
among these DSH related studies, only Bazzoli et al. (2006) specifically examined the
BBA impact regarding the reduction of Medicaid DSH payment. Second, the unit of
analysis in Lo Sasso and Seamster (2007) is the state. It is unclear from aggregated state
level information to know how individual hospitals responded to the change in payment.
Third, Davidoff et al. (2000) used a hospital-specific ratio of Medicaid payments to costs
to measure Medicaid payment generosity, which includes DSH payments. Bazzoli et al.
(2006) used a Medicaid Financial Pressure Index10 to measure financial pressure induced
when the BBA was first implemented in 1998. However, Medicaid DSH payment was
not explicitly measured in these two studies. It is unclear the specific effect of changing

10

Medicaid financial pressure index used in Bazzoli et al. (2006) was measured as: in year t by
using Medicaid costs per adjusted admission in year (t-1) minus Medicaid revenues per adjusted admission
in year t, then multiple by an estimate of Medicaid adjusted admissions in year (t-1), and then divided by
total hospital expenses in year (t-1).
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Medicaid DSH payments on the provision of hospital uncompensated care from these two
articles.
The Effect of Public Payment Changes on Quality of Care
Several empirical studies have investigated the effect of public payment change
on quality of care. Table 4 presents a summary of the empirical studies related to the
effect of public payment changes on quality of care. Many studies focus on Medicare
payment changes. For example, Culter (1995) and Shen (2003) both examined the impact
of the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) on quality of care. For example,
Culter (1995) assessed a logistic regression model, analyzing Medicare claim data and
social security records in six New England states from 1981 to 1988; and Shen (2003)
used long-difference regressions with instrumental variables to analyze all short-term,
acute care urban hospitals that have AMI patients between 1985 and 1994.They
employed different measures for quality of care and PPS pressures and also used different
samples to study the research question, but both reached similar results that the price
reduction resulting from the PPS adversely affected health outcomes.
Volpp, Konetzka, Zhu, Parsons, and Peterson (2005) constructed a BBA impact
index11 to evaluate the impact of payment reduction after the BBA on acute myocardial
infarction (AMI) in-hospital outcome measures, but did not find an association between
the BBA cost-saving efforts and AMI outcomes. Seshamani, Schwartz, and Volpp (2006)
used linear probability methods similar to Volpp et al. (2005) to study patient mortality
11

BBA impact index is a simulator which is created by Volpp et al. (2005b) and Seshamani et al.
(2006) to calculate the financial impact of the BBA using actual Medicare revenue. The index is equal to
the difference between the estimated reimbursement under BBA/BBRA and the estimated reimbursement
without BBA, and then multiplied by the percentage of net patient revenue from Medicare reimbursement
in the baseline of 1997.

Table 4: Empirical Studies of the Effect of Public Payment Changes on Quality of Care
Unit of analysis/
Study
Authors
Data Sources/year(s)
Sample/Statistical
technique
Medicaid DSH payment on Quality of Care Related Studies
Duggan
CA hospital discharge
Zip code level
(2000)
abstracts from OSHPD/ /Medicaid New
1990 and 1995
born infants/
Ordinary least
square regression
Baicker
Area Resource File with County level /not
and Staiger National Center for
specific/ Ordinary
(2005)
Health Workforce
least square
Analysis and Medicare
regression and
Claim data/ 1988-1990
control for state
and 1998-2000
fixed effects

Public Payment
policy/ policy
effects
1990 California
Medicaid DSH
program/ increasing
incentives to treat
indigent patients
Effectiveness of
Intergovernmental
matching grants
mechanism in States
/ No specific

Changes of Public Payment or Subsidies on Quality of Care Studies
Langa and
CA hospital discharge
Patient level /Age
1983 State Medicaid
Sussman
abstracts from OSHPD/ 35 through 64
cost-containment
(1993)
1983, 1995, 1988
Medicaid patients
policy/ reducing
with specific
reimbursement level
diagnostic codes/
Logistic regression
Culter
Medicare Claim data
Patient level/
1983 Medicare
(1995)
and Social Security
elderly population
Prospective
records in six New
(+65)/
Payment System
England states /1981Logistic regression
policy/ reducing
1988
reimbursement level

Theoretical
Perspective

Payment change
measures

Quality
Measures

Result
s

Economic
theory of
organizationa
l behavior

DSH per Medicaid
newborn within
each zip code
(monetary units)

Infant mortality
rates at zipcode
level

Ns

Economic
theory of
state
government
behavior

DSH per capita at
county level
(monetary units)

 28-day Infant
mortality at
county level
 90-day
Postheart attack
mortality at
county level

S(-)

n/a

n/a

Economic
theory

DRGs price
change to
measure marginal
and average
reimbursement
effects (monetary
units)

Inpatient
mortality

 In-hospital
mortality rate
 Post
hospitalization
mortality rate
 Readmission
post-discharge

S(-)

S(-)
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Table 4 (continued)
Authors

Data Sources/year(s)

Shen
(2003)

Medicare Claim data
and Social Security
death records/ 19851990, 1990-1994

Volpp et al.
(2003)

New Jersey and New
York hospital discharge
data/ 1990-1996

Volpp et al.
(2005a)

New Jersey and New
York hospital discharge
data/ 1990-1996

Volpp et al.
(2005b)

National Registry of
Myocardial
Infarction(NAMI)/1996
-2001
Pennsylvania State
discharge data and
death certificate records
from Pennsylvania
department of Health/
1997-2001

Seshamani
et
al.(2006a)

Unit of analysis/
Study
Sample/Statistical
technique
Hospital level/
Medicare AMI
patients/ Longdifference
regressions with
instrumental
variable
Patient level/ AMI
patients/
Difference-indifferences linear
probability panel
model
Patient level/ For
specific diagnosis
and under age 65
non-Medicare
patients/Linear
probability models
with fixed effect
Patient level/ AMI
patients for all
patients/ Logistic
regression
Patient level/ all
patients and
uninsured patient
under 65/ probit
regression

Public Payment
policy/ policy
effects

Theoretical
Perspective

Payment change
measures

Quality
Measures

Result
s

1983 Medicare
Prospective
Payment System
policy/ reducing
reimbursement level

Economic
theory of
organizationa
l behavior

PPS pressure
(monetary units)

AMI mortality
rates

S(-)

1993 New Jersey
Health Care Reform
Act/ reducing
hospital subsidies
for the uninsured

n/a

No specific
variable measures
of policy changes ;
use interaction
terms

S(-)

1993 New Jersey
Health Care Reform
Act/ reducing
hospital subsidies
for the uninsured

Economic
theory of
organizationa
l behavior

No specific
variable measures
of policy changes ;
use interaction
terms

AMI in-hospital
mortality during
the initial
hospitalization
provided LOS
<=30 with risk
adjustment.
Risk-adjusted
In-hospital
mortality for
AMI, CHF,
stroke

1997 The Balance
Budget Act/
reducing payment
level
1997 The Balance
Budget Act/
reducing payment
level

n/a

BBA impact
factor

NS

Economic
theory of
organizationa
l behavior

BBA impact
factor and time
trend

AMI in-hospital
mortality and
process
outcomes
Patients
Mortality rate
within 30 days of
hospital
admissions

S(-)

NS
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Table 4 (continued)
Authors

Data Sources/year(s)

Seshamani
et
al.(2006b)

Pennsylvania State
discharge data and
death certificate records
from Pennsylvania
department of Health/
1997-2001
HCUP-SID for 11
states/1995-2000

Clement et
al.(2007)

Unit of analysis/
Study
Sample/Statistical
technique
Patient level/
surgical patients/
probit regression

Public Payment
policy/ policy
effects

Theoretical
Perspective

Payment change
measures

Quality
Measures

Result
s

1997 The Balance
Budget Act/
reducing payment
level

n/a

BBA impact
factor and time
trend

Surgical patients
Mortality rate

S(-)

Hospital level/ all
types of patients/
fixed effect linear
regression

1997 The Balance
Budget Act/
reducing payment
level

n/a

Time trend and
post-BBA dummy

Risked-adjusted
PSIs

Mixed

Note:
 S(-): Significant negative relationship between public payment changes on quality (Worse)
 NS: No significant relationship between public payment changes on quality of care
 Mixed: Mixed relationship between payment changes on quality of care
 n/a: not available
 BBA: The Balance Budget Act
 PPS: Prospective Payment System
 DSH: Disproportionate share hospital payment
 HCUP-SID: Health Cost and Utilization Project-State Inpatient Data
 OSHPD: the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development in California
 AHA: American Hospital Association
 AMI: Acute Myocardial Infraction
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within 30-days of hospital admission and reached similar conclusions about the lack of an
effect of the BBA on health outcomes for privately insured and uninsured patients.
Another study also by Seshamani, Zhu, & Volpp (2006) used BBA impact index to study
the BBA effect on surgical patients in Pennsylvania state between 1997 and 2001, and
found surgical patient in-hospital mortality rate increased particularly in the high-impact
hospitals. Clement et al. (2007) also studied the impact of BBA and utilized fixed effect
model to analyze 11 states between 1995 and 2000. They found that effect of the BBA
affected Medicare patient outcomes adversely for some patient safety indicators (PSIs)
but not others. In addition, they did not find an effect of the BBA on uninsured patient
safety outcomes.
Focusing on the Medicaid program and state policy reforms, Langa and Sussman
(1993) and Dranove and White (1998) studied the effect of California’s Medi-Cal costcontainment policies in 1983 on patient outcomes. Dranove and White (1998) found a
reduction in service intensity after Medicaid reimbursement cutbacks, in particular for
Medicaid patients in hospitals with a large Medicaid patient caseload. Langa and
Sussman (1993) found the utilization of cardiac revascularization for Medicaid patients
decreased as Medicaid payment declined. Volpp et al. (2003) and Volpp, Ketcham,
Epstein, and Williams (2005) examined the effect of the New Jersey Health Care Reform
Act in 1993, which substantially reduced subsidies for hospital care for the uninsured.
These two studies reached similar conclusions that reductions in subsidies were
associated with adverse health outcomes, especially for uninsured patients.
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Few existing studies examine Medicaid DSH programs. Duggan (2000) examined
the extent to which increasing hospital financial payments from California’s Medi-Cal
DSH program affected infant mortality, but did not find that the incentives improved
health outcome for low-income patients. Baicker and Staiger (2004) studied the impact of
Medicaid DSH spending on 28-day infant mortality and 90-day post-heart attack
mortality between the periods of 1988-1990 and 1998-2000. Their unit of analysis was
the county and they found that an additional $100 per capita in DSH payment reduced the
infant mortality rate by 0.062 percentage points and reduced post-heart attack mortality
rate by 1.17 percentage points.
There are several gaps in the existing literature in relation to the research
questions of this study. First of all, the unit of analysis in Duggan (2000) is at the zip
code level while it is at county level in Baicker and Staiger (2004). As such, the measures
of DSH payments in Duggan (2000) and Baicker and Staiger (2004) are both aggregated
to either zip code level or county level. From these studies, it is unclear how individual
hospitals responded to the change in Medicaid DSH payments. The data are too
aggregated to provide clear insights. Second, these two studies only examined quality
outcomes that affect a limited group of patients (i.e., elderly or young children). For
example, the data for constructing the AMI mortality rate that Baicker and Staiger (2004)
examined was focused on Medicare beneficiaries. In addition, Duggan (2000) and
Baicker and Staiger (2004) focused on infant mortality. To the best of our knowledge,
since 1997, low-income newborn and children under 18 years old are likely covered
under Medicaid or State Children Health Insurance Program (SCHIP); and patients who
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are over age 65 are eligible for Medicare since 1965. It is still unclear from these two
studies how Medicaid DSH payment changes affect the health outcomes for low-income
patients between the ages 18 and 64.
Summary
In Chapter 2, this study reviews the background of Medicaid DSH payment
program, how previous studies measured key dependent variables and also discussed
existing literature that is related to the effect of public payment on the provision of
hospital uncompensated care and quality of care. Through this review, this study
identifies the gaps among current studies that are still unfolded for answering study
questions specifically. This review process helps to recognize the proceeding plan for the
next chapter.

CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A primary concern in this study is whether the reduction in Medicaid
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments affected the provision of hospital
uncompensated care and the quality of care for Medicaid and uninsured patients. The
underlying conceptual framework in this study derives from Newhouse (1970) economic
theory of not-for-profit hospital behavior and from theoretical extensions by Hoerger
(1991), Frank and Salkever (1991), and other researchers. The theoretical framework
developed by Newhouse (1970) and other researchers has been applied to study hospital
responses to governmental payment policy changes (Sloan, 2000). This study will start
with an overview of organizational economic theory and then derive the hypotheses from
this theoretical perspective. Following that, a discussion related to other control variables
that might affect the provision of uncompensated care and the quality of care will be
presented. Finally, a graphical depiction of the conceptual framework will be presented.
The main effect of interest is the association between the changes in Medicaid DSH
payments and the provision of hospital uncompensated care and quality of care.
Ownership Types and Hospital Behavior
There has been a long debate among health economists about the differences in
organizational missions and behaviors of for-profit (FP) and private not-for-profit (NFP)
health care providers. FP hospitals are legally allowed to distribute some proportion of
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profits to their stakeholders and they can issue stock, which is another source of capital
that enables them to meet financial needs. In simple microeconomic models, FP hospitals
are assumed to maximize profits and set their outputs at the level where marginal revenue
equals marginal cost. Specifically, as Friedman (1984) described, a FP hospital considers
“…all production alternatives and chooses the one which will maximize its profits,
subject to the constraints of factor prices and the demand for its output”.
NFP hospitals, on the other hand, are expected to meet a broader set of needs by
providing charity care services, community benefits, or teaching as part of their
organizational missions (Friedman, 1984; Gray, 1986; Hansmann, 1987; Marsteller,
Bovbjerg, & Nichols, 1998; Sutton & Stensland, 2004; Yoder, 1986). NFP hospitals are
not legally allowed to distribute surplus to those who control the organization, but they
can retain earnings for internal reinvestment (Friedman, 1984). This type of hospital does
not maximize profit but maximizes utility in terms of the quantity and quality of services
produced subject to break-even constraints (Newhouse, 1970). Under financial constraint
due to public payment policy changes, NFP hospitals may alter hospital resources used to
produce the quantity and quality of outputs.
Public hospitals often play an important role as the “last resort” for people who
cannot pay for their care and these institutions typically receive financial subsidies from
government sources to support their activities (Chen, Bazzoli, & Hsieh, 2009; Friedman,
1984; Mann et al., 1995; Shen, 2002). Public hospitals are thought to be substantially
different from private FP and NFP hospitals (Duggan, 2000; Kornai, 1986; Mann et al.,
1995; Niskanen, 1971). Public hospitals are typically owned by the government and they
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are expected to continue to operate even if they consistently face financial deficits
because government sponsors will prevent them from going out of business. On the other
hand, they are not allowed to retain earnings if they have surplus because government
may use divert or expropriate the surplus for other uses (Kornai, 1986; Shen & Eggleston,
2008). Public hospitals are expected to provide the levels of output production so as to
exhaust their budgets. So they are typically modeled as budget maximizers (Friedman,
1984). Therefore, if governmental budgets to public hospitals decline, one can expect that
public hospitals to reduce the provision of hospital care. Since the organizational
objectives and behaviors of public hospitals are distinct from private hospitals (namely
private FP and NFP hospitals), this study will focus on theoretical discussions of
differential FP and NFP hospital response when confronted by changes in government
policy or other exogenous factors (i.e., the reduction of public payments).
How do NFP and FP hospitals respond if there is an exogenous reduction in
payments given their distinct ownership types? Hoerger (1991) expanded upon
Newhouse model and predicted that NFP hospitals may reduce the quality or the
provision of free care and act more like FP hospitals when their net revenues decline.
Hoerger’s model suggests that, when an exogenous factor becomes unfavorable, a NFP
hospital “cushions the impact on profits by reducing outputs and acting more like a
profit-maximizing hospital”. A FP hospital, on the other hand, will “choose the output
that takes it to the peak of the profit function” and may have less variability than NFP
hospitals in its quality/quantity response to the external changes (Hoerger, 1991). Many
existing studies have applied the Hoerger theoretical framework to assess the effects of
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payment change on hospital provision of uncompensated care and hospital quality of
care. These studies are reviewed in the next two subsections.
Theoretical Relationship of Public Payment Changes to Uncompensated Care Provision
In relation to the provision of uncompensated care specifically, many researchers
suggest that NFP and FP hospitals should be considered separately given their distinct
organizational motivations (Banks et al., 1997; Davidoff et al., 2000; Frank & Salkever,
1991; Frank, Salkever, & Mitchell, 1990; Gray, 1991; Gruber, 1994; Mann et al., 1995).
Frank and Salkever (1991) modeled NFP hospital decision-making regarding the delivery
of uncompensated care. A NFP hospital’s utility is a function of net revenues and the
level of unmet need in the community for indigent care. As the Frank and Salkever
(1991) model predicted, the reduction in hospital net revenues because of exogenous
price reductions (holding total needs for indigent care constant) may lead NFP hospitals
to reduce uncompensated care for indigent patients, depending on the relative magnitudes
of substitution and income effects (Davidoff et al., 2000; Frank & Salkever, 1991).
Specifically, the substitution effect suggests that, when the payment rate increases (i.e.,
Medicare payment rate), hospitals have more incentives to provide care for Medicare
patients and thus may reduce the volume of care for other types of patients, including
Medicaid patients and the uninsured. On the other hand, a countervailing income effect
exists, when payments increase for one payer, hospitals may have more financial
resources to subsidize the costs of providing uncompensated care. Thus, the provision of
uncompensated care may increase due to this income effect (Davidoff et al., 2000).
Alternatively, if Medicaid DSH payments for low-income people increase, the income
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and substitution effect operate in the same direction providing hospitals with more
resources to treat Medicaid and uninsured patients.
With respect to FP hospitals, Gray (1991) and Banks et al. (1997) indicated that
the supply of uncompensated care for these institutions is one of the costs of doing
business. FP hospitals may suffer a loss of business if they do not meet community
expectations of providing at least some indigent care. FP hospitals may offset the costs of
this care from the net revenues generated by insured patients (Banks et al., 1997; Gray,
1991). Therefore, as the theory predicts, even when confronted with the fiscal pressures,
FP hospitals may not substantially change their provision of uncompensated care because
community expectations of their role in providing indigent care may be unaffected by
changes in payment policies (Banks et al., 1997; Davidoff et al., 2000).
Many empirical studies have applied these theoretical frameworks to examine the
effect of public payment changes on uncompensated care for hospitals with different
ownership types. For example, Campbell and Ahern (1993) applied the Newhouse model
and suggested that changes in Medicare and Medi-Cal reimbursement policy adversely
affected hospital uncompensated care. By including the interaction terms for ownership
type and profit level in the study, they found that public and NFP hospitals were more
likely to increase their indigent care when their profits increased, relative to FP hospitals.
Thorpe and Phelps (1991) also applied the Newhouse model and found that hospitals
increased charity care by approximately 1.7 percent for each 10 percent increase in
payment from the uncompensated care pool in New York State. Consistent with the
theoretical predictions by Frank and Salkever (1991) and Banks et al. (1997), Davidoff et
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al. (2000) found NFP and public hospitals increased the provision of uncompensated care
in response to increased Medicaid payment generosity. Bazzoli et al. (2006) found that
core safety net hospitals, which were mostly public or NFP hospitals, reduced their
provision of uncompensated care in response to Medicaid financial pressures while nonsafety net hospitals, mostly FP hospitals, did not have similar responses. Likewise, Mann
et al. (1995) found Medi-Cal fiscal pressure caused the most pressured hospitals to alter
their provision of uncompensated care relative to the least pressured hospitals. Given our
research questions, this study will use the theoretical perspectives of Newhouse (1970),
Hoerger (1991)and other researchers as the primary conceptual framework to study the
impact of Medicaid DSH payment reduction on the provision of hospital uncompensated
care.
Theoretical Relationship of Public Payment Changes to Quality of Care
There is still no theoretical or empirical consensus on the perceived quality
differentials between NFP and FP hospitals (Glaeser & Shleifer, 1998; Hansmann, 1987;
Hoerger, 1991; Marsteller et al., 1998; Mitchell & Shortell, 1997; Newhouse, 1970; Shen,
2002; Shortell & Hughes, 1988; Sloan, Picone, Taylor, & Chou, 2001). Some health
economists suggest that NFP hospitals would produce a high level of quality because the
hospital utility functions contain quality as a primary objective (Hoerger, 1991;
Newhouse, 1970). Consistently, Hansmann (1996) and Glaeser and Shleifer (1998) also
suggest that due to an information asymmetry, consumers would choose NFP hospitals
because of anticipated superior quality. As to FP hospitals, quality is not so much as a
goal as it is a constraint. These theoretical perspectives suggest that a NFP hospital may
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produce a higher level of quality than a FP hospital. However, Marsteller et al. (1998)
argued that, because of the greater number of NFP hospitals in a market, quality “norms”
are usually set by NFP hospitals and thus FP hospitals must provide quality of care at the
same level as NFP hospitals in order to compete with them. From an empirical
standpoint, some existing studies found that NFP hospitals provide better health
outcomes than FP hospitals (Shen, 2002; Sloan et al., 2001), while others found no
significant difference in quality among different ownership types (Mitchell & Shortell,
1997; Shortell & Hughes, 1988).
However, when confronted with a reduction in public payments, not only the
Newhouse (1970) and Hoerger (1991) models, but also Spence (1975) predicted that
hospitals would reduce the quality of care regardless of ownership types. Spence (1975)
suggested that hospitals would select a particular level of quality to produce based on the
value that consumers are willing to pay and the costs of producing quality. That is, when
price to cost margins are high, as Dranove and White (1998) noted, “…firms prosper by
increasing sales. Thus, it pays hospitals with high margins to boost quality”. Conversely,
if any exogenous factors cause the profit margin to decline, hospitals will reduce the
quality of care. Dranove and White (1998) and many other researchers have discussed
that the effect of cutbacks on quality may also depend on whether quality is a public good
or private good (Dranove & White, 1998; Glazer & McGuire, 2002; Spence, 1975).12 If
quality is a private good, a payment decline for one payer (i.e., Medicaid) may cause a

12

If quality is a private good, hospitals are able to adjust quality to provide different levels of
quality for different patients. If quality is a public good, however, hospital cannot make such patientspecific adjustments and thus provide the same quality of care to all patients.
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hospital to reduce quality for Medicaid patients, but maintain or increase quality for
privately insured patients (Dranove & White, 1998; Gertler, 1989). On the other hand, if
quality is a public good, as many researchers have argued because there are substantial
commonalities (i.e., the same health staff, equipment, surgical and lab facilities) in a
hospital, quality produced may be similar for different payer patients (Dranove & White,
1998; Glazer & McGuire, 2002). Therefore, when a payment decline for one payer (i.e.,
Medicaid payment), it may affect hospital quality of care for both Medicaid patients and
patients with other payers.
Several empirical studies have applied these theoretical frameworks to examine
the effect of public payment changes on hospital quality of care. For example, Dranove
and White (1998) applied the Spence (1975) model and observed a reduction in service
intensity for Medicaid patients, in particular for patients of Medicaid-dependent hospitals,
in the face of substantial Medicaid reimbursement cutbacks in the early 1990s. Similarly,
Bazzoli et al. (2008) used Spence (1975) and Newhouse (1970) theoretical frameworks to
study the effects of declining hospital financial condition on patient quality and suggested
that a hospital with profound financial problems may provide lower quality of care to its
patients. Shen (2003) also applied the Newhouse (1970) model in her study and found
hospital financial pressures resulting from the Medicare Prospective Payment System
policy had adverse effects on short-term health outcomes. Likewise, Volpp et al. (2005)
used this theoretical framework, and found results that the reduction in hospital subsidies
through the New Jersey Health Care Reform Act in 1993 resulted in lower quality of
care. Given our research questions, this study will rely on Newhouse (1970), Hoerger
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(1991), Spence (1975) and other researchers’ theoretical frameworks as the primary
conceptual framework to study the impact of Medicaid DSH payment reduction on
hospital quality of care.
Hypotheses
Medicaid DSH payment is a major funding source from both Federal and State
government to offset costs for those hospitals providing greater amounts of care to
Medicaid and uninsured patients. As hospital net revenue decline from the budget cuts of
Medicaid DSH payment after the BBA, hospitals that depended on Medicaid DSH
support may be especially affected. Economic theory generally predicts that reductions in
the subsidies for the uninsured may lead to reductions in the provision of uncompensated
care provided to the uninsured (Davidoff et al., 2000; Frank & Salkever, 1991; Hoerger,
1991; Newhouse, 1970). In this case, both the substitution and income effects of a
payment change operate in the same direction. Specifically, if Medicaid DSH subsidies
for the low-income patients decline, hospitals may substitute care for other types of
patients and thus reduce care for low-income patients (i.e., the substitution effect).
Additionally, due to the reduction in DSH subsidies, hospitals may receive less financial
resources to offset costs of care for low-income patients (i.e., the income effect). Given
that both income and substitution effects work the same way, this study hypothesizes that
the decline in DSH may lead to a reduction in the provision of hospital uncompensated
care.
H1: Reductions in Medicaid DSH payment will be negatively associated with the
provision of hospital uncompensated care in NFP hospitals, all other things
being equal.
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Given the theoretical models of Hoerger (1991), Frank and Salkever (1991), Gray
(1991) and Banks et al. (1997), NFP and FP hospitals may have different motivations for
providing uncompensated care in response to a reduction in Medicaid DSH payments.
Besides, FP hospitals may provide less care for low-income patients and thus receive
smaller DSH subsidies than NFP hospitals. In that case, the decline in Medicaid DSH
may have a larger financial impact on NFP hospitals than FP hospitals. As such, NFP
hospitals tend to reduce their provision of uncompensated care to indigent patients while
FP hospitals may have comparatively smaller changes. Therefore, this study hypothesizes
that:
H2: Compared to NFP hospitals, FP hospitals will make smaller cuts in
uncompensated care in response to Medicaid DSH payment reductions, all
other things being equal.
With respect to quality of care, there is still no theoretical or empirical consensus on
the perceived quality differentials between NFP and FP hospitals (Glaeser & Shleifer,
1998; Hansmann, 1987; Hoerger, 1991; Marsteller et al., 1998; Mitchell & Shortell,
1997; Newhouse, 1970; Shen, 2002; Shortell & Hughes, 1988; Sloan et al., 2001).
However, when confronted with a reduction in public payments, not only the Newhouse
(1970) and Hoerger (1991) model but also Spence (1975) predicted that hospitals would
change the quality of care they produced. Dranove and White (1998) suggested that if
quality were a private good, hospitals may reduce quality for Medicaid and uninsured
patients while maintaining or increasing quality for patients with other insurance status if
DSH payments fall. On the other hand, if quality is a public good, hospitals may reduce
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their quality of care for all patients regardless of their insurance status. Given these
theoretical predictions, this study hypothesizes that:
H3a: If quality of care is primarily a public good, reduced Medicaid DSH payments
will have a negative association with hospital quality of care for both
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients, all other things being
equal.
H3b: If quality of care is primarily a private good, reduced Medicaid DSH
payments will have a negative association with hospital quality of care for their
Medicaid/uninsured patients, while having no or a positive association with
quality of care for privately insured patients, all other things being equal.
Control Variables
In addition to the changes in Medicaid DSH payments, several other factors may
be associated with the provision of hospital uncompensated care and with the quality of
care provided to Medicaid and uninsured patients and thus should be incorporated in the
model as control variables. These variables include other governmental financial
subsidies (Zit), market characteristics (Mit), and hospital-specific characteristics (Hit).
Other Governmental Financial Subsidies (Zit)
In addition to Medicaid DSH payments, several funding sources are important for
hospitals that treat a large share of low-income patients, including Medicare DSH and
State and local governmental financial subsidies (Fishman & Bentley, 1997; Hadley et
al., 2005; Hadley & Holahan, 2003). The primary consideration for including other
funding sources as control variable is to hold hospitals’ subsidies from other major
sources constant while the amount of Medicaid DSH payment they received declines.
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Medicare DSH payment is under the Medicare Prospective Payment System
(PPS) program. Medicare DSH payments were enacted in 1986 and were expected to
compensate hospitals for higher operating costs as they treated disproportionately large
number of low-income patients. The BBA cut Medicare DSH payments by an estimated
total of $0.6 billion between 1998 and 2003 (Wynn et al., 2002).
State and local governmental financial subsidies are also important in that they
help hospitals to cover the revenue shortfalls arising from the costs of Medicaid belowmarket payments and to make up the deficits for caring uninsured patients (Baxter &
Mechanic, 1997; Fishman & Bentley, 1997; Hadley et al., 2005; Hadley & Holahan,
2003; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007; Meyer, Legnini, Fatula, & Stepnick, 1999; Thorpe &
Phelps, 1991; Stephen Zuckerman, Coughlin, Len Nichols, & Ormond, 1998). These
state or local financing sources include state or county tax appropriations, district
assessment revenue, and restricted donations or subsidies for indigent care (Hadley &
Holahan, 2003; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007). State or county tax appropriations are
payments that hospitals receive from state and local governments and often treated as an
offset to uncompensated care expenses by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC) (Hadley & Holahan, 2003). Local governmental subsidies (i.e., restricted
donations for indigent care or district assessment revenue) are allocated by county
governments from tobacco or property taxes and provide non-operating revenue to
hospitals to compensate for revenue lost when providing indigent care.
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Market Characteristics (Mit)
Some market characteristics may affect hospitals’ ability to continue providing
care to low-income populations. For example, expansions of public insurance coverage
(i.e., expanded Medicaid eligibility) in a market will reduce the number of uninsured
people and thus the provision of hospital uncompensated care will be expected to decline
(Blewett et al., 2003; Davidoff et al., 2000; Dubay, Norton, & Moon, 1995; Lo Sasso &
Seamster, 2007). With respect to the association between hospital quality of care for lowincome individuals and Medicaid expansion, Currie and Gruber (2001) suggested that
medical utilization and quality of care may improve for low-income individuals who are
uninsured prior to becoming Medicaid-eligible because this group of people may be
expected to access medical service at an early stage. However, there may be a
countervailing effect on the individuals who had private insurance before becoming
Medicaid-eligible (Busch & Duchovny, 2005; Currie & Gruber, 2001).
Medicaid managed care penetration and private HMO penetration in a market also
may affect hospital provision of uncompensated care and quality of care to low-income
individuals (Banks et al., 1997; Davidoff et al., 2000; Lo Sasso & Seamster, 2007; Meyer
et al., 1999; Norton & Lipson, 1998; Stephen Zuckerman et al., 1998). Managed care
may heighten competition and create financial pressures for hospitals for their Medicaid
and privately insured patients. Under managed care, hospitals need to control costs given
the discounted prices they negotiate with health plans. They may also need to deal with
lower rates of patient utilization as managed care organizations steer patients to other
settings (Frank et al., 1990; Gruber, 1994; Mann et al., 1995; Rosko, 1999; Davidoff et al,
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2001; McKay and Meng, 2007; Thorpe et al., 2001; Lo Sasso and Seamster, 2007;
Bazzoli et al., 2006; Shen, 2003).
Lower hospital market concentration among providers may also increase price
competition and lead to fewer excess revenues to support uncompensated care provision
(Gaskin, 1997; Gruber, 1994; Thorpe et al., 2001; Weissman, Gaskin, & Reuter, 2003).
In relation to hospital quality of care, some prior studies argued that competition among
hospitals might mitigate the effect of financial pressures on hospital quality (Kessler &
McClellan, 2000; Pope, 1989). Gaynor (2006) and Chen (2008), on the other hand,
suggested that the effect of hospital competition on quality of care is dependent on how
price is set. Specifically, when price is set by public payers (i.e., Medicare), hospitals
have to focus on improving quality of care to attract patients in a highly competitive
market. Alternatively, increases in competitive pressures in the private insurance market
may have a negative effect on hospital quality of care because managed care
organizations (MCOs) focus more on price than on quality of care. In this circumstance,
one would expect that market competition may decrease quality of care for privately
insured individuals. However, since prior research studied the effects of regulated price
on quality of care primarily for Medicare patients (Chen, 2008; Gaynor, 2006;
Gowrisankaran & Town, 2003), it is still unclear what implications these studies have for
Medicaid and uninsured patients.
Other market factors may affect the provision of hospital uncompensated care and
hospital quality of care provided to low-income patients. For example, prior studies
suggested that the presence of many FP hospitals in a market may affect the behavior of
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private NFP hospitals and that NFP hospitals may mimic FP behavior when confronted
by financial constraints under these circumstances (Cutler & Horwitz, 1998; Duggan,
2002). Therefore, if a NFP hospital is located in a market with a high portion of FP
hospitals, that NFP hospital may reduce its uncompensated care or quality of care more
than NFP hospitals located in markets with fewer FP hospitals. In addition, the existence
of public and teaching hospitals in a market area are associated with lower
uncompensated care provision at other hospitals in that market (Bazzoli et al., 2006;
Campbell & Ahern, 1993; Davidoff et al., 2000; Hsieh, Clement, & Bazzoli, 2010;
Thorpe & Phelps, 1991). Traditionally, public and teaching hospitals provide large
amounts of care for the uninsured or low-income populations, and this may reduce the
demand for indigent care at other institutions (Campbell & Ahern, 1993; Davidoff et al.,
2000; Duggan, 2002; Gaskin, 1997; Hsieh et al., 2010). Some market factors related to
the demand for indigent care are also included, such as median household income,
unemployment rate, and percent of poverty at the county level. As the number of
uninsured increases, one would expect that hospitals would need to provide care for more
indigent patients.
Hospital Characteristics (Hit)
This study also includes hospital-specific characteristics that may influence
hospital provision of care to indigent patients. For example, hospital capacity (i.e., bed
size, labor force) also needs to be considered because hospitals with larger capacity will
have more ability to serve low-income patients. Also, many studies have shown a
positive association between registered nurse (RN) staff and quality of care (Lindrooth,
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Bazzoli, Needleman, & Hasnain-Wynia, 2006; Mark et al., 2005; Mark et al., 2004).
Therefore, this study will include hospital bed size and the labor force size (i.e., the
number of RN) in both the uncompensated care and quality of care models.
Medicare share will also be included in both models as a proxy for Medicare
fiscal pressure. Medicare typically represents the largest revenue source for a hospital.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) was expected to produce $112 billion in
Medicare savings in the first five years (federal fiscal years 1998 through 2002), by
reducing the projected annual growth rate in program spending from an 8.8 percent
baseline in 1995 to 5.6 percent in 2002. This may bring greater financial pressures on a
hospital if that hospital serves a large share of Medicare patients. With respect to the
association between Medicare share and the provision of uncompensated care in NFP
hospitals, if the income effect dominates, hospitals may have less slack financial
resources to subsidize uncompensated care cost when Medicare payment pressure
increases. If the substitution effect dominates, the effect of Medicare financial pressure
on hospital uncompensated care may depend on the relative magnitude between Medicare
pressure and Medicaid DSH payment reductions. That is, if Medicare financial pressure
is larger than pressure resulting from the cuts of Medicaid DSH payments, hospitals may
increase or may not change their provisions of uncompensated care. Regarding the
association between Medicare share and quality of care, when Medicare fiscal pressure
increases, hospitals may not have the financial resources to invest in quality
improvements for their Medicare beneficiaries and the effect may spillover to other
payers (i.e., Medicaid and uninsured) if quality of care is a public good.
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In theory, when faced with reductions in Medicaid DSH, NFP hospitals are
expected to reduce their provision of uncompensated care while FP hospitals may have
relatively smaller changes. To examine the second hypothesis in this study, a FP dummy
variable will be included in the uncompensated care model (NFP hospitals are the
reference group). In addition, this study will also include a county hospital dummy and a
district hospital dummy variable because these hospitals face different financial
constraints. 13
Teaching hospitals often receive indirect medical education (IME) payments from
Medicare and other sources of financial support that may allow them to provide more
uncompensated care (Rosko, 2004). In addition, teaching hospitals are expected to
provide teaching, research and clinical services. As a result, these hospitals often adopt
the latest technologies and have highly specialized staff to provide high quality care. As
such, this study will include a teaching variable in both models. This study also included
controls for a hospital’s system status given research by Lee, Alexander, & Bazzoli
(2003) which suggested that hospital system affiliations could affect hospital involvement
in meeting community needs. In addition, hospital system affiliations may be associated
with quality outcomes (Chukmaitov et al., 2009; Cuellar & Gertler, 2005; Ho &
Hamilton, 2000).
Given the deliberations from prior studies that hospitals that providing more hightech services are able to deliver better quality care, following Bazzoli et al. (1999), this

13

California Health Care Foundation (2007). The Financial Health of California Hospitals.
http://www.chcf.org/documents/hospitals/HospitalFinancialHealthFullReport.pdf (Access Date: 18 Nov
2009).
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study controls for hospitals that provide the numbers of high-tech services above 75th
percentile nationwide in the quality model. Hospital all payer case-mix is also included in
the quality model because hospitals treating patients with more severe illnesses may
require resources and health staff (Chukmaitov et al., 2009; Rosko & Carpenter, 1994).
Conceptual Framework
Figure 3 presents a graphical depiction of the conceptual framework drawn from
economic theory and the literature discussed above. This study examines whether the
changes in Medicaid DSH payment resulting from the BBA have impacts on the
provision of hospital uncompensated care and on the quality of care provided to Medicaid
and uninsured patients. This study first examines the associations between Medicaid DSH
payments and hospital provision of uncompensated care. Specifically, this study is
interested in knowing whether, as economic theory predicts, the reductions of Medicaid
DSH due to the BBA have a negative effect on the provision of hospital uncompensated
care. In addition, this study examines the association between hospital ownership and the
provision of uncompensated care. As regards quality of care, this study investigates
whether the reductions in Medicaid DSH also affect quality of care for
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients, given the public good /private good
theoretical perspectives of quality of care.
In order to control potential variables that may affect the provision of hospital
uncompensated care and quality of care provided to low-income patients, this study
includes other governmental financial subsidies, market characteristics and hospitalspecific characteristics as control variables in the model.
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Control Variables

Control Variables
Hospital-specific
characteristics (Hit)
o Number of staffed beds
o Full time and part time
RNs to beds
o Medicare share
o Ownership
o Teaching status
o System Affiliation
Number of high-tech
services
Hospital all payer casemix Index

Key Independent Variable
o Medicaid DSH payment
(DSHit): Net DSH (DSHIGT)

Hospital Outcomes
 Uncompensated Care (UCit)
Quality of Care (QCit)

Control Variables
Other Governmental Financial
Subsidies (Zit)
o Other federal subsidies:
Medicare DSH payments
o Other state and local financial
subsidies
-State and county tax
appropriation
-Restricted donations and
subsidies for indigent care
-Subsidies for district hospitals
(district hospital only)

Market Characteristics at the
county level (Mit)
o Ratio of Medicaid eligible
to total population in a
county
o Ratio of Medicaid Managed
Care enrollees to total
population in a county
o Private HMO penetration in
MSA
o Admissions-HHI in a
county
 % of public beds in a
county
 % of teaching beds in a
county
o % of for-profit beds in a
county
o Median household income
in a county (in 1000s)
o Unemployment rate in a
county
o Poverty rate in a county

Note:

 : Variables used in uncompensated care model specifically.
 : Variables used in quality of care model specifically.
o : Variables used in both uncompensated care model and quality of care model.

Figure 3. Conceptual Framework of the Effect of Medicaid Disproportionate Share
Hospital Payment on the Provision of Hospital Uncompensated Care and
Quality of Care.
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Summary
This chapter developed a conceptual framework and a set of testable hypotheses
by integrating economic theory to examine the impact of the reductions in Medicaid DSH
payment on the provision of hospital uncompensated care and on the quality of care
provided to Medicaid and uninsured patients. Chapter 4 will discuss research methods,
including research design, data sources, sampling, variable measurements, and the overall
analytical approach used to test these hypotheses.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

The research methodologies used in this study to empirically examine the
research questions and to address the theoretical hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3 will
be discussed and explained in this chapter. In chapter 4, this study includes research
design, data sources, variable measurements, econometric issue encountered, and final
choice of analytical approach.
Research Design
The purpose of this study is to examine the association between the BBA induced
changes in Medicaid DSH payments during the late 1990s and early 2000s and hospital
outcomes, specifically hospital provision of uncompensated care and quality of care.
BBA policy provides a natural experimental environment for this study to observe the
impact of policy implementation on hospital behavior. In addition, not all hospitals
receive Medicaid DSH payment supports. These two factors provide this study with a
way to conduct a pre and post quasi-experimental analysis with control and treatment
groups. This type of design will allow comparisons between control and treatment groups
and the resulting effects from the BBA policy changes in Medicaid DSH payments.
Longitudinal unbalanced panel data for California hospitals from 1996 to 2003
are utilized to implement the reseach design. There are several reasons for examing this
state: first, California has a higher uninsured rate than the national level. In 2008, the
uninsured rate in California was 18.6 percent while the national uninsured rate
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was 15.4%. 14 Second, California receives a high proportion of federal Medicaid DSH
payments each year (Hearne, 2004). Third, the audited financial report data contains
relatively complete information regarding the Medicaid DSH payments hospitals
received and the uncompensated care hospitals provided. 15
Data Sources
Study data are drawn from several databases. First, annual hospital financial data
from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) in California
were used. This dataset includes state audited financial statements for all California
hospitals, such as balance sheets and income statements. Hospital charity care, bad debt
and Medicaid DSH information are obtained from this dataset. Second, Healthcare Cost
and Utilization Project (HCUP) state inpatient data (SID) offers clinical (i.e., patient
primary diagnosis, discharge status) and non-clinical information (i.e., expected
insurance status) for each hospital admission at the patient level. This study applies
AHRQ-PSI software to assess the inpatient discharge data to construct patient safety
indicators for each hospital. Third, the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual
Survey contains hospital structural data, such as ownership, bed size, hospital services
and utilization. Fourth, the Area Resource File (ARF), which is compiled by the Bureau
of Health Professions, has extensive information on hospital market structure, community
demographics, and socioeconomic attributes at the county level. Fifth, HealthLeader-

14

Data information is from Census Bureau.
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/historic/index.html (Access Date: Oct12, 2009)
15

Other states also have high uninsured rate and “high DSH” status, like Florida and New York.
However, the financial reports from other states were not able to provide sufficient information for this
study to examine DSH payment impacts.
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Interstudy provides data on HMO enrollment at the MSA level, which is used to compute
private HMO market share. Sixth, Medi-Cal annual statistical reports provide statistical
data on California Medi-Cal program services, expenditures, and eligibles for this study.
Seventh, Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports provide public information
about the managed care programs rendering care to Medi-Cal beneficiaries. Eighth, the
Medicare Cost Report, also called the CMS-2552-96 report, provides data on the
Medicare DSH payments that hospitals received. Ninth, the overall hospital case-mix
index data from OSHPD in California are used. To calculate the overall hospital case-mix
index, OSHPD applies Medicare Severity-Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRG) and
their associated weights to all patient discharge data by hospitals in California.
Study Sample
This study includes only short-term, non-federal general acute care hospitals in
California. Kaiser hospitals, which constitute 25 hospitals in each study year, are
excluded because they do not report data to OSPHD. In addition, this study includes only
hospitals that could be matched across the major databases used in the study. It’s about
7% of hospitals that had to be excluded as a result of this restriction. There are a total of
about 2,547 hospital-year observations, representing 376 hospitals that report data in one
or more years. Since nearly eight percent of hospitals changed or experienced operating
status (i.e., hospital closure or ownership conversion) during study years, this study will
do a sensitivity analysis to see if there is any difference including or excluding these
hospitals from the analysis.
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Between 1996 and 2003, 145 hospitals received Medicaid DSH payments in one
or more years, and about 50 percent of DSH hospitals received Medicaid DSH
continuously for more than six years. Among these DSH hospitals, namely those
hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments, about 12% are district hospitals, 22%
are county hospitals, 36% are not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals and 30% are for-profit (FP)
hospitals.
For patient safety outcome measures, this study draws data from Healthcare Cost
and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Inpatient Data (SID) for California from 1996 to
2003. Following Volpp, Ketcham et al.(2005), this study excludes patients who: were
younger than 18 or older than 6416; were enrolled in Medicare17; stayed in the hospital
longer than 30 days18; were residents of a state other than California; were discharged
alive in less than 1 day because these patients either were miscoded or had conditions not
requiring a hospital stay; or had specific exclusions defined by the Agency of Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ). This study stratifies patients into two groups by insurance
status: one group represents the privately insured and the other those insured by Medicaid
or uninsured. Overall, privately insured individuals represent about 55% of the total
patient sample and Medicaid/uninsured the remaining 45%. Through the algorithm of the
patient safety indicators (PSIs) software provided by AHRQ, risk-adjusted PSIs measures
16

Many low income children under 18 receive health insurance coverage from Medicaid or State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Individuals age 65 or above will be covered by Medicare.
17

Patients who are under age 65 with certain disabilities or people of all ages with End-Stage
Renal Disease (permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or a kidney transplant) will be eligible for
Medicare coverage. http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareGenInfo/ (Access Date: 13 Oct, 2009)
18

From the descriptive analysis for the patient length of stay for the patient age between 18 and
64 in each year, 99 percentile of length of stay is 30 days.
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for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients are constructed separately at
the hospital provider level.
Variable Measurements
Dependent Variables
Uncompensated Care Provision
This analysis examines how changes in Medicaid DSH payment affect the
provision of hospital uncompensated care. Following Campbell and Ahern (1993) and
Bazzoli et al. (2006), two measures of uncompensated care will be used in this study. The
first one is the sum of charity care plus bad debt charges adjusted by the hospital specific
cost-to-charge ratio and then divided by one million for purposes of interpretation. The
other variable is the percentage of total operating expense devoted to charity care and bad
debt expense (after adjustment by hospital specific cost-to-charge ratio).
Quality of Care
In relation to quality measures, this study aims to examine the effects changes in
hospital Medicaid DSH payments on hospital quality of care among Medicaid and
uninsured patients as well as privately insured patients. In terms of quality of care
measures, this study used PSI software (version 4.0, released on June 2009 by AHRQ) to
construct individual patient safety indicators and one PSI composite measure.
The new AHRQ-PSI composite measure includes 11 PSIs as described in Chapter
2. The composite measure is a weighted average of the scaled and reliability-adjusted
ratios for the component indicators. The reliability-adjusted ratio is weighted average of
the risk-adjusted ratio and the reference population ratio. An example of the procedures
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of how to construct composite measure, which is published by AHRQ on March, 2008,
shows in Table 5. The reliability-adjusted ratio (column D) considers both provider level
risk-adjusted rate (column B) and reference population risk-adjusted (column C) rate as
well as the degree of reliability for the indicator (column A). After constructing
reliability-adjusted ratio, a PSI composite measure (column F) is constructed. A PSI
composite measure is a weighted average of the eleven individual PSI indicators based on
the reliability-adjusted ratio and component weight for each individual PSI. The
component weight (column E) is determined based on the purpose of use of the
composite measure, as AHRQ indicates in its PSI composite measure documentation.
A denominator weight method is used to measure the component weights. The
denominator weights are determined by the average number of the frequencies of patients
at risk for each individual PSI. In general, a denominator weight reflects the amount of
risk of experiencing the outcome of interest in a given population. If a PSI has higher
frequency of patients at risk, it will be given a higher weight. Since this study focuses on
patients who are age between 18 and 64, this study uses data from a nationwide
comparative data published by AHRQ (2007) to determine the denominator weights
when constructing the composite PSI measure for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately
insured patients who are age between 18 and 64. Table 6 presents the frequencies of
patients at risk for patient aged 18-39 and 40-64 and the specific parameters of
component weights used in this study. The sum of the component weights among the 11
PSIs equals one.

71
Table 5. An Example of the Calculation for PSI Composite Measure
Columns

A

B

C

D

E

F

Reliability
Weight

Riskadjusted
Ratio

Reference
Population
Ratio

Reliabilityadjusted
ratio
(RAR) a

Component
weight

Composite
Measure b

0.951

1.190

0.983

1.180

0.076

0.089

PSI06 Iatrogenic
Pneumothorax

0.768

2.784

0.963

2.361

0.225

0.530

PSI07 Selected Infection
Due to Medical Care

0.903

1.543

0.938

1.484

0.186

0.277

0.088

1.868

1.020

1.094

0.047

0.052

PSI09 Postop Hemorrhage
or Hematoma

0.742

1.247

1.003

1.184

0.071

0.084

PSI10 Postop Physio and
Metabol Derangmts

0.708

0.859

0.910

0.874

0.034

0.030

PSI11 Postop Respiratory
Failure

0.960

0.773

0.965

0.781

0.028

0.022

0.967

1.304

0.982

1.293

0.071

0.092

0.799

1.711

0.936

1.555

0.009

0.013

PSI14 Postop Wound
Dehiscence

0.492

0.462

1.004

0.738

0.015

0.011

PSI15 Accidental Puncture
or Laceration

0.966

1.348

0.926

1.333

0.238

0.317

1.000

1.518

PSI03 Decubitus Ulcer

PSI08 Postop Hip Fracture

PSI12 Postop PE or DVT
PSI13 Postop Sepsis

Note:
This data example of constructing composite measure is from page 8 and 9 in the Patient Safety Indicators
(PSI) Composite Measure Workgroup Final Report, March 2008. Patient Safety Indicators Download.
AHRQ Quality Indicators. March 2007. http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/psi_download.htm or

http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/downloads/psi/AHRQ_PSI_Workgroup_Final.pdf
a

RAR=[risk-adjusted ratio*reliability weight]+[reference population ratio*(1-reliability weight)]
Composite Measure=[indicator1 RAR* component weight1]+ [indicator2 RAR* component
weight2]+…+[indicator11 RAR*component weight11].
b
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Table 6. The Component Weight Used in This Study.

PSI03 Decubitus Ulcer
PSI06 Iatrogenic
Pneumothorax
PSI07 Selected Infection Due
to Medical Care
PSI09 Postop Hemorrhage or
Hematoma
PSI10 Postop Physio and
Metabol Derangmts
PSI11 Postop Respiratory
Failure
PSI12 Postop PE or DVT
PSI13 Postop Sepsis
PSI14 Postop Wound
Dehiscence
PSI15 Accidental Puncture or
Laceration

Age18-39
Denominator

Age 40-64
Denominator

Average
Denominator
age 18-64

Component
weight a

928,685

2,805,708

1,867,197

0.0593

3,821,116

9,765,963

6,793,540

0.2157

6,444,382

6,585,254

6,514,818

0.2069

1,204,216

3,542,177

2,373,197

0.0754

569,546

2,094,105

1,331,826

0.0423

544,539

1,747,936

1,146,238

0.0364

1,206,942
94,734

3,531,754
454,161

2,369,348
274,448

0.0752
0.0087

323,798

823,265

573,532

0.0182

2,970,117

10,309,169

6,639,643

0.2109

31,489,470
1.0000
Note:
The PSI Comparative Data for provider level was published by AHRQ. The statistical information is
generated from 2004 nationwide Inpatient Sample. More detailed information about this nationwide
comparative data can be found at the linkage as
http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/archives/psi/psi_provider_comparative_v31.pdf (Access date: Feb
13, 2010). Or see Patient Safety Indicators Archive. AHRQ Quality Indicators. March 2007. Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD.

http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/psi_archive.htm
a

The component weight presented here is used in this study.

Following Clement et al. (2007), several criteria are examined for selecting PSIs
in this study. First, because patient adverse events are rare events, a random occurrence
for a hospital with a low volume of patients at risk would yield a high rate of incidence
(Bazzoli et al., 2008; Clement et al., 2007) . Therefore, each indicator is constructed for
an individual hospital only if it had a population of 30 or more at risk for the event
associated with the indicator, as recommended by AHRQ. Second, to ensure enough
observations to achieve generalizability across California hospitals, PSI indicators for
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both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured are selected only if 75% or more of
California hospitals reported having 30 or more patients at risk during hospitalization for
a given PSI (Clement et al., 2007). Based upon the preliminary results in this study, six
individual PSIs and one PSI composite score are selected to measure quality of care in
this study. The six PSIs consist of death in low mortality DRGs (PSI02), iatrogenic
pneumothorax (PSI06), selected infections due to medical care (PSI07), post-operative
hemorrhage or hematomy (PSI09), post-operative pulmonary embolism or deep vein
thrombosis (PSI12), and accidental puncture or laceration during procedure (PSI15). In
this study, these six individual risk-adjusted PSIs are multiplied by 100 and interpreted as
percentages, as recommended by AHRQ.
Key Independent Variable
Many researchers have noted that the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital
Program is essentially a complicated financing system (Coughlin & Liska, 1997; Ku &
Coughlin, 1994; Mechanic, 2004). It is necessary to know how the financing mechanism
works in order to construct accurate measures of the Medicaid DSH payments that
individual hospitals received.
The majority of state governments used intergovernmental transfers to generate
matching federal funds for DSH payments. Taking the California State’s Medicaid DSH
program (also called the SB855 DSH program) as an example, Figure 4 shows that the
state collects funds through intergovernmental transfers (IGTs) from public entities,
including counties, local district hospitals, and the University of California. Then, the
federal government matches the state’s funds at the California federal Medicaid matching
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Medicaid DSH Program in California
Public Hospitals
(counties, local hospitals)
1

Private Hospitals
4

4
State of California
(DSH)
2

3
State General Fund

Federal Government

1

State collects revenue through intergovernmental transfers (IGTs) from public
entities, including counties, local hospital
districts, and the University of California.

2

Federal government matches the State s
share at California s federal Medicaid
matching rate: 51.55%

3

4

State retains a portion of the
combined fund as an
administrative fee .
State distributes combined funds
as supplemental payments to
both public and private hospitals.

From William Huen (1999), California s Disproportionate Share Hospital Program:
Background Paper , The Medi-Cal Policy Institute

Figure 4. The Graphical Depiction of the Mechanism of Intergovernmental Transfer to
Generate Federal DSH Matching Funds.

rate of 51.55%. After that, the state retains a portion of the combined funds in its state
General Fund and distributes the other portion of the combined funds to both public and
private hospitals (Coughlin & Liska, 1997; Huen, 1999; Ku & Coughlin, 1994; McCue &
Draper, 2004; Mechanic, 2004). Knowing how the Medicaid DSH financing mechanism
works, McCue and Draper (2004) and Baicker and Staiger (2004) have argued that the
Medicaid DSH payments received by counties, district and public hospitals should take
into account the part used as intergovernmental transfer to match federal funds. That is,
the DSH payment in public hospitals will be net of IGTs so that net DSH=DSH-IGTs.
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Alternatively, private hospitals do not pay IGTs. So the net DSH payment for private
hospitals is simply the DSH amount so that net DSH=DSH.
Following McCue and Draper (2004) and Baicker and Staiger’s (2004)
suggestions, this study uses net Medicaid DSH payments in millions of dollars. Net
Medicaid DSH in million equals the real amount of gross Medicaid DSH dollar minus the
amount used to match federal Medicaid DSH funds through intergovernmental transfer to
counties, district and public hospitals, then divided by one million. This study obtains
DSH variables from hospital annual audited financial report data published by the Office
of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) in California.
An additional item is worth noting regarding the process of distributing Medicaid
DSH payments to eligible hospitals in California. It may not affect the measurement of
the DSH variable, but may be subject to some autoregressive process since the Medicaid
DSH payments for a hospital in year t depend upon the one or two year lagged Medicaid
and uninsured patient load at that hospital. Taking California as an example, the
Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) in the California state of Health and Human
Service Agency first decides which hospitals are eligible to receive DSH funds and then
distribute the program funds to eligible hospitals. Two criteria are used to decide which
hospitals are eligible to receive Medicaid DSH payments according to prior two calendar
year (CY) hospital annual cost report data19: (1) the hospital’s number of Medi-Cal
inpatient days must be at least one standard deviation above the statewide mean; (2) the
19

See “Adjustment in payment for inpatient hospital services furnished by disproportionate share
hospitals” in Social Security Act, from http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title19/1923.htm (Access Date:
April10, 2008)
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hospital’s revenues from low-income utilization (including Medi-Cal and uncompensated
care) must account for 25% or more of its total revenues. Then, an eligible hospital will
receive DSH funds in year t based on 80% of the prior calendar year (t-1) Medi-Cal
inpatient days multiplied by a DSH per diem amount.20 This study will address this
autocorrelation issue in the methodology section.
Control Variables
Other Governmental Financial Subsides (Zit)
To accurately assess the impact of the decline in DSH payments had upon
uncompensated care and quality of care, it is important to control for any other
compensation provided to cover Medicaid and uninsured patients. Two measures are
included. The first one is state and local governmental financial subsidies, which is the
sum of several state and county funding amounts, including state and county tax
appropriations, restricted donations and subsidies for indigent care, and subsidies for
district hospitals. Information on these state and local financial data is provided in the
hospital annual audited financial report data published by OSHPD in California. The
second alternative funding measure is Medicare DSH payments, which is the amount that
hospitals receive from Medicare. The amount of Medicare DSH payments is determined
by a complex formula and each hospital's DSH percentage. The hospital's DSH
percentage is derived as the sum of two ratios: the proportion of all Medicare days that
are attributable to beneficiaries of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a cash benefit

20

More detailed information about SB855, Medi-Cal Disproportionate Share Hospitals Payment
Program can be found from accounting manual of Medi-Cal Supplemental Payment at
http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/policies/acctman/h-576-57.pdf (Access Date: Jan, 2009).
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program for aged and disabled people, and the proportion of all patient days for which
Medicaid is the primary payer. The Medicare DSH payment data are obtained from
Medicare Hospital Cost Report.
Market Characteristics (Mit)
Several market factors are controlled in this study, including ratio of Medicaid
eligibles to total population, ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population,
private HMO penetration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of hospital concentration, the
presence of public hospitals within the county, the presence of teaching hospitals within
the county, the presence of for-profit hospitals within the county, and demand-related
factors (i.e., median household income, unemployment rate, and poverty level). In terms
of Medicaid eligibility, this study uses data from 1996-2003 Medi-Cal Annual Statistical
Reports to construct the ratio of the number of average monthly Medi-Cal eligible
individuals to the total population at the county level.21 Medicaid managed care is
measured as the ratio of the number of Medicaid managed care enrollments to the total
population at the county level. This variable is derived from 1996-2003 Medi-Cal
Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports. 22
This study uses a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the basis of
hospital admissions to measure market competition at the county level. In calculating
21

County Welfare Departments in California determine eligibility for all Medi-Cal eligible with
the exception of Supplemental Security Income/State Supplementary Payment (SSI/SSP) eligibles. See
Table 25 in the Medi-Cal annual statistical reports:
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/statistics/Pages/AnnualStatisticalReports.aspx(Access Date: Jan13.
2009)
22

Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/statistics/Pages/ManagedCareAnnualStatisticalReports.aspx (Access
(Access Date: Jan13. 2009)
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HHI, this study combines hospital admissions for those hospitals in the same system
within the same county and treats the system as if it were one organization. This study
uses the percentage of public beds to total hospitals beds within the county to measure the
presence of public hospitals at the county level. Likewise, the presence of teaching
hospitals is measured as the percentage of teaching hospital beds to total hospital beds
within the county and the presence of for-profit hospitals is measured as the percentage of
for-profit hospital beds to total hospital beds within the county. The hospital bed data are
from the AHA annual survey data.
Ideally, it would be best to measure uninsured demand directly by using the
number of uninsured and low-income individuals in the county. However, there are no
publicly available data that allow measuring this variable over time.23 Hence, this study
uses median household income, the unemployment rate and the ratio of persons in
poverty to the total population for each county as proxy variables to capture uninsured
demand. These demographic data are from the Area Resource File from 1996 to 2003.
Hospital Characteristics (Hit)
Several hospital characteristics are measured in this study, including ownership
types, hospital system affiliation, teaching status, hospital bed size, hospital nurse labor
force, whether located in an urban area, hospital Medicare share, provision of high
technology services, and hospital overall case mix index. Hospital ownership types
consist of three dummy variables to identify for-profit hospitals, county hospitals, and

23

Existing uninsured estimates by county are only available for the year 2000 from U.S. Census
Bureau, Data Integration Division, Small Area Estimates Branch,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/sahie/index.html (Access Date: Dec 2008)
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district hospitals (not-for-profit hospital is the omitted category). Ownership data are
from the hospital annual audited financial data published by OSHPD in California. These
ownership dummy variables are then interacted with DSH variables in the
uncompensated care model. This study includes a system affiliation variable that
identifies whether a hospital is a member of a multihospital system. Two dummy
variables are used to identify hospitals’ teaching status, including major teaching hospital
if a hospital is the member of the Council of Teaching Hospitals and Health Systems
(COTH) (majteach=1) and minor teaching hospital if a hospital is not a COTH member
but has resident/physician training programs (minteach=1). This study includes the
natural logarithm of the number of hospital staff beds to measure hospital bed size in
order to diminish heteroskedasticity among different hospital size. Hospital nurse labor
force is measured as the sum of the number of full time registered nurses and part time
registered nurses, divided by total hospital staffed beds. A binary variable, urban, is used
to indicate if a hospital is located in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). This study
defines Medicare share as Medicare inpatient days divided by total inpatient days.
This study uses a binary variable called high-tech to identify whether a hospital’s
count of tertiary services exceeds the 75th percentile of this count for the national
distribution of the number of tertiary services owned or provided by the general acute
care hospitals.24 This study follows Bazzoli et al. (1999) to identify the list of services
included in the high-tech measure. These hospital characteristics are constructed from the
24

Tertiary services are specialized, highly technical level of health care. Specialized intensive care units,
advanced diagnostic support services and highly specialized personnel are usually characteristic of tertiary
health care.
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AHA annual survey. This study also includes hospital case-mix index for all patients
published by OSHPD. Additionally, annual dummy variables are included to identify the
study years, with 1996 being the referent category. Table 7 provides summary
information on the variable and data sources.
Table 7. Variables, Definition, and Sources
Variable

Comments

Data Source
and Year

Dependent Variables

 Uncompensated care

1. The sum of charity care plus bad debt costs (adjusted by
specific hospital cost to charge ratio). This variable is
measured in millions.
2. The ratio of charity care and bad debt charges (adjusted by
specific hospital cost to charge ratio) to total operating
expenses, and then multiplied by 100 as percent.
 Quality of care (QCit) Patient safety indicators for Medicaid and uninsured patients
and privately insured patients. This set of variables contains
six individual PSIs (PSI02, PSI06, PSI07, PSI09, PSI12, and
PSI15) and also one composite PSI indicator. For more
detailed information regarding variable construction, please
refer to in AHRQ QI
(http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov). Six individual
PSIs are measured as percentage. The composite PSI is a
continuous value.
Key Independent Variables

CA OSHPD,

o Net Medicaid DSH
payment (DSHit –
IGTit)

CA OSHPD,

provision (UCit)

Real dollar amount of Medicaid DSH that a hospital received
minus the dollar amount of IGTs that a hospital paid to state
through intergovernmental transfers (in particular for public
hospitals). This variable is measured in millions.

1996-2003

CA HCUP-SID,
1996-2003

1996-2003

Control Variables
o Other governmental
financial subsidies
(Zit)

This study attempts to measure governmental financial
sources other than Medicaid DSH used to support hospital
costs for caring Medicaid and uninsured patients. Two
measures are constructed:
1. State and local governmental financial support included
state tax appropriations, county tax appropriations,
district assessment revenue and restricted donations and
subsidies for indigent care
2. Medicare DSH payments: the amount of Medicare DSH
payments that hospitals receive from Medicare.

CA OSHPD,
1996-2003
Medicare
Hospital Cost
Report, 19962003
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Table 7 (continued)
Variable

Comments

Data Source
and Year

Market Characteristics at the county level (Mit)
o Ratio of Medicaid
eligibles to total
population

The ratio of the number of average monthly Medi-Cal
eligible individuals to total population at that county.

Medi-Cal
annual
statistical
reports,
1996-2003

o Ratio of Medicaid
managed care
enrollees to total
population

The ratio of the number of Medicaid managed care enrollees
to total population at that county.

Medi-Cal
Managed Care
Annual
Statistical
Reports,
1996-2003

o Private HMO
penetration in MSA

The ratio of population enrolled in HMOs in MSA.

HealthLeaderInterstudy,
1996-2003

o HerfindahlHirschman Index

Sum of squared market share based on hospital admissions.
In calculating HHI, this study combined hospital admissions
for those hospitals in the same system within the same
county and treats the system as if it were one organization.

AHA, 19962003

 Presence of public

The percentage of total hospital beds that are public hospital
beds in the county

AHA, 19962003

The percentage of total hospital beds that are teaching
hospital beds in the county

AHA, 19962003

The percentage of total hospital beds that are for-profit
hospital beds to in the county

AHA, 19962003

o Median household
income

Median household income in the county (in 1000s)

ARF, 19962003

o Unemployment rate

Unemployment rate in the county

ARF, 19962003

o Poverty rate

The ratio of persons in poverty to total population at that
county

ARF, 19962003

hospitals in county

 Presence of teaching
hospitals in county

 Presence of for-profit
hospitals in county

Hospital Specific Characteristics (Hit)
o Ownership types

o System affiliated

Dummy variables identifying FP, county hospital, district
hospitals. These variables are interacted with DSH variables
in uncompensated care model.

CA OSHPD,

A dummy variable for identifying hospitals that are affiliated
with a multi-hospital system.

AHA, 19962003

1996-2003
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Table 7 (continued)
Variable

Comments

o Teaching status

Two dummy variables that identify hospitals teaching status,
including major teaching hospital if a hospital is COTH
member (majteach=1) and minor teaching hospital if a
hospital has resident/physician training program but is not a
COTH members (minteach=1).
Natural logarithm of the number of hospital staffed beds

o Bed size
o Full time and part
time RN to bed
o Medicare Share
o Medicare Share
interacted with
PostBBA dummy
variable
 Urban
 High-tech service

 Case-Min Index

Ratio of full time and part time registered nurses to staffed
beds
Medicare inpatient days divided by total hospital inpatient
days
The interaction variable of Medicare share with a dummy
variable indicating post BBA (year 1996 and 1997 are pre
BBA period).
A Dummy variable to identify whether a hospital is located
in urban area.
A dummy variable to identify whether a hospital’s count of
tertiary services exceeds the 75th percentile of this count for
the distribution of the count of tertiary services for hospitals
nationwide. This study used definitions of Bazzoli et al.
(1999) to identify high-tech services.
Case-mix index for all patients in a hospital.

Data Source
and Year
AHA, 19962003

AHA, 19962003
AHA, 19962003
AHA, 19962003
AHA, 19962003

AHA, 19962003
AHA, 19962003

CA OSHPD
case-mix index,
1996-2003

Year dummy variables Year dummy variables for 1997-2003 (1996 as reference
(Yrit)
group)
Note1:
 CA-OSHPD: State audited hospital annual financial reports from the Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development (OSHPD)
 CA-OSHPD case-mix index:
http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/PatDischargeData/CaseMixIndex/default.asp (Accessed:
Nov10, 2009).
 Medicare Hospital Cost Report:
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CostReports/02_HospitalCostReport.asp#TopOfPage (Accessed: Oct 08,
2007)
 Medi-Cal annual statistical reports:
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/statistics/Pages/AnnualStatisticalReports.aspx(Accessed:
Jan13. 2009)
 Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports:
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/statistics/Pages/ManagedCareAnnualStatisticalReports.aspx
(Accessed: Jan13. 2009)
 HCUP-SID: Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project-State Inpatient Data
 AHA: American Hospital Association Annual Survey
 ARF: Area Resource File
Note2:
 : Variables used in the uncompensated care model specifically.
: Variables used in the quality of care model specifically.
o : Variables used in both the uncompensated care model and the quality of care model.
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Empirical Specification and Methodology
This study uses longitudinal data from 1996 to 2003 to examine the effects of
changes in Medicaid DSH payment on the provision of hospital uncompensated care and
quality of care, controlling for hospital characteristics, other governmental financial
subsidies, and market characteristics that influence these outcome measures. Since the
two dependent variables yield some different econometrics considerations, each will be
discussed separately below.
Uncompensated Care Model
The basic empirical specifications used to examine the first and second sets of
hypotheses relevant for the hospital uncompensated care model are presented in reduced
form equations (1) and (2). In addition, the reduced form equation (2) adds a vector of
interaction terms for ownership status and the net Medicaid DSH payments (NFP as
reference group) to examine the second set of hypotheses.
UCit  0  1netDSH it  2 Zit  3M it   4 H it  tYr  i  it

(1)

UCit   0  1netDSH it   2 Zit   3M it   4 H it   5 ( FPit  netDSH it )
  6 (CNTYit  netDSH it )   7 ( DISTRICit  netDSH it )   tYr   i  it

(2)

where i= an individual hospital; t=year; UCit indicates the provision of hospital
uncompensated care for hospital i in year t; netDSHit represents net Medicaid DSH
payments, which was measured as gross Medicaid DSH minus the amount of
intergovernmental transfers from public hospitals; Zit indicates a vector of state or local
governmental financial support measures for indigent care. Mit indicates a vector of
market characteristics. Hit represents a vector of hospital characteristics. Yr represents a
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vector of year dummy variables. FPit represents a dummy variable for for-profit
hospitals. CNTYit is a dummy variable for county hospitals. DISTRICit is a dummy
variable for district hospitals. αi and τi indicate hospital specific error components for the
uncompensated care model. µ it and υit indicate random error terms for the uncompensated
care model.
The dependent variable in equations (1) and (2) are measured in two ways as
uncompensated care costs in millions and as the ratio of uncompensated care costs to
total operating expenses. The coefficient estimations of netDSH from equation (1) (i.e., β1
in equation (1)) should capture the effect of changes in net DSH payments on hospital
provision of uncompensated care for study hospitals overall, holding constant other year,
hospital, and county specific effects. Unlike equation (1), ownership and net Medicaid
DSH payment are interacted in equation (2) and, as noted, not-for-profit hospitals are the
reference group. The equation (2) allows this study to test study Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 2. Alternatively, the coefficient estimations of netDSH from equation (2)
(i.e., δ1 in the equation (2)) should capture the effect of changes in net DSH payments on
not-for-profit hospital provision of uncompensated care specifically. The coefficient signs
are expected to be positive and significant because NFP hospitals may reduce the
provision of uncompensated care provided to low-income patients in response to
reductions in Medicaid DSH payment. In addition, as proposed in Hypothesis 2, FP
hospitals may have smaller reductions in uncompensated care provision relative to NFP
hospitals (Banks et al., 1997; Hoerger, 1991). The total effects of netDSH payment for
for-profit hospitals are expected to be significantly different from zero but smaller than
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the coefficient estimates of net DSH payment for not-for-profit hospitals. Specifically,
this study expects the sum of the coefficient estimates δ1 and δ5 in equation (2) are less
than δ1, and both are expected to be significantly different from zero.
Given the nature of the unobserved effects and the different model assumptions,
several statistical alternatives for analyzing panel data are considered, including pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS), random effects (RE), fixed effects (FE) and first-difference
(FD) estimators. Pooled OLS assumes that the explanatory variables affect each hospital
randomly and that the error structure does not have a hospital-specific component. An
alternative analytical technique for panel data is a random effect model that has more
restrictive assumptions than those of a pooled OLS. Random effect models assume the
error structure has a hospital-specific component and the error components and that the
explanatory variables are strictly exogenous (Woodridge, 2002). The pooled OLS and
random effect models can be compard using the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier
Test. This test tests the null hypothesis that the error structure does not have a random
hospital-specific component (Woodridge, 2002).
A fixed effect (FE) model, on the other hand, allows for arbitrary correlation
between the unobserved effect and the observed explanatory variables but does not allow
estimation of the influence of time-invariant regressors. The FE panel technique
eliminates the unobserved effect (i.e., αi and τi) that may affect parameter estimates
through within transformation process. To compare the RE and FE models, Hausman
tests are often utilized to test the null hypotheses whether or not the RE model yields
consistent estimates of the parameters given the assumption that the hospital-specific
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error component and regressors are uncorrelated. Additionally, to compare pooled OLS
and FE model, F-test are often used to test the null hypotheses from restricted and
unrestricted models to check whether or not the error component has a fixed effect
hospital specific component.
As with the fixed effect (FE) model, the first-differencing model also eliminates
the unobserved error component, in this case through first-differencing. FE model
estimators essentially measure the association between individual-specific deviations of
regressors from their time-demeaned values and individual-specific deviations of the
dependent variable from its time-demeaned value over time. The first-differences (FD)
estimators, on the other hand, measure the association between individual-specific oneperiod changes in regressors and individual-specific one-period changes in the dependent
variable (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). To compare FE and FD models, Wooldridge (2006)
suggested one could test for serial correction in the idiosyncratic errors, uit . Although
both FE and FD techniques yield unbiased parameter estimates, when the uit in equation
(1) or υit in equation (2), for example, are serially uncorrelated with ui,t-1 or υi,t-1, FE
estimation is more efficient than FD. If the uit or υit follow a positive serial correction,
then FD will be more efficient (Woodridge, 2006).
Table 8 presents the results from the comparisons of several model specification
tests. Fixed effect method is used in this study because it yields more consistent and
efficient estimates than other alternatives. This is the case for both versions of the model
with uncompensated care costs and percentage of uncompensated care to total operating
expense as dependent variables.
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Table 8. Results for Comparisons of Model Specification Tests: Identifies Preferred
Model for Each Test
Model
Comparisons

Specification Tests

OLS vs. FE
OLS v.s. RE

F-test for no fixed effects
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
multiplier test
Serial correlation tests developed by
Woolridge
Hausman Test
Preferred Model

FD v.s. FE
RE v.s. FE

Uncompensated care
costs (in millions)

FE
RE

Percent of
uncompensated care
costs to total operating
expense (%)
FE
RE

FE

FE

FE
FE

FE
FE

Note:
OLS: Pooled Ordinal Least Square
FE: Fixed Effect Model
FD: First Differencing Model
RE: Random Effect Model

The uncompensated care econometric models presented in this study are
complicated by four factors: individual hospital heterogeneity, county-level clustering of
observations, an explanatory variable that may be subject to autoregressive issue and the
fact that hospital ownership was observed changing during the course of the study thus
impacting the sample. First, the use of hospital-specific data may result in
heteroskedasticity. The presence of heteroskedasticity, while not affecting bias or
consistency in coefficient estimates, influences the efficiency of standard errors. To
account for unequal error variances between individual hospitals in the uncompensated
care model, this study uses heteroskedasticity-robust standard error adjustment in the
fixed effect model. Second, because some of our policy variables measure county-level
variation in Medicaid program characteristics and demand characteristics, there may exist
intra-county error correlation that could bias downward the estimated standard errors
(Davidoff et al., 2000). As such, the estimated covariance matrices of the fixed effect

88
models are also adjusted with the Huber-White correlation to account for the specific
intra-county effect. Third, the uncompensated care model may take on some
characteristics of an autoregressive process since the Medicaid DSH payments that a
hospital received in time t depend upon low-income patient utilizations lagged one or two
years. The issue of autocorrelation in the models may cause bias in standard errors and
reduce efficiency (Drukker, 2003; Thorpe & Phelps, 1991; Woodridge, 2002). To
account for this issue, this study conducted a test for serial correlation in the panel models
using methods discussed by Wooldridge (2002).25 These test results indicate that a
potential serial correlation issue existed in the model.
To the best of our knowledge, there is an alternative model to deal with the
autocorrelation problem in the fixed effect model. The first step of this approach is to
estimate the degree of autocorrelation (rho) between the error term in time t and time t-1.
Given an estimate of rho, one can do a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, which is one of
the methods that is used to transform the data for removing autocorrelation components,
and then do the within transformation to remove the hospital specific fixed-effects as is
usually done in the fixed effect model (Wooldridge, 2006; Stata manual, 2007: pp.
423).26 However, the disadvantage of this approach is that one loses one year of data in
the transformation process, and thus, decreases the degrees of freedom. This study will do
a sensitivity analysis to check if the coefficient estimates regarding the relationship
between net Medicaid DSH and uncompensated care provision change substantially when
25

This study will use a new Stata commend xtserial, which implements the Wooldridge test for
serial correlation in panel data (Woolridge, 2002, p.483).
26

This study used Stata SE 10.0 version command xtregar to correct autocorrelation in fixed
effect models.

89
correcting for this serial correlation. Finally, since some California hospitals experienced
ownership changes (i.e., hospital closure or ownership conversion) during the study
years, this study also conducts a sensitivity analysis to check if the results are sensitive to
the presence of such hospitals. The result section that follows focuses primarily on the
fixed effect models corrected for heteroskedasticity and intra-county variability.
Quality of Care Model
The basic empirical specification for the hospital quality of care model is
presented in reduced form equations (3).

QCitjk   0   1netDSH it   2 Zit   3 M it   4 H it
  5 FPit   6CNTYit   7 DISTRICit   tYr  i   it

(3)

where i= an individual hospital; t=year; j=0 for Medicaid/uninsured and 1 for privately
insured patients; k=1 to 7 for the 7 distinct PSI measures; and QCitjk represents quality of
care for Medicaid/ uninsured patients and privately insured j patients, which are
measured as k patient adverse events, for a hospital i in the year t. netDSHit is net
Medicaid DSH payment, which is measured as gross Medicaid DSH minus
intergovernmental transfers of public hospitals; Zit is state or local governmental financial
support for indigent care; Mit is a vector of market characteristics; Hit is a vector of
hospital characteristics; Yr represents a vector of year dummy variables; FPit is a dummy
variable for for-profit hospitals; CNTYit is a dummy variable for county hospitals;
DISTRICit is a dummy variable for district hospitals; λi is a hospital specific error
component; and εit is a random error term for the quality of care model. This equation is
used to examine the third set of hypotheses.
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Hospital quality of care are measured by six individual patient safety indicators
(PSIs) and one PSI composite measure separately for Medicaid/uninsured and privately
insured, with a total of fourteen regressions estimated. PSIs are used to measure patient
adverse events. Therefore, given the third hypothesis, the coefficient signs of netDSH
(i.e., γ1) in the PSIs regressions are expected to be negative and significant for both
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients, if quality of care is a public good.
Specifically, if quality of care is public good, when confronted with reductions of
Medicaid DSH payments, hospitals will reduce the quality of care they provide to both
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients so that the incidence of patient adverse
events may go up. On the other hand, if quality of care is a private good, hospitals may
reduce their quality of care provided to Medicaid/uninsured patients, but may not change
or may improve the quality of care provided to privately insured patients. In this case,
this study would expect a negative and significant sign to netDSH (i.e., γ1) in the PSIs
regressions for the Medicaid/uninsured patients and a positive and significant or an
insignificant coefficient for the privately insured patients.
As indicates in Tables 9 and 10, this study estimates all quality of care models
with pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), random effect (RE), fixed effect (FE) and firstdifferencing (FD) specification and conducted model specification tests to identify which
statistical method is preferred. The results are not entirely conclusive for both
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured quality of care models. In one case OLS is
preferred; RE is preferred in other three cases; and FE is preferred in another three cases.
After comparing several model specification tests from the PSIs regressions, the results
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Table 9. Results for Comparisons of PSIs Model Specification Tests for
Medicaid/Uninsured: Identifies Preferred Model for Each Test
PSI models for Medicaid/Uninsured
Specification Tests

PSI02

PSI06

PSI07

PSI09

PSI12

PSI15

OLS
OLS

FE
RE

FE
RE

FE
RE

FE
RE

FE
RE

FD:FE

F-test for no fixed effects
Breusch and Pagan
Lagrangian multiplier test
Serial correlation tests

PSI
composite
FE
RE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

RE:FE

Hausman Test

FE

RE

FE

RE

FE

RE

FE

OLS

RE

FE

RE

FE

RE

FE

OLS: FE
OLS: RE

Preferred Model
Note: OLS: Pooled Ordinal Least Square
FE: Fixed Effect Model
FD: First Differencing Model
RE: Random Effect Model

Table 10. Results for Comparisons of PSIs Model Specification Tests for Privately
Insured: Identifies Preferred Model for Each Test
PSI models for Privately Insured
Specification Tests

PSI02

PSI06

PSI07

PSI09

PSI12

PSI15

FE
OLS

FE
RE

FE
RE

FE
RE

FE
RE

FE
RE

FD:FE

F-test for no fixed effects
Breusch and Pagan
Lagrangian multiplier test
Serial correlation tests

PSI
composite
FE
RE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

RE:FE

Hausman Test

RE

RE

FE

RE

FE

RE

FE

OLS

RE

FE

RE

FE

RE

FE

OLS: FE
OLS: RE

Preferred Model
Note: OLS: Pooled Ordinal Least Square
FE: Fixed Effect Model
FD: First Differencing Model
RE: Random Effect Model

indicates inconsistent patterns of preferred model specifications for Medicaid/uninsured
and privately insured PSIs measures. Since random effect specification is superior and
more efficient than pooled OLS model specification, random effect model appears
relatively more frequently as the preferred model than FE method given the specification
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test results. To be consistent, random effect model specification method is selected to
analyze all quality of care models in this study.
Quality of care models in this study raise several econometric issues, including
individual hospital heterogeneity, multiple comparisons among different quality
equations, and the fact that hospital ownership was observed changing during the course
of the study thus impacting the sample. First, because this study uses hospital-specific
data, heterogeneity may be a problem. The presence of heteroskedasticity, while not
affecting bias or consistency in coefficient estimations, influences the efficiency of
standard errors. To account for unequal error variances between individual hospitals in
the quality of care model, this study uses heteroskedasticity-robust standard error
adjustment in the random effect (RE) model. Second, for quality of care models, there are
six pairs of individual PSIs regressions with different types of patient adverse events for
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients. In order to know whether the effects
of net Medicaid DSH estimates from different individual PSI regressions are jointly and
significantly different from zero, a chow test is conducted to deal with this concern. The
Chow test is an econometric test and is often used in program evaluation to examine
whether coefficient estimates in multiple linear regressions have an equivalent impact on
different population subgroups (Chow, 1960; Woodridge, 2006). Six individual PSIs data
are pooled together and then are analyzed by using random effect models with
heteroskedasticity robust standard error adjustment.27. After that, joint Wald tests are to
27

Since the composite PSI already combined different individual PSIs as one measure, the joint
test of chow test is test simultaneously significant for other six individual PSIs (i.e., PSI02, PSI06, PSI07,
PSI09, PSI12, and PSI15) for the net Medicaid DSH variables for Medicaid/uninsured and privately
insured separately.
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examine the effect of net Medicaid DSH payments on both Medicaid/uninsured and
privately insured separately. Finally, since several California hospitals experienced
ownership changes (i.e., hospital closure or ownership conversion) during the study
period, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to check if there is any difference resulting
from including or excluding these hospitals in the analysis. In the result section, this
study will report results from random effect models for six individual PSIs and one
composite PSI measure for Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured in separate tables.
Summary
This chapter covers the research design, data sources, variable measurements,
empirical specifications and analytical strategies used in this study. A research design of
pre and post quasi-experimental with control and treatment groups is used to examine the
research questions of interest. Unbalanced longitudinal data for California hospitals from
1996 to 2003 are utilzed to implement the reseach design. For the uncompensated care
models, this study mainly uses a fixed effect specification adjusted for heteroskedasticityrobust and intra cluster corrected standard errors. For the quality of care models, this
study uses random effect models with heteroskedasticity-robust standard error
adjustments to take into account unobserved hospital specific factors. The findings of this
study are presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the findings are discussed along with their
implications, limitations, and applications for the future research.

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

Chapter 5 discusses study findings after applying research methodologies
discussed in Chapter 4. Two major sections are presented, one for the uncompensated
care model and the second for the quality of care model. In each section, results for
descriptive analysis, regression models and sensitivity analysis will be reported.
Uncompensated Care Model
Results of Descriptive Analysis
Table 11 provides descriptive data on uncompensated care for two hospital groups
(DSH hospitals and non-DSH hospitals) both as a whole and by ownership types. DSH
hospitals are defined as those hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments. The 2003
data are adjusted for inflation using the 1996 consumer price index for medical care.
Looking first at DSH and non-DSH hospitals’ overall annual uncompensated care costs
and also the percent of uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses, DSH
hospitals provide about twice the uncompensated care as measured by costs as compared
to non-DSH hospitals. For the DSH hospitals overall, annual costs increase 19.8% to
$4.43 million in 2003 and the percent of expense devoted to uncompensated care also
increases from 4.64% to 4.88% of total hospital operating expenses. Non-DSH hospitals
overall, on the other hand, increase annual uncompensated care costs from $1.71 million
in 1996 to $2.35 million in 2003, but slightly decrease the percent of total hospital
expense devoted to uncompensated costs by 2003.
94
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Table 11. Average Uncompensated Care Expenses per Hospital by Hospital DSH and
Ownership Types
Annual Uncompensated Care Costs
(in million) a
Hospital Category

% of Uncompensated Care to Total
Operating Expenses

1996
($)

2003
($)

% Change

1996
(%)

2003
(%)

Difference
in %

DSH Hospitals c
Overall
Not-for-profit hospital
For-profit hospital
District hospitals
County hospitals

$3.69
5.00
0.85
0.52
5.71

$4.43
6.18
1.82
0.58
8.95

19.8%
23.8%
113.7%
11.7%
56.8%

4.64%
4.88
3.34
5.59
4.96

4.88%
5.11
4.61
4.18
5.49

+0.24
+0.23
+1.27
-1.41
+0.53

Non-DSH Hospitals
Overall
Not-for-Profit hospital
For-Profit Hospital
District Hospital
County Hospital b

$1.71
2.08
0.90
1.72
1.94

$2.35
2.78
1.38
1.98
-

37.0%
33.9%
53.2%
14.8%

2.96
2.63
2.71
4.56
8.89

2.87
2.59
3.04
3.83
-

-0.10
-0.03
+0.33
-0.73

Note:
a
All dollar values presented here are adjusted for inflation to 1996 dollars by the consumer price index for
medical care.
b
Only two study county hospitals were non-DSH hospitals in 1996; And, all study county hospitals were
DSH hospitals in 2003.
c
DSH hospitals are defined as those hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments. In the study sample,
the total number of DSH hospitals in 1996 is 79 and 104 in 2003; the total number of non-DSH hospitals
in 1996 is 261 and 200 in 2003.

Table 11 also reports changes in uncompensated care for study hospitals with
different ownership types between 1996 and 2003. These data suggest that not-for-profit
and county hospitals for the DSH and non-DSH categories generally provide higher
amount of uncompensated care as measured by costs than other types of hospitals.
Moreover, DSH and non-DSH district hospitals have higher percent of uncompensated
care costs to total operating expenses than other hospital types in 1996, though this
percent declines for these hospitals by 2003. In general, both DSH and non-DSH for-
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profit hospitals have a growth in the amount of uncompensated care as measured by costs
and by the percent of uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses.
Table 12 provides descriptive statistics on key variables in the analysis. These
data represented means and standard deviation across multiple years from 1996 to 2003
for two hospital groups (i.e., DSH hospitals and non-DSH hospitals). The means for
uncompensated care costs per year and percent of uncompensated care costs to total
operating expenses are consistent with the data presented in Table 12. The amount of
several variables (i.e., uncompensated care costs, net Medicaid DSH payment, Medicare
DSH payments and State and local governmental financial subsidies) reflects real dollar
amounts in millions that hospitals received in each year, adjusted for inflation to 1996
dollar using the consumer price index for medical care. In relation to the net Medicaid
DSH payment measures, the mean and standard deviation of this variable show a wide
range of values. Hospitals that receive higher amount of Medicaid DSH payments are
more often large safety net and teaching hospitals.
Results of Fixed Effect Models
Table 13 reports the sets of fixed effect results for uncompensated care models.
Corresponding to the econometric models discussed in Chapter 4, this study reports
model (1) without ownership and net Medicaid DSH interaction variables and model (2)
that includes ownership and net Medicaid DSH payment interactions. Both the analysis
of the uncompensated care costs in millions and the percent of uncompensated care costs
to total operating expenses are presented. The coefficient estimates for all explanatory
variables from the model (2) are consistent with the coefficient estimates from the
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Table 12. Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables: All hospitals and Al Study Years
DSH
Hospitals
Mean
SD
Uncompensated Care Provision
Uncompensated care costs per year (in
millions) a
Percent of uncompensated care costs to total
operating expense (%)
Governmental Financial Supports
Net Medicaid DSH payment (in millions) a
Medicare DSH payments (in millions) a
State and local governmental financial
subsidies (in millions) a
Market Characteristics (at county level)
Ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total population
Ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to
total population
Ratio of private HMO enrollees to total
population at MSA level
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Presence of public hospitals in county (%)
Presence of teaching hospitals in county (%)
Median household income (in 1000s)
Unemployment rate (%)
Poverty rate (%)
Hospital Characteristics
Full time and part time RN to staffed bed
Log of the number of hospital staffed beds
Proportion system affiliated
Proportion major teaching hospital
Proportion minor teaching hospital
Hospital Medicare share (%)
Proportion not-for-profit hospital
Proportion for-profit hospital
Proportion county hospital
Proportion district hospital
N ( Study Hospital Observations, 1996-2003 )

Non-DSH
Hospitals
Mean
SD

Overall
Hospitals
Mean
SD

4.39

6.23

1.92

2.45

2.63

4.08

5.06

3.20

2.90

2.19

3.52

2.70

4.97
3.42

16.49
3.65

0.00
1.74

0.00
2.82

1.43
1.97

9.12
12.65

6.60

22.95

0.10

0.41

2.22

3.17

17.81

5.67

15.93

5.72

16.47

5.77

7.42

5.24

5.87

5.10

6.32

5.19

42.65

18.26

41.09

20.09

41.53

19.59

0.23
20.60
31.73
36.51
7.11
1.95

0.22
22.80
20.05
7.28
3.68
5.87

0.31
17.82
27.08
38.17
6.60
2.35

0.26
19.91
22.15
7.92
3.30
6.07

0.29
18.62
28.42
37.69
6.75
2.24

0.25
20.82
21.66
7.78
3.42
6.01

1.20
5.04
0.56
0.09
0.20
35.05
0.36
0.30
0.22
0.12

0.58
0.82
0.50
0.28
0.40
16.47
0.48
0.46
0.41
0.32

1.38
4.90
0.67
0.04
0.07
46.05
0.61
0.26
0.00
0.13

0.63
0.86
0.47
0.19
0.25
13.84
0.49
0.44
0.07
0.34

1.33
4.94
0.64
0.05
0.11
42.89
0.54
0.27
0.07
0.13

0.62
0.85
0.48
0.22
0.31
15.46
0.50
0.44
0.25
0.33

732

1815

2547

Note:
DSH hospitals are defined as those hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments.
a
All dollar values presented here are adjusted for inflation to 1996 dollars by the consumer price index for
medical care.

98
Table 13. Fixed Effect Regression Models
Uncompensated care
costs (in millions)

Variables

Net Medicaid DSH payment (in millions)
Medicare DSH payments (in millions)
State and local governmental supports (in
millions)
Ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total population
Ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to
total population
HMO penetration at MSA level (%)
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Presence of public hospitals in county (%)
Presence of teaching hospitals in county (%)
Median household income (in 1000s)
Unemployment rate (%)
Poverty rate (%)
Full time and part time RN to bed
Log of the number of hospital staff beds
System affiliated
Major teaching hospital
Minor teaching hospital
Hospital Medicare share (%)
Hospital Medicare share (%) at post BBA
period
Interaction term of for-profit hospital and net
Medicaid DSH
Interaction term of county hospital and net
Medicaid DSH

(1)
without
ownership
interactions
0.0294**
(0.0131)
0.1718***
(0.0299)
0.0388
(0.0606)
-0.0523**
(0.0235)
0.0021
(0.0180)
-0.0105
(0.0074)
-0.4411
(0.6642)
0.0039
(0.0101)
-0.0041
(0.0078)
0.1059
(0.0642)
0.1955
(0.1485)
0.0095
(0.0170)
0.2946***
(0.1083)
0.6589***
(0.1778)
-0.0374
(0.0997)
4.2134**
(1.7287)
0.0327
(0.4372)
0.0044
(0.0062)
-0.0090
(0.0104)

(2)
with
ownership
interactions
0.0343*
(0.0205)
0.1714***
(0.0290)
0.0388
(0.0605)
-0.0525**
(0.0230)
0.0025
(0.0176)
-0.0106
(0.0074)
-0.4542
(0.6631)
0.0040
(0.0101)
-0.0041
(0.0078)
0.1061
(0.0639)
0.1951
(0.1498)
0.0094
(0.0171)
0.2933***
(0.1085)
0.6647***
(0.1790)
-0.0391
(0.0984)
4.2187**
(1.7166)
0.0299
(0.4466)
0.0044
(0.0063)
-0.0089
(0.0106)
-0.0103
(0.0360)
-0.0055
(0.0277)

Percent of
uncompensated care costs
to total operating
expenses (%)
(1)
(2)
without
with
ownership
ownership
interactions interactions
0.0120***
0.0223***
(0.0034)
(0.0073)
0.0542
0.0502
(0.0394)
(0.0375)
-0.0053
-0.0050
(0.0184)
(0.0182)
0.0211
0.0214
(0.0462)
(0.0468)
0.0035
0.0036
(0.0271)
(0.0263)
-0.0029
-0.0031
(0.0111)
(0.0110)
-1.3153*
-1.3293*
(0.6944)
(0.6953)
-0.0096
-0.0095
(0.0092)
(0.0091)
0.0066
0.0069
(0.0098)
(0.0098)
0.0474
0.0485
(0.0354)
(0.0354)
-0.0551
-0.0566
(0.0866)
(0.0872)
-0.0019
-0.0013
(0.0208)
(0.0211)
0.1538
0.1487
(0.0938)
(0.0941)
-0.0594
-0.0691
(0.3542)
(0.3550)
-0.3206**
-0.3351**
(0.1465)
(0.1477)
1.1483
1.1667
(0.7203)
(0.7193)
0.0276
0.0113
(0.3255)
(0.3190)
0.0003
0.0001
(0.0062)
(0.0062)
-0.0007
-0.0005
(0.0075)
(0.0076)
0.0397
(0.0311)
-0.0125
(0.0094)
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Table 13 (continued)
Uncompensated care
costs (in millions)

Variables

(1)
without
ownership
interactions

(2)
with
ownership
interactions
-0.8393***
(0.2691)

0.2643
(0.3742)
0.8083
(0.7211)
0.8793
(0.8254)
1.2279
(0.8278)
1.5222*
(0.8996)
1.4464*
(0.8636)
1.5873*
(0.8880)
-6.4446
(4.2092)

0.2634
(0.3748)
0.8046
(0.7201)
0.8742
(0.8266)
1.2260
(0.8280)
1.5240*
(0.9022)
1.4446*
(0.8619)
1.5868*
(0.8856)
-6.4641
(4.2198)

-0.0357
(0.3697)
0.1259
(0.5550)
0.0882
(0.5730)
0.1889
(0.5947)
0.1768
(0.5810)
0.1360
(0.5604)
0.3051
(0.5577)
2.2244
(2.4478)

-0.0341
(0.3749)
0.1108
(0.5558)
0.0707
(0.5747)
0.1733
(0.5999)
0.1693
(0.5842)
0.1280
(0.5605)
0.3080
(0.5577)
2.2482
(2.4431)

2540
0.0876
376

2540
0.0879
376

2540
0.0186
376

2540
0.0200
376

Interaction term of district hospital and net
Medicaid DSH
Year 1997
Year 1998
Year 1999
Year 2000
Year 2001
Year 2002
Year 2003
Constant

Observations
R-square
Number of Hospital
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.10

Percent of
uncompensated care costs
to total operating
expenses (%)
(1)
(2)
without
with
ownership
ownership
interactions interactions
-1.0127
(0.9219)

model (1). Given the study hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3 and the model specification
discussed in Chapter 4, the discussion below will focus on the fixed effect models that
include ownership interaction variables, model (2), in the Table 13.
The analysis of the explanatory variables associated with uncompensated care is
as follows. Looking first at the net Medicaid DSH payment variable which reflects the
impact of Medicaid DSH payments upon the behavior of not-for-profit hospitals, this
study finds a positive and marginally significant association (p=0.10) between net
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Medicaid DSH payment and uncompensated care costs and a positive and highly
significant association (p<0.01) between net Medicaid DSH payment and the percent of
uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses. This result suggests that not-forprofit hospitals may reduce their uncompensated care provision given the reductions of
Medicaid DSH payment they encountered during study years after controlling for
ownership and net Medicaid DSH payment interactions with not-for-profit hospital as
reference group. Other things being equal, the marginal effect of the net Medicaid DSH
payment indicates that an increase of one million dollars (in 1996 dollars) increases
uncompensated care costs by 0.0343 million dollars, and increases the percent of
uncompensated costs to total operating expenses in not-for-profit hospitals by 0.0223
percentage points in the not-for-profit hospitals. The findings for net Medicaid DSH
payments support the hypothesis H1 in this study.
In terms of other governmental financial subsidies, the positive coefficient for the
Medicare DSH payments (p<0.01) in the analysis of uncompensated care costs suggests
that hospitals provide more uncompensated care in response to an increase in Medicare
DSH payments during the study period. On the other hand, the results do not show a
significant relation between Medicare DSH payments and the percentage of
uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses. With respect to market
characteristics, the results suggest that expanding the ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total
population in a market would significantly reduce hospital uncompensated care costs
(p<0.05), but the expansion of the ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total population does not
have a significant effect on the percent of uncompensated care costs to total operating
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expenses. Contrary to expectations, the findings indicate that hospitals located in more
competitive markets had a higher percent of operating costs devoted to uncompensated
care (p<0.1). This result reflects the descriptive result presented in the Table 12 that DSH
hospitals, which are hospitals that provided a higher amount of uncompensated care, are
often located in markets with relatively lower market concentration (and thus higher
hospital competition) than non-DSH hospitals.
With respect to other hospital characteristics associated with the provision of
uncompensated care, the results indicate that hospitals that have more capacity (i.e.,
higher registered nurse to bed ratio, large bed size) would provide more uncompensated
care costs (p<0.01) but that capacity had no effect on the percent of uncompensated care
costs to total operating expenses. The result of the effect of hospital bed size on the
uncompensated care provision is consistent with Bazzoli et al. (2006). Hospital system
affiliation leads to lower uncompensated care costs as a percent of total operating
expenses (p<0.05) but no significant effect on the hospital uncompensated care costs.
Hospitals that became major teaching hospitals significantly increased their annual
uncompensated care costs (p<0.05) but not the percent of uncompensated care costs to
total operating expenses.
Given hypothesis 2 in this study, the coefficient estimate for the total effect of the
net DSH payment for for-profit hospitals on their uncompensated care costs is 0.024
(which is equivalent to 0.0343-0.0103) with a standard error equals to 0.0312 and a pvalue equals to 0.446. In addition, the coefficient estimate for the total effect of for-profit
hospitals on their percent of expenses devoted on uncompensated care is 0.062 (which is

102
equivalent to 0.0223+0.0397) with a standard error equals to 0.026 and a p-value equals
to 0.024. These results indicate that for-profit hospitals may not evidently change their
uncompensated care costs when faced with declining DSH payments. Instead, they may
decrease significantly in the percent of uncompensated care costs to total operating
expenses in response to a reduction in Medicaid DSH payments. However, compared to
not-for-profit hospitals, the overall findings for the interaction of for-profit hospitals and
net Medicaid DSH payment do not support hypothesis H2 that for-profit hospitals make
smaller cuts in response to Medicaid DSH reductions. The results also indicate that
compared to not-for-profit hospitals, district hospitals have smaller changes for their
uncompensated care costs (p<0.01) in response to the reduction of net Medicaid DSH
payments, but have no differential response when measured by the percent of total
operating expenses devoted in uncompensated care.
Additionally, the findings for annual year dummy variables indicate that,
compared to the provision of uncompensated care in 1996, hospitals significantly
increase uncompensated care costs in 2001, 2002 and 2003 (p<0.1) but not the percent of
uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses.
Sensitivity Analysis
Table 14 presents the results of several sensitivity analyses and compared the
coefficient estimates of the effect of Medicaid DSH payment on hospital provision of
uncompensated care with the original fixed effect model. Model (1) reports the
coefficient estimates of the net Medicaid DSH payment in the original fixed effect
models as reported in Table 14. Model (2) reports the coefficient estimates of net
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Table 14. Sensitivity Analysis for Alternative Model Specifications in Uncompensated Care
Models
Uncompensated care costs (in millions)
Model
Specifications

(1) a

(2) b

(3) c

Net Medicaid
DSH payment
(in millions)

0.0343*

0.0337

0.0327*

0.0223*** 0.0193***

(0.0131)

(0.0206)

(0.018)

(0.0073)

(0.0056)

0.0130
(0.0179)

0.0355*

Gross
Medicaid
DSH payment
(in millions)
Gross DSH
Intergovernm
ental Transfer
(in millions)
R-square
N

(4) d

Percent of uncompensated care costs to total
operating expense (%)
(1) a
(2) b
(3) c
(4) d

0.0879
2540

0.0882
2335

0.0539
2164

(0.0178)

0.0203**
*
(0.0059)

-0.0061
(0.0210)

-0.0083
(0.0071)

0.0928
2540

0.0200
2540

0.0165
2335

0.0217
2164

0.0199
2540

Note:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a
Model (1) is the original fixed effect model using net Medicaid DSH as dependent variable.
b
Model (2) is model (1) excluding hospitals that experienced ownership changes or closure during study period.
c
Model (3) is fixed effect model adjusting autocorrelation and used net Medicaid DSH as dependent variable.
d
Model (4) is fixed effect model using gross Medicaid DSH and gross DSH intergovernmental transfer variable.
All models were estimated using Stata software package SE 10.0 version.
*** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1

Medicaid DSH payment from a fixed effect model like that of Model (1) but excluding
hospitals that experienced ownership conversion or closure during the study years. Model
(3) reports the coefficient estimates of net Medicaid DSH payment of the fixed effect
model with the autocorrelation adjustment as discussed in Chapter 4. Model (4) reports
the coefficient estimates of gross Medicaid DSH payment and gross DSH
intergovernmental transfer, which are used to construct net Medicaid DSH payment in
the fixed effect models.
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Looking first at the analysis of uncompensated care costs, the coefficient
estimates do not change substantially across different alternative model specifications.
The coefficient estimates of net Medicaid DSH payment in Model (1) is 0.0343 (p=0.10),
0.0337 in Model (2), and 0.0327 (p<0.1) in Model (3). The coefficient estimates of gross
Medicaid DSH payment is 0.0355 (p<0.1) and gross DSH intergovernmental transfer is 0.0061. The number of hospital year observations in Model (1) and Model (4) is 2,540.
After excluding hospital observations that experienced ownership changes during study
years, the sample size falls to 2,335 for Model (2). In Model (3), the number of
observations from the fixed effect model with autocorrelation adjustments, as described
in the Chapter 4, dropped from 2,540 to 2,164. Smaller sample sizes obviously reduce the
degrees of freedom and make it more difficult to find significant results. The value of R
square for the different alternative model specifications is also reported in Table 14.
Likewise, as one can see the results of these sensitivity analyses for the percent of
uncompensated care costs to total operating expenses are similar to the results for the
uncompensated care costs.
Quality of Care Model
Results of Descriptive Analysis
Table 15 reports the total number of Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured
patient discharges at risk when constructing the selected PSIs from the study hospitals
during the study period from 1996 to 2003. The total number of patients at risk ranges
from about 0.72 to 3.1 million. Table 15 also presents the total number of study hospitalyear observations for each PSI measure included in this study.
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Table 15. Study Sample of Risk-Adjusted Patient Safety Indicators and Study Hospitals
All Study Hospitals
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs)

Total Number of
Patient discharges at
Risk, 1996-2003

Total Study HospitalYear Observation,
1996-2003

2,363,792
2,480,894
3,097,461
728,878

2,294
2,460
2,432
2,207

732,945

2,208

2,575,934

2,460

2,225,225
2,641,067
2,923,431
1,311,490

2,272
2,413
2,389
2,203

1,317,164

2,215

2,763,312

2,426

PSI Medicaid/Uninsured
PSI 02: Death in low mortality DRGs
PSI 06: Iatrogenic pneumothorax
PSI 07: Selected infections due to medical care
PSI 09: Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma
PSI 12: Postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep
vein thrombosis
PSI 15: Accidental puncture or laceration
PSI Privately Insured
PSI 02: Death in low mortality DRGs
PSI 06: Iatrogenic pneumothorax
PSI 07: Selected infections due to medical care
PSI 09: Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma
PSI 12: Postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep
vein thrombosis
PSI 15: Accidental puncture or laceration

Table 16 reports descriptive data on each study PSIs for Medicaid/uninsured and
privately insured for hospitals in two hospital groups (i.e., DSH hospitals and non-DSH
hospitals). DSH hospitals are defined as those hospitals that received Medicaid DSH
payments. The individual PSIs (i.e., PSI02, PSI06, PSI07, PSI09, PSI12, and PSI15) are
presented here as percentages for Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured for the
hospital, while the composite PSI (i.e., PSI Composite score) was a composite score for
Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured for the hospital. Higher numbers indicate
higher incidence of patient adverse events, namely worse quality outcome.
Similar to Table 12, Table 17 presents descriptive statistics on key variables in the
analysis for quality of care model. These data represent means and standard deviation for

Table 16. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables for Quality of Care Models
DSH Hospitals
Patient Safety Indicators (PSI)
PSI- Medicaid/Uninsured
PSI 02: Death in low mortality DRGs (%)
PSI 06: Iatrogenic pneumothorax (%)
PSI 07: Selected infections due to medical care (%)
PSI 09: Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma (%)
PSI 12: Postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein
thrombosis (%)
PSI 15: Accidental puncture or laceration (%)
PSI Composite score

Non-DSH Hospitals

Overall Hospitals
1996

2003 Differencea

0.005
-0.011
0.022
0.131

0.012
0.048
0.092
0.053

0.018
0.033
0.112
0.187

0.006
-0.015
0.020
0.135

0.379

0.163

0.233

0.387

0.154

0.241
0.973

0.224
0.977

-0.016
0.47%

0.223
0.963

0.198
0.953

-0.025
-1.08%

-0.005
-0.071
-0.053
0.173

0.028
0.048
0.093
0.062

0.018
0.040
0.100
0.215

-0.009
-0.008
0.007
0.153

0.026
0.055
0.098
0.059

0.017
0.029
0.088
0.216

-0.009
-0.026
-0.010
0.157

0.558

0.103

0.237

0.299

0.063

0.280

0.377

0.097

0.260
0.971

-0.078
-8.49%

0.409
1.067

0.469
1.068

0.059
0.05%

0.394
1.066

0.402
1.036

0.008
-2.79%

1996

2003 Difference

0.010
0.045
0.075
0.077

0.018
0.023
0.098
0.208

0.297

a

1996

2003 Difference

0.009
-0.022
0.024
0.130

0.012
0.049
0.097
0.046

0.017
0.038
0.119
0.177

0.403

0.106

0.216

0.166
0.930

0.147
0.905

-0.019
-2.74%

0.020
0.079
0.117
0.046

0.015
0.007
0.064
0.219

0.454
0.338
1.061

a

PSI-Privately Insured
PSI 02: Death in low mortality DRGs (%)
PSI 06: Iatrogenic pneumothorax (%)
PSI 07: Selected infections due to medical care (%)
PSI 09: Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma (%)
PSI 12: Postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein
thrombosis (%)
PSI 15: Accidental puncture or laceration (%)
PSI Composite score

Note:
a
For PSI02-PSI15, difference presented here is the difference in %; for PSI composite score, difference presented here is percentage change.
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Table 17. Descriptive Statistics of Study Explanatory Variables for Quality of Care
Models
DSH
Hospital
Mean
SD

Explanatory Variables

Governmental Financial Supports
Net Medicaid DSH payment (in millions) a

Non-DSH
Hospital
Mean
SD

Overall
Hospital
Mean
SD

4.97

16.49

0.00

0.00

1.43

9.12

3.42

3.65

1.74

2.82

1.97

12.65

6.60

22.95

0.10

0.41

2.22

3.17

17.81

5.67

15.93

5.72

16.47

5.77

7.42

5.24

5.87

5.10

6.32

5.19

42.65

18.26

41.09

20.09

41.53

19.59

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

0.23

0.22

0.31

0.26

0.29

0.25

Presence of for-profit hospitals in county (%)

0.18

0.15

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.16

36.51

7.28

38.17

7.92

37.69

7.78

Unemployment rate (%)

7.11

3.68

6.60

3.30

6.75

3.42

Poverty rate (%)

1.95

5.87

2.35

6.07

2.24

6.01

Full time and part time RN to bed

1.20

0.58

1.38

0.63

1.33

0.62

Log of the number of hospital staff beds

5.04

0.82

4.90

0.86

4.94

0.85

Proportion system affiliated

0.56

0.50

0.67

0.47

0.64

0.48

Proportion major teaching hospital

0.09

0.28

0.04

0.19

0.05

0.22

Proportion minor teaching hospital

0.20

0.40

0.07

0.25

0.11

0.31

35.05

16.47

46.05

13.84

42.89

15.46

Proportion hospitals located at urban area

0.90

0.30

0.88

0.33

0.88

0.32

Proportion hospitals that provide high-tech
services

0.25

0.44

0.28

0.45

0.27

0.44

Hospital all payer casemix index

0.94

0.22

1.06

0.28

1.03

0.27

Proportion not-for-profit hospital

0.36

0.48

0.61

0.49

0.54

0.50

Proportion for-profit hospital

0.30

0.46

0.26

0.44

0.27

0.44

Proportion county hospital

0.22

0.41

0.00

0.07

0.07

0.25

Proportion district hospital

0.12

0.32

0.13

0.34

0.13

0.33

Medicare DSH payments (in millions)

a

State and local governmental supports (in
millions) a
Market Characteristics (at county level)
Ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total
population
Ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to
total population
HMO penetration (%) at MSA level

Median household income (in 1000s)

Hospital Characteristics

Hospital Medicare share (%)

Note:
DSH hospitals are defined as those hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments.
a
All dollar values presented here are adjusted for inflation to 1996 dollars by the consumer price index for
medical care.
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multiple years from 1996 to 2003 for two hospital groups (i.e., DSH hospital and nonDSH hospital). The values of several variables (i.e., uncompensated care costs, net
Medicaid DSH payment, Medicare DSH payments and State and local governmental
financial subsidies) reflects real dollar amounts in millions that hospitals received in each
year, adjusted for inflation to 1996 dollars using the consumer price index for medical
care.
Results of Random Effect Models
Tables 18 and 19 present the results of random effects models for the six PSIs and
one PSI composite measure for Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured patients. To
recap the theoretical hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3, this study expects that reductions
in Medicaid DSH payment could result in a decrease in hospital quality of care for
Medicaid/uninsured patients. If quality of care is public good, there will be a similar
decrease in quality of care for privately insured patients. On the other hand, if quality of
care is private good, this study expects that reductions in Medicaid DSH payment may
result in an improvement or in no change in the quality of care for privately insured
patients. Given the primary interests of this study and the hypotheses discussed
previously, the results in Tables 18 and 19 should be reviewed simultaneously.
Overall, the results indicate a negative association between net Medicaid DSH
payments and individual and composite PSIs for Medicaid/uninsured patients and a
mixed effect of net Medicaid DSH payments for privately insured patients. Looking first
at the estimated impact of net Medicaid DSH payments on the quality of care for
Medicaid/uninsured patients, the findings while consistently negative are not particularly

Table 18. Random Effect Model Results for PSIs Measures for Medicaid/Uninsured
Medicaid/ Uninsured Patients

VARIABLES

Net Medicaid DSH payment (in millions)
Medicare DSH payments (in millions)
State and local governmental supports (in millions)
Ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total population
Ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total
population
HMO penetration at MSA level (%)
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Presence of for-profit hospitals in county (%)
Median household income (in 1000s)
Unemployment rate (%)
Poverty rate (%)
Hospital located in the urban area
Full time and part time RN to hospital staffed beds

PSI
Composite
measure

PSI 02
Death in
low
mortality
DRGs

PSI 06
Iatrogenic
pneumothorax

PSI 07
Selected
infections
due to
medical
care

PSI 09
Postoperative
hemorrhage
or hematoma

PSI 12
Postoperative
pulmonary
embolism or
deep vein
thrombosis

PSI 15
Accidental
puncture
or
laceration

-0.0009
(0.0006)
0.0011
(0.0026)
-0.0021***
(0.0005)
-0.0008
(0.0019)
-0.0011
(0.0014)
-0.0009*
(0.0005)
0.0741**
(0.0307)
-0.0001
(0.0004)
0.0003
(0.0014)
-0.0007
(0.0025)
-0.0038**
(0.0018)
0.0111
(0.0277)
-0.0097
(0.0078)

-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0000
(0.0007)
-0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0017
(0.0011)
-0.0011*
(0.0006)
0.0003
(0.0002)
-0.0257*
(0.0147)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0012
(0.0010)
0.0010
(0.0015)
-0.0014*
(0.0008)
-0.0172
(0.0115)
-0.0020
(0.0039)

-0.0002*
(0.0001)
0.0004
(0.0010)
-0.0002
(0.0001)
-0.0006
(0.0013)
-0.0004
(0.0009)
-0.0002
(0.0004)
-0.0022
(0.0185)
-0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0010)
0.0004
(0.0021)
-0.0004
(0.0013)
0.0100
(0.0237)
0.0010
(0.0050)

-0.0005*
(0.0003)
-0.0017
(0.0022)
-0.0010***
(0.0004)
0.0029
(0.0025)
-0.0028*
(0.0015)
0.0007
(0.0006)
0.0777*
(0.0415)
-0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0009
(0.0015)
-0.0015
(0.0020)
-0.0018
(0.0020)
-0.0039
(0.0310)
0.0024
(0.0080)

-0.0005
(0.0004)
0.0034
(0.0030)
-0.0006
(0.0004)
-0.0028
(0.0034)
0.0007
(0.0024)
-0.0009
(0.0011)
-0.1229**
(0.0555)
-0.0014**
(0.0006)
0.0010
(0.0022)
0.0024
(0.0048)
-0.0046*
(0.0024)
-0.0141
(0.0512)
-0.0228*
(0.0132)

-0.0003
(0.0006)
-0.0005
(0.0049)
-0.0011*
(0.0006)
-0.0017
(0.0056)
0.0008
(0.0032)
0.0022*
(0.0012)
-0.0962
(0.0869)
0.0001
(0.0009)
-0.0032
(0.0032)
-0.0046
(0.0061)
0.0069
(0.0044)
-0.1064*
(0.0567)
0.0359
(0.0260)

-0.0005*
(0.0003)
-0.0007
(0.0028)
-0.0008**
(0.0003)
-0.0026
(0.0033)
-0.0004
(0.0023)
-0.0020**
(0.0008)
0.0678
(0.0594)
0.0001
(0.0006)
0.0019
(0.0024)
0.0022
(0.0047)
-0.0061*
(0.0031)
-0.0030
(0.0493)
0.0334**
(0.0146)
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Table 18 (continued)
Medicaid/ Uninsured Patients

VARIABLES

Log of the number of hospital staffed beds
System affiliated
Major teaching hospital
Minor teaching hospital
Provide high-tech services
Hospital all payer casemix index
Hospital Medicare share (%)
Hospital Medicare share (%) at post BBA period
For-profit hospital
County Hospital
District Hospital
Year 1997

PSI
Composite
measure

PSI 02
Death in
low
mortality
DRGs

PSI 06
Iatrogenic
pneumothorax

PSI 07
Selected
infections
due to
medical
care

PSI 09
Postoperative
hemorrhage
or hematoma

PSI 12
Postoperative
pulmonary
embolism or
deep vein
thrombosis

PSI 15
Accidental
puncture
or
laceration

0.0013
(0.0096)
0.0100
(0.0108)
0.2730***
(0.0507)
0.0084
(0.0178)
-0.0093
(0.0123)
0.0960***
(0.0183)
-0.0005
(0.0005)
0.0004
(0.0005)
0.0142
(0.0131)
-0.0850***
(0.0295)
-0.0135
(0.0168)
-0.0568*
(0.0319)

-0.0026
(0.0045)
-0.0001
(0.0061)
0.0089
(0.0083)
0.0074
(0.0071)
-0.0016
(0.0063)
0.0360***
(0.0131)
-0.0004***
(0.0001)
0.0004
(0.0004)
0.0034
(0.0073)
-0.0050
(0.0139)
0.0060
(0.0106)
-0.0217
(0.0145)

0.0010
(0.0076)
-0.0004
(0.0081)
0.0232**
(0.0112)
0.0012
(0.0073)
0.0059
(0.0059)
0.0075
(0.0102)
0.0003
(0.0003)
-0.0002
(0.0004)
0.0136
(0.0105)
0.0003
(0.0140)
0.0019
(0.0185)
-0.0021
(0.0228)

0.0184*
(0.0104)
0.0117
(0.0100)
0.1057***
(0.0279)
0.0143
(0.0148)
-0.0195
(0.0129)
0.1046***
(0.0259)
0.0002
(0.0004)
-0.0001
(0.0005)
0.0124
(0.0144)
0.0222
(0.0318)
-0.0040
(0.0143)
-0.0282
(0.0337)

0.0032
(0.0200)
0.0264
(0.0204)
0.0610*
(0.0343)
-0.0148
(0.0197)
-0.0327*
(0.0176)
0.0340
(0.0384)
0.0006
(0.0011)
-0.0014
(0.0011)
-0.0220
(0.0217)
-0.0108
(0.0382)
0.0229
(0.0427)
0.0518
(0.0465)

0.0820***
(0.0269)
0.0081
(0.0368)
0.1842***
(0.0561)
0.0261
(0.0335)
-0.0409
(0.0316)
0.1006**
(0.0499)
-0.0006
(0.0013)
-0.0009
(0.0016)
0.0321
(0.0416)
-0.0679
(0.0554)
-0.0240
(0.0605)
0.1345*
(0.0719)

0.0265
(0.0175)
0.0289*
(0.0172)
0.0864**
(0.0342)
0.0237
(0.0269)
0.0194
(0.0179)
0.0407
(0.0290)
0.0000
(0.0013)
-0.0006
(0.0012)
0.0177
(0.0214)
-0.0515
(0.0333)
-0.0088
(0.0332)
-0.0969
(0.0600)
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Table 18 (continued)
Medicaid/ Uninsured Patients

VARIABLES

Year 1998
Year 1999
Year 2000
Year 2001
Year 2002
Year 2003
Constant

Observations
Number of Hospitals
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1
PSI indicates patient safety indicator.

PSI
Composite
measure

PSI 02
Death in
low
mortality
DRGs

PSI 06
Iatrogenic
pneumothorax

PSI 07
Selected
infections
due to
medical
care

PSI 09
Postoperative
hemorrhage
or hematoma

PSI 12
Postoperative
pulmonary
embolism or
deep vein
thrombosis

PSI 15
Accidental
puncture
or
laceration

-0.0613
(0.0395)
-0.0619
(0.0388)
-0.0738*
(0.0391)
-0.1043***
(0.0391)
-0.0774**
(0.0391)
-0.0833**
(0.0391)
0.9581***
(0.0984)

-0.0135
(0.0221)
-0.0283
(0.0198)
-0.0286
(0.0201)
-0.0190
(0.0192)
-0.0211
(0.0179)
-0.0283
(0.0176)
-0.0397
(0.0510)

0.0008
(0.0250)
-0.0008
(0.0249)
0.0083
(0.0262)
-0.0207
(0.0252)
-0.0015
(0.0254)
-0.0088
(0.0254)
0.0267
(0.0645)

-0.0123
(0.0410)
-0.0176
(0.0400)
-0.0188
(0.0430)
-0.0341
(0.0410)
0.0059
(0.0423)
-0.0044
(0.0388)
-0.2001*
(0.1071)

0.1160*
(0.0675)
0.1484**
(0.0669)
0.1288*
(0.0701)
0.0898
(0.0679)
0.1283*
(0.0743)
0.1304*
(0.0689)
0.1648
(0.1556)

0.1822*
(0.0961)
0.1842*
(0.0978)
0.2391**
(0.1066)
0.2328**
(0.1021)
0.2957***
(0.1058)
0.2619**
(0.1028)
-0.2023
(0.2358)

-0.0860
(0.0654)
-0.0544
(0.0652)
-0.0680
(0.0650)
-0.0944
(0.0653)
-0.0591
(0.0688)
-0.0980
(0.0651)
0.0953
(0.1796)

2418
363

2291
348

2457
367

2429
363

2204
338

2205
338

2457
367
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Table 19. Random Effect Model Results for PSIs Measures for Privately Insured
Privately Insured Patients
VARIABLES

Net Medicaid DSH payment (in millions)
Medicare DSH payments (in millions)
State and local governmental supports (in millions)
Ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total population
Ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total
population
HMO penetration at MSA level (%)
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Presence of for-profit hospitals in county (%)
Median household income (in 1000s)
Unemployment rate (%)
Poverty level (%)
Hospital located in the urban area
Full time and part time RN to hospital staffed beds

PSI
Composite
measure

PSI 02
Death in
low
mortality
DRGs

PSI 06
Iatrogenic
pneumothorax

PSI 07
Selected
infections
due to
medical
care

PSI 09
Postoperative
hemorrhage
or hematoma

PSI 12
Postoperative
pulmonary
embolism or
deep vein
thrombosis

PSI 15
Accidental
puncture or
laceration

-0.0001
(0.0004)
0.0012
(0.0035)
-0.0007
(0.0006)
-0.0004
(0.0023)
-0.0046***
(0.0017)
-0.0003
(0.0007)
0.0127
(0.0386)
-0.0004
(0.0005)
0.0013
(0.0018)
0.0027
(0.0034)
-0.0058**
(0.0025)
-0.0021
(0.0362)
0.0119
(0.0111)

-0.0007*
(0.0004)
0.0005
(0.0011)
0.0003
(0.0007)
0.0018
(0.0013)
0.0000
(0.0009)
0.0001
(0.0004)
0.0321
(0.0317)
0.0003
(0.0004)
-0.0001
(0.0007)
-0.0032**
(0.0016)
-0.0006
(0.0016)
0.0110
(0.0237)
-0.0086
(0.0062)

0.0005
(0.0003)
-0.0004
(0.0007)
0.0004
(0.0003)
-0.0007
(0.0010)
0.0001
(0.0006)
0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0192
(0.0191)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.0003
(0.0005)
0.0000
(0.0014)
-0.0013
(0.0013)
-0.0230
(0.0185)
0.0043
(0.0039)

0.0004
(0.0006)
0.0002
(0.0015)
-0.0002
(0.0005)
0.0027
(0.0017)
-0.0023**
(0.0011)
0.0004
(0.0004)
-0.0246
(0.0222)
0.0002
(0.0003)
0.0009
(0.0009)
-0.0010
(0.0019)
-0.0042**
(0.0018)
-0.0059
(0.0195)
0.0089
(0.0067)

-0.0010**
(0.0005)
0.0030
(0.0027)
-0.0012**
(0.0006)
-0.0047
(0.0037)
-0.0037
(0.0026)
0.0012
(0.0011)
-0.0670
(0.0578)
-0.0006
(0.0006)
-0.0003
(0.0022)
0.0082
(0.0057)
-0.0001
(0.0026)
-0.0304
(0.0585)
-0.0051
(0.0160)

-0.0042*
(0.0023)
0.0021
(0.0050)
-0.0022
(0.0016)
0.0076
(0.0048)
-0.0025
(0.0031)
0.0016
(0.0010)
-0.1046
(0.0713)
0.0005
(0.0008)
0.0027
(0.0026)
-0.0079
(0.0060)
0.0068
(0.0052)
-0.0715
(0.0666)
-0.0027
(0.0196)

-0.0004
(0.0005)
-0.0020
(0.0040)
-0.0012*
(0.0007)
-0.0036
(0.0048)
-0.0054**
(0.0026)
-0.0004
(0.0011)
-0.0260
(0.0820)
-0.0009
(0.0009)
0.0067**
(0.0029)
0.0162**
(0.0074)
-0.0100***
(0.0037)
-0.0694
(0.0799)
0.0558**
(0.0236)

112

Table 19 (continued)
Privately Insured Patients
VARIABLES

Log of the number of hospital staffed beds
System affiliated
Major teaching hospital
Minor teaching hospital
Provide high-tech services
Hospital all payer casemix index
Hospital Medicare share (%)
Hospital Medicare share (%) at post BBA period
For-profit hospital
County Hospital
District Hospital
Year 1997

PSI
Composite
measure

PSI 02
Death in
low
mortality
DRGs

PSI 06
Iatrogenic
pneumothorax

PSI 07
Selected
infections
due to
medical
care

PSI 09
Postoperative
hemorrhage
or hematoma

PSI 12
Postoperative
pulmonary
embolism or
deep vein
thrombosis

PSI 15
Accidental
puncture or
laceration

0.0398***
(0.0131)
0.0132
(0.0134)
0.1451**
(0.0642)
0.0219
(0.0241)
0.0155
(0.0145)
0.0914***
(0.0240)
-0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0004
(0.0006)
0.0248
(0.0176)
-0.1187***
(0.0336)
0.0012
(0.0214)
-0.0920**
(0.0420)

-0.0039
(0.0055)
0.0012
(0.0101)
0.0155
(0.0174)
0.0132
(0.0194)
0.0055
(0.0059)
-0.0039
(0.0166)
0.0003
(0.0004)
-0.0005
(0.0005)
-0.0084
(0.0088)
0.0125
(0.0269)
-0.0031
(0.0130)
-0.0268
(0.0292)

0.0110**
(0.0052)
-0.0010
(0.0049)
0.0268**
(0.0119)
-0.0026
(0.0055)
-0.0022
(0.0047)
0.0277***
(0.0066)
-0.0006
(0.0006)
0.0007
(0.0006)
0.0020
(0.0055)
-0.0259*
(0.0149)
0.0007
(0.0083)
-0.0359
(0.0261)

0.0004
(0.0086)
0.0094
(0.0095)
0.0599***
(0.0231)
0.0304**
(0.0122)
-0.0143*
(0.0084)
0.0829***
(0.0188)
0.0006
(0.0007)
-0.0003
(0.0007)
-0.0170
(0.0115)
-0.0172
(0.0224)
-0.0197*
(0.0113)
-0.0637*
(0.0347)

-0.0031
(0.0242)
0.0336
(0.0242)
0.0635*
(0.0379)
-0.0062
(0.0202)
0.0053
(0.0191)
0.0164
(0.0319)
0.0019*
(0.0010)
-0.0010
(0.0011)
-0.0076
(0.0254)
0.0018
(0.0511)
0.0299
(0.0424)
0.1586***
(0.0420)

0.0271
(0.0278)
0.0465
(0.0329)
0.1208
(0.0847)
0.0796**
(0.0389)
0.0070
(0.0227)
0.1440***
(0.0473)
-0.0001
(0.0016)
-0.0021
(0.0018)
0.0047
(0.0340)
0.1667
(0.1142)
-0.0019
(0.0492)
0.1058
(0.0713)

0.0614*
(0.0337)
0.0519*
(0.0267)
0.0082
(0.0467)
-0.0018
(0.0301)
0.0232
(0.0205)
0.0522
(0.0424)
-0.0012
(0.0014)
0.0008
(0.0014)
0.0672*
(0.0344)
-0.2643***
(0.0576)
-0.0125
(0.0493)
-0.1738***
(0.0662)
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Table 19 (continued)
Privately Insured Patients
VARIABLES

Year 1998
Year 1999
Year 2000
Year 2001
Year 2002
Year 2003
Constant

Observations
Number of Hospitals
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1
PSI indicates patient safety indicator.

PSI
Composite
measure

PSI 02
Death in
low
mortality
DRGs

PSI 06
Iatrogenic
pneumothorax

PSI 07
Selected
infections
due to
medical
care

PSI 09
Postoperative
hemorrhage
or hematoma

PSI 12
Postoperative
pulmonary
embolism or
deep vein
thrombosis

PSI 15
Accidental
puncture or
laceration

-0.1303***
(0.0490)
-0.1186**
(0.0497)
-0.1180**
(0.0489)
-0.1270***
(0.0490)
-0.1363***
(0.0488)
-0.1208**
(0.0490)
0.8163***
(0.1176)

-0.0025
(0.0233)
-0.0053
(0.0227)
-0.0023
(0.0237)
-0.0046
(0.0237)
-0.0108
(0.0213)
-0.0039
(0.0218)
0.0265
(0.0621)

-0.0692
(0.0468)
-0.0785*
(0.0466)
-0.0820*
(0.0460)
-0.0771*
(0.0465)
-0.0882*
(0.0460)
-0.0799*
(0.0456)
0.0670
(0.0874)

-0.0776*
(0.0421)
-0.0619
(0.0425)
-0.0579
(0.0428)
-0.0837**
(0.0427)
-0.0569
(0.0421)
-0.0603
(0.0423)
-0.0285
(0.0699)

0.2046***
(0.0647)
0.1815***
(0.0640)
0.2022***
(0.0653)
0.1853***
(0.0659)
0.2033***
(0.0664)
0.2285***
(0.0679)
-0.0025
(0.1648)

0.2266*
(0.1208)
0.1813
(0.1199)
0.1824
(0.1189)
0.1913
(0.1192)
0.2455**
(0.1201)
0.2908**
(0.1253)
-0.3092
(0.2197)

-0.2166**
(0.0991)
-0.1737*
(0.0996)
-0.1891*
(0.1005)
-0.0841
(0.0973)
-0.1734*
(0.1015)
-0.1556
(0.1046)
-0.0531
(0.2702)

2367
356

2259
343

2410
363

2386
360

2200
334

2204
334

2414
364
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statistically significant. Specifically, the results indicate that net Medicaid DSH payments
may marginally affect three studied PSI measures, including the percentage of patients
having iatrogenic pneumothorax adverse event (PSI 06) (p<0.1), the percentage of
patients having selected infections due to medical care (PSI 07) (p<0.1) and the
percentage of patients having accidental puncture or laceration (PSI 15) (p=0.1), but the
magnitudes of the effects are very small, ranging from a 0.0002 to a 0.0005 percentage
point increase per one million dollar decrease in net Medicaid DSH payment. As
discussed in Chapter 4, since there are many different types of patient adverse events,
Chow tests is conducted to test the null hypothesis that the effects of net Medicaid DSH
payments on all patient outcomes for Medicaid/uninsured patients are jointly zero. The
joint tests from individual PSIs (PSI02, PSI06, PSI07, PSI09, PSI12, and PSI15) yield a
chi-square value of 13.29 and a p-value equal to 0.0386. This joint test result suggests
that the net Medicaid DSH payments among the individual PSIs are significantly
associated with patient care, as estimated effect is uniformly of the same coefficient sign
this is interpreted to mean that increased Medicaid DSH payments increased quality of
care for Medicaid/uninsured patients.
With respect to the coefficient estimations of net Medicaid DSH payments for
privately insured patients, the results indicate that the directions of the impacts are mixed
but all those that are significant have a negative association between net Medicaid DSH
payment and patient safety for privately insured. Specifically, the findings indicate net
Medicaid DSH payments may marginally affect three studied PSI measures including the
percentage of patient death in low mortality DRGs (PSI02) (p<0.1), the percentage of
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patients having postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma (PSI09) (p<0.05), and the
percentage of patients having postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein
thrombosis (PSI12) (p<0.1), but the magnitude of effects are also very small, being in the
range from a 0.0007 to a 0.001 percentage point increase per one million dollar decrease
in net Medicaid DSH payment. Similarly, this study conducts a Chow test to test whether
these coefficients as a group are jointly equal to zero. The results yield a chi-square test
statistic equal to 14.30 with a p-value equal to 0.0264. The findings from this joint test
indicate that net Medicaid DSH payments may have weak impacts on individual PSIs for
the privately insured.
Although the results from joint tests indicate there is an association between net
Medicaid DSH payments and patient adverse events for both Medicaid/uninsured and
privately insured, the magnitude of the effects are very small. Moreover, because the
effects are not all evident across different PSI measures, the findings do not strongly
support the study hypothesis H3a or H3b.
In terms of PSI results for Medicaid/uninsured patients, consistent patterns of
effect are also not all evident for the explanatory variables across different PSI measures.
For example, higher values of PSI composite scores are associated with hospitals that:
receive fewer state and local governmental financial subsidies; are located in a market
with fewer populations below poverty level; are major teaching hospitals; or have a more
severely ill patient population. Greater rate of in-hospital deaths for low-mortality DRGs
(PSI02) is associated with hospitals that: are located in a market with lower ratio of
Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population; are located in a market with fewer
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populations below poverty level; or have a more severely ill patient population. Higher
rate of the incidence of iatrogenic pneumothorax (PSI06) is only associated with hospitals
that are major teaching hospitals. Greater rate of the incidence of selected infections due
to medical care (PSI07) is associated with hospitals that: receive fewer state and local
governmental financial subsidies; are located in a market with lower ratio of Medicaid
managed care enrollees to total population; had more staffed beds; are major teaching
hospitals; or have a more severely ill patient population. Higher rate of the incidence of
postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma (PSI09) is associated with hospitals that: are
located in a market with fewer populations below poverty level; or are major teaching
hospitals. Greater rate of the incidence of postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep
vein thrombosis (PSI12) is associated with hospitals that: receive fewer state and local
governmental financial subsidies; have more staffed beds; are major teaching hospitals;
or have a more severely ill patient population. Higher rate of incidence of accidental
puncture or laceration (PSI15) is associated with hospitals that: receive fewer state and
local governmental financial subsidies; are located in a market with fewer populations
below poverty level; or are major teaching hospitals. Other explanatory variables have
limited effects and also lacked consistent patterns across different PSIs measures for
Medicaid/uninsured patients.
With respect to the PSI results for privately insured patients, the results suggest
that higher values of PSI composite score are associated with hospitals that: are located in
a market with lower ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population; are
located in a market with fewer populations below poverty level; have more staffed beds;

118
are major teaching hospitals; or have a more severely ill patient population. In addition,
compared to not-for-profit hospitals, county hospitals have lower patient adverse events
as measured by PSI composite score. Higher rate of the incidence of iatrogenic
pneumothorax (PSI06) is associated with hospitals that: have more staffed beds; are
major teaching hospitals; or have a more severely ill patient population. In addition,
compared to not-for-profit hospitals, county hospitals also have lower rate of the
incidence of iatrogenic pneumothorax. Greater rate of the incidence of selected infections
due to medical care (PSI07) is associated with hospitals that: are located in a market with
lower ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population; are located in a
market with fewer populations below poverty level; are major or minor teaching
hospitals; or have a more severely ill patient population. Higher rate of the incidence of
postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma (PSI09) is associated with hospitals that: receive
fewer state and local governmental financial subsidies; or are major teaching hospitals.
Greater rate of the incidence of postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein
thrombosis (PSI12) is associated with hospitals that: are minor teaching hospitals; or have
more severely ill patient populations. Higher rate of incidence of accidental puncture or
laceration (PSI15) is associated with hospitals that: receive fewer state and local
governmental financial subsidies; are located in a market with lower ratio of Medicaid
managed care enrollees to total population; are located in a market with fewer population
below poverty level; or have more staffed beds. Other explanatory variables have limited
effects and also lacked consistent patterns across different PSIs measures for privately
insured patients.
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Sensitivity Analysis
As Table 20 presents, several sensitivity analyses are conducted and compared the
coefficient estimations of the effect of Medicaid DSH payment on hospital patient safety
indicators with the original random effect models. Model (1) reports the coefficient
estimates for the net Medicaid DSH payment variable in the original random effect
models as reported in Table 18 and Table 19. Model (2) reports the coefficient estimate
for the net Medicaid DSH payment variable after excluding hospitals that have ever
experienced ownership conversion or closure during study years. The results of this
sensitivity analysis indicate that the coefficient estimates of the effect of net Medicaid
DSH payment on hospital patient safety/ quality of care are robust to the presence of all
hospital observations.
Summary of Key Study Findings
In this chapter, the study findings for uncompensated care model and quality of
care model are presented. Given the research questions and theoretical hypotheses
discussed in the Chapter 3, one could see the results primarily focused on investigating
the association between net Medicaid DSH payments and hospital outcomes (i.e., hospital
uncompensated care provision and patient safety/ quality indicators). With respect to the
results from the uncompensated care model, the study findings support hypothesis H1,
which suggested that not-for-profit hospitals may reduce their uncompensated care
provision given the reductions of Medicaid DSH payment they encountered during study
years. Other things being equal, the marginal effect of the net Medicaid DSH payment
indicates that an increase of one million dollars (in 1996 dollars) increased

Table 20. Results for Sensitivity Analysis in Quality of Care Model
Medicaid/Uninsured
Dependent
variable\Key
Independent Variable

Privately Insured

Net Medicaid DSH
payment (in millions)

Net Medicaid DSH payment
(in millions)

Net Medicaid DSH
payment (in millions)

Net Medicaid DSH
payment (in millions)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

N

Coefficient

SE

N

Coefficient

SE

N

Coefficient

SE

N

Coefficient

SE

PSI Composite
measure

2418

-0.0009

(0.0006)

2223

-0.0010*

(0.0006)

2367

-0.0001

(0.0004)

2189

-0.0001

(0.0004)

PSI 02 Death in low
mortality DRGs

2291

-0.0001

(0.0001)

2116

-0.0001

(0.0001)

2259

-0.0007*

(0.0004)

2094

-0.0005*

(0.0003)

PSI 06 Iatrogenic
pneumothorax

2457

-0.0002*

(0.0001)

2258

-0.0002** (0.0001)

2410

0.0005

(0.0003)

2228

0.0004

(0.0003)

PSI 07 Selected
infections due to
medical care

2429

-0.0005*

(0.0003)

2231

-0.0006*

(0.0003)

2386

0.0004

(0.0006)

2202

0.0004

(0.0006)

PSI 09 Postoperative
hemorrhage or
hematoma

2204

-0.0005

(0.0004)

2035

-0.0005

(0.0004)

2200

-0.001**

(0.0005)

2040 -0.0013*** (0.0005)

PSI 12 Postoperative
pulmonary embolism
or deep vein
thrombosis

2205

-0.0003

(0.0006)

2036

-0.0001

(0.0006)

2204

-0.0042*

(0.0023)

2044

-0.004**

(0.0020)

PSI 15 Accidental
puncture or laceration

2457

-0.0005*

(0.0003)

2258

-0.0006** (0.0003)

2414

-0.0004

(0.0005)

2231

-0.0004

(0.0005)

Note: Model (1) represents the model including hospital observations that experienced ownership change or closure during study years.
Model (2) represents the models excluding hospital observations that experienced ownership change or closure during study years.
PSI indicates patient safety indicator. N represents hospital-year observations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1
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uncompensated care costs by 0.0343 million dollars and increased by 0.0223 percentage
points the fraction of uncompensated costs to total operating expenses.
In addition, these results indicated, compared to not-for-profit hospitals, for-profit
hospitals may not evidently have smaller cuts in their uncompensated care costs as well
as the percent of total operating expense devoted in the uncompensated care costs when
faced with declining DSH payments. The overall findings for the interaction of for-profit
hospitals and net Medicaid DSH payment do not support hypothesis H2.
Given the anticipated hypotheses for the effect of the reduction of net Medicaid
DSH payments on patient safety, although the results indicated there may be a weak
association between net Medicaid DSH payments and some study measures for patient
adverse events for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured, the magnitude of the
effects are very small and in some cases mixed. Moreover, because the effects are not all
evident across all PSI measures, the findings are inconclusive as regards study
hypotheses H3a and H3b.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

In response to the growing number of the uninsured in the U.S., general
approaches that state and federal governments take to address the problems are either to
reduce the number of uninsured individuals by expanding public insurance coverage or to
subsidize the cost of uncompensated care for health care providers (Weissman, 2005).
Medicaid DSH payments are one of the major funds that support health care providers, in
particular safety net hospitals, and help to offset their costs for providing care to lowincome patients. The public and policy makers have often expressed concerns that safety
net hospitals may reduce the medical care they provide to low-income patients when
faced with Medicaid DSH budget cuts.
This study examines the impact of changes in Medicaid DSH payments resulting
from the BBA health policy reform on hospital outcomes, while controlling for factors
such as other governmental financial subsidies, hospital and market characteristics. Two
hospital outcomes are examined: the provision of uncompensated care and quality of care
for Medicaid and uninsured patients. These two dimensions are important and need to be
monitored by policy makers and researchers in any health policy reform related to
medical care for the uninsured population. In Chapter 5, this study presented detailed
results for the uncompensated care model and quality of care model. Here the results are
summarized, the key findings interpreted, and implications discussed. Study limitations
and suggestions for future study are reviewed at the end of this chapter.
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Summary
Uncompensated Care Model
This study applied organizational economic theory of not-for-profit hospital
behavior and theoretical extensions from Newhouse (1970), Hoerger (1991), Frank and
Salkever (1991) and other researchers as a framework to examine the association between
the provision of uncompensated care and Medicaid DSH payments. Fixed effect models
are used as the major statistical technique to assess the research questions. Data for
California hospitals from 1996 to 2003 are examined. The study findings suggest that
not-for-profit hospitals reduce their provision of uncompensated care in response to
reductions in Medicaid DSH payments. Specifically, the marginal effect of the net
Medicaid DSH payment indicates that an increase of one million dollars (in 1996 dollars)
increases uncompensated care costs by $34,300 dollars, and increases by 0.0223
percentage points the percent of uncompensated costs to total operating expenses in notfor-profit hospitals.
The study results, however, do not support the hypotheses that for-profit hospitals
reduce uncompensated care by a smaller degree than not-for-profit hospitals for a
comparable DSH decline, as economic theory and previous study suggested (Banks et al.,
1997). It may because this study only studies one state and a particular Medicaid DSH
payment change. Future research is needed to examine whether public payment
generosity affect for-profit hospital uncompensated care provision from theoretical
perspectives.
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In addition to the key findings for net Medicaid DSH payments, this study also
finds several interesting results from the control variables. In terms of other governmental
financial subsidies, the study results suggest that reductions in Medicare DSH payments
negatively affected hospital uncompensated care provision and that the effect may be
larger than that for net Medicaid DSH payments. The results indicate that a $1 million
reduction in Medicare DSH payment (in 1996 dollars) is associated with a $171,400
dollar decline in hospital uncompensated care costs. The reason for the magnitude of
effects different between the changes in Medicare DSH payment and Medicaid DSH
payments on hospital uncompensated care may be because there are about 70% of study
hospitals receiving Medicare DSH payments but only about 30% of study hospitals
receiving Medicaid DSH payments. The effects will diminish statistically given the
relative small number of hospitals receive the payments. The study results also indicate
that one percentage point increase in the ratio of the Medicaid eligibles to total population
in a county would decrease uncompensated care costs by $52,500 dollars (in 1996
dollars). Moreover, the study findings suggest that hospitals with more capacity (i.e.,
more nurses per staffed beds, more staffed beds) and hospitals that became major
teaching hospitals have more capacity and ability to provide uncompensated care.
Quality of Care Model
This study applied organizational economic theory of not-for-profit hospital
behavior and theoretical extensions from Newhouse (1970), Hoerger (1991), Spence
(1975) and Dranove &White (1998) as frameworks to examine the association between
hospital quality of care and Medicaid DSH payments. Random effect models are used as
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the major statistical technique to assess the research questions. Data for California
hospitals from 1996 to 2003 are examined. The overall study findings do not provide
strong evidence to support an association between net Medicaid DSH payments and
patient adverse events for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured. The magnitude
of the effects are very small and only a few PSI measures have significant DSH effects
with most of these being only marginally significant (p<=0.1).
In addition to the key findings of net Medicaid DSH payments, this study also
finds several interesting findings from the control variables. For example, the study
findings suggest a consistent inverse association between patient safety/quality and state
and local governmental financial subsidies. This relation may arise because hospitals
used these non-patient care revenues (i.e., state and county tax appropriation, district
assessment revenue, and donations and subsidies for indigent care) to improve hospital
infrastructure, for example, by investing in up-to-date equipment to improve technology
efficiency or by replacing semi-private rooms to single private room to lower the chance
of the spread of infection, and in turn to maintain the quality of care (Bazzoli et al.,
2008). Additionally, the study results indicate that hospitals located in a market with a
higher ratio of Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population generally have better
patient safety/quality. This may be because California State required managed care plans
and health providers to meet certain standards (Holahan, Zuckerman, Evans, &
Rangarajan, 1998). California State expanded Medi-Cal managed care during these study
years. Medi-Cal managed care was implemented on a county-by-county basis through a
combination of voluntary and mandatory managed care plans. In order to assure quality
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of care, California State established mechanisms to monitor managed care plan
performance and quality of care as well as access to care for Medi-Cal beneficiaries
(Bindman, Chattopadhyay, Osmond, Huen, & Bacchetti, 2005; Holahan et al., 1998).
One study examined the impact of Medi-Cal managed care on the hospitalization rates
due to ambulatory care sensitive conditions and found Medi-Cal managed care is
associated with a large reduction in the hospitalization rate, compared to Medicaid feefor-service (Bindman et al., 2005). Consistent with Bindman et al. (2005) study, the
results from this study suggest that Medi-Cal managed care is associated with a lower
incidence of hospital adverse events for both Medicaid/uninsured and privately insured
patients. Moreover, the study findings suggest that hospitals with more staffed beds,
major teaching hospitals, and hospitals that had a more severely ill patient population
have higher incidence rates of patient adverse events.
Limitations of this Study
As with any study, this research has limitations that must be acknowledged. First,
due to the lack of comparable data on key study variables across other states, this study
only examined hospitals in California. The results may not be generalizable to other
states. Second, this study conducts a pre-and-post design that covered the study period
between 1996 and 2003 in order to capture the specific impact of Medicaid DSH payment
cuts resulting from the BBA on hospital outcomes. However, other policy reforms (i.e.,
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which was effective in 1995) that
capped the expansion of Medicaid DSH expenditures in early 1990s may have had some
residual historical effects on hospital outcomes for the study years (i.e., 1996 and 1997)
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covered in this study. This historical threat may affect the internal validity of this study
results. Third, the data used to construct quality measures (i.e., PSIs) were based on the
administrative data, which may not capture all patients’ detailed risk factors. In addition,
this study uses only patient safety indicators to measure hospital quality of care. There
are other types of quality measures that can be used in this kind of study, such as patient
mortality, length of stay, or hospital readmissions. Despite its shortcomings, the study
results do provide some important implications for health policy and practice.
Implications of the Findings
Implications for Health Policy
With respect to the current U.S. health care reform, one of the approaches that
Congress and the Obama administration will use to finance health coverage involves
Medicaid DSH and Medicare DSH payments.28 The basic idea is to reallocate these funds
that currently go to safety net providers for providing uncompensated care to instead
finance comprehensive health care reform (Berenson et al., 2009; McKethan, Nguyen,
Sasse, & Kocot, 2009). To find an optimal solution for covering more Americans over
the next ten to twenty years, policy makers need to consider many factors simultaneously
because when one factor changes, others might be affected subsequently.
This study provides empirical results regarding the magnitudes of the association
between the changes of hospital uncompensated care provisions and other policy factors
(i.e., Medicaid and Medicare DSH payments, and the ratio of Medicaid eligibles to total

28

More detailed information on the health reform law can be found at:
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/housesenatebill_final.pdf. Among the reform items, the ways to
finance health reform plan are listed in the last two pages. (Access Date: 01March.2010).
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population). If Medicaid covers more low-income uninsured after universal health
reform, hospitals may no longer need to provide free care and thus the hospital provision
of uncompensated care will decline. Hospitals, in turn, receive guaranteed payment
revenue from payers like Medicaid for caring for low-income patients. In this regard, it
would make sense for proposed health reform policy to redirect the Medicaid and
Medicare DSH payments that originally fund hospitals to provide such care to lowincome patients and to cover the universal health insurance coverage.
However, a concern may arise during the transition to health reform as Hsieh,
Clement, & Bazzoli (2010) discussed in their paper, “… If there is a regulatory mandate
requiring individuals to obtain health insurance, it will not immediately solve the issue of
the uninsured and hospital uncompensated care.” Traditionally, safety net hospitals play
important roles in providing high-cost and potentially unprofitable services and care for a
disproportionate share of the low-income population. Therefore, they mostly rely on the
Medicaid and Medicare DSH to offset the unreimbursed costs of these services. If safety
net funds that originally are used to support safety net providers decrease immediately,
safety net providers may be adversely affected because they will still need to take care of
low-income patients who are not insured and do not have sufficient financial support for
health care during the transition period to universal coverage. If that is the case, policy
makers need to carefully address the size of budget cutbacks to safety net funds because
these cuts may harm the financial condition of safety net providers and their continuing
ability to treat low-income, uninsured individuals during the transition.
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In addition, reductions in safety net funding may affect not only the provision of
hospital uncompensated care but also other hospital outcomes (i.e., quality of care).
Although this study does not find substantial evidence suggesting that reductions in
Medicaid DSH payment after the BBA had a negative impact on hospital quality of care
for either Medicaid/uninsured or privately insured patients, future research is necessary to
continuously monitor hospital quality of care when healthcare reform is implemented.
Policy makers may need to collect better patient safety and quality indicators in order to
have a better sense of the effect of hospital finances on the quality of care provided to
patients.
Another issue may also arise in relation to community benefit requirements of
not-for-profit hospitals after comprehensive healthcare reform is implemented(Bazzoli,
Clement, & Hsieh, 2010). Currently, the revised IRS 990 tax-exempt form requires
hospitals to report the dollar amount of community benefit provided (namely, charity
care, uncompensated care and Medicaid shortfalls). After comprehensive healthcare
reform, hospitals may no longer have much charity care or uncompensated care, but may
provide more care to Medicaid patients, policy makers may need to rethink what
activities constitute community benefits in relation to tax exempt status of not-for-profit
hospitals once health reform is implemented.
Implications for Practice
A major uncertainty confronting hospitals currently is the types of changes that
will result from upcoming comprehensive healthcare reform. If safety net funds from
Medicaid and Medicare DSH are reallocated to fund comprehensive health coverage,
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organizations originally receiving state and federal subsidies for uncompensated care may
no longer receive this assistance. Hospital managers and administrators, in particular
those associated with safety net providers, need to understand their environment and
estimate the possible reductions in safety net funding they may experience. For example,
hospital managers need to continue to collect and analyze information on the amount of
uncompensated care they provide, how many state and federal subsidies they receive for
supporting such care and what the historical Medicaid payment rate for Medicaid patients
has been. Using such data, hospital managers may anticipate possible scenarios and
conduct sensitivity analyses regarding the simultaneous impacts of reduced Medicaid and
Medicare DSH as well as expanded Medicaid coverage for the uninsured on hospital
financial performance. It will be helpful for hospitals to adjust and reallocate available
resources when they have a better idea of potential future scenarios.
In addition, although the study results do not strongly support that reductions in
Medicaid DSH payment after the BBA had a negative impact on hospital quality of care
for either Medicaid/uninsured or privately insured patients, hospital managers still need
to continuously monitor hospital quality of care.
Suggestions for Future Study
As discussed previously, this study examines only California hospitals to assess
the impact of Medicaid DSH payment changes resulting from the BBA policy changes on
the provision of hospital uncompensated care and quality of care. If Medicare and
Medicaid DSH payment will be reallocated to fund comprehensive healthcare reform,
future studies are needed, including:
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(1) To examine what effects of the reduction in safety net financial subsidies will have on
safety net hospitals’ financial conditions in the short-run and in the long-run after
comprehensive health reform is implemented;
(2) To examine what effects of the reductions in safety net financial subsidies will have
on safety net hospitals’ quality of care in the short-run and in the long-run after
comprehensive health reform is implemented;
(3) Given the results of qualify of care models, the patient safety indicators may not be
sensitive to capture the quality of care for low-income population. Future research are
needed to examine quality indicators that are more sensitive to care received by
Medicaid and uninsured patients, such as births or birth complication.
Conclusions
Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment is one of the major
funding sources that hospitals used to offset part of their uncompensated care costs since
early 1990s. This payment scheme has been revised in many prior health reforms such as
the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991,
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.
Medicaid DSH payments may be eliminated in the future if funding is redirected towards
support of health care reform provisions. In other words, if there is universal coverage in
the U.S., the main purpose of these payments may no longer be necessary. Nevertheless,
during the transition from the old to new system, it is necessary to study the effects of the
transition and so that the best health policy decisions can be made.
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